Disinvestments in Selected Public Undertakings in India: Problems and Prospects by Shujaat, Mariam
DISINVESTMENTS IN SELECTED PUBLIC 
UNDERTAKINGS IN INDIA: PROBLEMS 
AND PROSPECTS 
/ 
ABSTRACT^ 
. THESIS 
SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF 
Mottov of $t)ilo2;optip I 
i ' ECONOMICS 
MARIAM SHUJAAT 
Under the Supervision of 
PROF. ASHOK MITTAL 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 
AUGARH MUSUM UNIVERSITY 
AUGARU (INDIA) 
2010 
ABSTRACT 
Soon after becoming an independent country, the planners adopted strategies for a self reliant 
and economically independent India. It called for heavy investment in infrastructure hence the 
concept of Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) emerged. Since 1947 these PSUs have been 
playing a major role in Indian economy; but they did not perform as expected in a corporate 
world. The scholars were and still are divided on the performance measures of PSUs. Some 
maintain that the PSUs were not established to generate revenue or make surplus but to serve 
the society while the other argue that PSUs have no right to waste the hard earned money of 
tax payers. The debate continued and the government in the year 1991 started opening up its 
economy and giving up protection to PSUs in some form or the other. It started taking out 
some of its share and selling it to public, generally termed as disinvestment. 
The researcher made an attempt to find out if the disinvestment resulted in the desired 
objective or not. the performance of PSUs after the disinvestment and has used established 
measures of financial performance like ratios, return on assets, return on investment and other 
similar financial indicators to arrive at conclusions. 
The thesis has been divided into seven chapters. First chapter provides background and 
evolution of Public Sectors Undertakings in India. It is followed by the contribution of PSUs in 
Indian economy and history of PSUs. Thereafter, a brief description of methodology for 
disinvestment has been discussed. In Chapter II background of disinvestment and the need for 
disinvestment, rationale for disinvestment and major Policy Guidelines have been discussed. 
These guidelines include bidding procedures, global scenario and World Bank Guidelines. The 
important features of Disinvestment Commission have also been discussed in this chapter. 
In Chapter III survey of literature has been provided. This section, first explain how has the 
survey of literature been organised and then it talks about economic and political issues and the 
historical perspective. Governments at central level ahs played major role in the disinvestment 
process. Some goverrmients have supported the move while some have opposed. Accordingly 
the pace with which disinvestment drive has moved reflects the form of government and its 
thinking. Hence the disinvestment during the period of various governments has been 
discussed in details. The period, importantly includes Congress led government, United Front 
Government Period and BJP Government Period. The chapter also discusses post sale related 
issues of select PSUs and post closing adjustments. This has enabled the researcher to identify 
the research gaps. At the end of this chapter summary of literature review has been provided. 
In chapter IV the Research Methodology ahs been discussed. It includes introduction to 
research methodology, statement of problems and objectives of study, sampling procedure and 
justification of the sample, hypotheses and testing procedure, methodology of data collection, 
analysis and presentation. Chapter V analyses problems and prospects of disinvestment, major 
issues, and employees related issues and legal issues. In chapter VI, critical analysis of 
prospects of disinvestment has been discussed. Economic analyses of select PSUs, critical 
analysis of select PSUs and major problems resulting from disinvestment have been discussed. 
Thereafter hypotheses have been tested using appropriate tools. In chapter VII, conclusion and 
suggestions have been given. 
Brief account of each chapter is given below. 
Introduction: 
In pre-independence era, there were hardly any "Public Sectors" in our economy. Indian 
Railways, The Post & Telegraph, The Port Trust, The Ordnance and the Aircraft Factories and 
a few more Government controlled undertakings were there in the name of PSUs. After 
independence, India adopted the road of plaimed economic development through Five year 
plans. In this India opted for dominance of the Public Sector firmly believing that political 
independence without economic self-reliance would not enable the Government to fulfill the 
aspirations of the countrymen. The passage of Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 and 
adoption of socialist pattern of society as the national economic goal of the country bulk the 
foundation of the dominant public sector as we see it today. It was believed that a dominant 
public sector would reduce the inequality in the distribution of income and wealth and advance 
the general prosperity of the nation. During all five year plan periods the PSUs emerged as 
major economic entities of the country. The investment in public sector enterprises grew from 
Rs. 29 Crore in 5 PSU on 01.04.1951 to Rs.2,52,554 Crores in 240 PSUs on 31.03.2000 and to 
the tune of Rs. 5,55,740 crores in 2009. This shows how important PSUs were for the 
government. 
Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs), were given a special role in India's planned economy, 
grew both in terms of numbers and investment for over four decades from the early 1950s. At 
the commencement of the First Five Year Plan there were five PSUs with a total investment of 
Rs. 29 crores. At the end of the Seventh Plan inl990; there were 244 PSUs and the investment 
in them had gone up to Rs. 99,329 crores. Although disinvestments had started from the early 
1990s, at the end of the Eighth Plan in 1997, investment had soared to Rs.213,610 crores. At 
the end of the fiscal year 2000-01, PSUs had a total investment of Rs.274,114 crores. The 
PSUs made a significant contribution to industrial production, 100 percent in lignite, over 80 
per cent in coal, crude oil and zinc, almost 50 percent in aluminum and over 30 per cent in 
finished steel. 
In terms of profitability, the PSUs showed diverse patterns. In 2000-01, 122 enterprises made a 
profit with the top 10 among them - giants such as the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation 
(ONGC), the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC), the Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) 
and the Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited (VSNL) - accounting for close to 70 per cent of the 
total net profit of Rs.l9, 604 crores. Sector-wise, petroleum, power and communications 
contributed to 60 per cent of the profits. During that year, there were 111 loss-making 
enterprises with a total loss of Rs. 12,839.00 crores. 
The major contributors to the losses were Hindustan Fertilizer, the Fertilizer Corporation of 
India (FCI), Bharat Cooking Coal, and some other enterprises dealing with coal. The return on 
investment of all PSUs taken together remained low - post-tax profitability being only about 5 
per cent on capital employed. According to reports "The public sector in India, which was 
perceived to be the vehicle of speedy economic development, has run into rough waters. It not 
only failed to produce surpluses which it was expected to generate for future growth, but the 
return on investment remained poor. "The question that is examined is whether disinvestment 
and privatisation can lead to better results." 
Disinvestment Background and rationale: 
As the PSUs did not result in desired objective as perceived by many, and also the economy at 
international level was opening up, the government started the process of loosing some of its 
control on PSUS by disinvesting and giving part of ovraership to private persons. Looking at 
the year 1970 the performance of most of the public enterprises was far below the expectations. 
The weakness and defects of public enterprises started manifesting with grave danger to 
Government and economy in many countries, with no solution in sight. By the mid 1980 
globally the political opinion was veering round to the view that the proportion of GNP due to 
Government economic activity should be reduced to the extent possible and business activities 
should be left to private sector as far as possible. During the 1980s, collapse of the socialist 
economy of the Soviet Block, introduction of economic reforms by Russia, East European 
countries and China knocked the bottom out of protagonists of Government intervention in 
every commercial activity for the benefit of the masses. The Industrial policy of 1991 started 
the process of delicensing and except 18 industries. Industrial licensing was withdrawn. The 
market was opened up to domestic private capital and foreign capital was provided free entry 
up to 51 % equity in high technology areas. The aim of economic liberalisation was to enlarge 
competition and allowing new firms to enter the market. Thus the emphasis shifted from PSEs 
to liberalisation of economy and gradual disinvestment of PSEs. When the crises of foreign 
debt services was at its peak, a paradigm shift of Goverrmient's economic policy orientation 
originated in 1991 which was a turning point in this regards. 
Because of the current revenue expenditure on items such as interest payments, wages and 
salaries of Government employees and subsidiaries, the Government was left with hardly any 
surplus for capital expenditure on social and physical infirastructure. Whereas the Government 
should have been spending on basic education, primary health and family welfare, huge 
amounts of resources are blocked in several non-strategic sectors such as hotels, trading 
companies, consultancy companies, textile companies, chemical and pharmaceutical 
companies, consumer goods companies, etc. Not only this - the continued existence of the 
PSEs was forcing the Govenmient to commit fiirther resources for the sustenance of many non-
viable Public Sector Enterprises. 
Because of burgeoning revenue deficit in Central budget year after year on account of current 
revenue expenditure on items such as interest payments, wages and salaries of Government 
employees and subsidies, the Govenunent was left with hardly any surplus for capital 
expenditure on social and physical infrastructure. Huge amount of public resources were 
blocked in several non-strategic PSEs giving meager return Govenmient is forced to commit 
ftirther resources for sustenance of many non viable PSEs in absence of exit route. Above all it 
had to service huge amount of outstanding debt before any money was available for 
investment in infrastructure. All these Government economic woes led to an obviously straight 
forward option of divestment of Government stake in PSEs. 
Various methods of disinvestment were devised and adopted by the government. Among others 
it included policies on selection of bidders, determination of reserve price, offer for sale, sale 
of residual equity by the auction method, strategic sale, offers for sale, auction method and 
valuation. 
A very important development that took place in this direction was the constitution of 
Disinvestment Commission which made many recommendations through its various reports. 
It suggested Strategy and Issues in its report submitted in December, 1996, while underlining 
the importance of the subject of valuation, discussed three basic approaches to valuation like 
Discounted Cash flow (DCF), Relative valuation and Net asset value. 
Survey of Literature; 
Articles, research papers, reports from various committees including those tabled in the 
parliament, news paper reports and debates in both houses of parliament have been studies to 
cover the work done by other researchers in this area. In all 166 such references have been 
quoted. In this chapter efforts have been made to study the research work of various scholars 
on the subject. The study also includes refereed journals, books, news papers and periodicals 
and business magazines such as the Business Standards and Business Today. Political 
commentary from various sources including the library of the parliament and other sources 
have been scanned. A perusal of work done by the learned scholars shows that much has been 
researched on contribution of public sectors, pros and cons of having them in the economy or 
not. The social aspect of their existence too has been elaborated. But the effect of 
disinvestment on sectors has not been quantitatively measured like in which direction their 
stocked moved. What was the impact on their Price Earning Ratio and for that matter on many 
financial parameters which are considered as nerves of any organization? Hence the researcher 
thought it fit to study this rather less explored area and efforts have been made in this 
direction. 
The articles reviewed by the researcher so far more or less confirm that no study has been 
conducted to find out the effect of disinvestment fi-om financial angle especially with 
reference to improvement in ratio as a measure of financial analysis. Hence the researcher 
could find a research gap which has been tried to be filled in through this research. How has 
the researcher tried to fill in this gap, has been done has been discussed in the subsequent 
chapter on research methodology. 
Research methodology: 
Survey of literature has established that there exists a gap in the researches carried out by various 
learned scholars. Majority of them have heavily relied on the theatrical construct and financial 
information of the firms has rarely been sued to measure the effect of disinvestment. Adequate 
efforts have not been made to find out what happened in the market prior to the announcement of 
disinvestment and after the announcement. Following objectives were outlined for this research, 
(i) To study and measure the profitability of PSUs after and before disinvestment 
using ratio as a measure in analysis in general and ratio analysis of specific 
sectors 
(ii) To study the return on total assets pre and post disinvestment 
(iii) To study the return on Capital Employed of PSUs 
(iv) To study the return on shareholder's equity of PSUs 
(v) To study the Return on Investment (ROI) of PSUs in pre and post disinvestment 
scenario 
(vi) To test the hypothesis in respect of above and conclude 
The problems and prospects of disinvestment in PSUs can be studied from many angles. One 
can conclude based on the related researches conducted in the area and the critical analysis of 
experts reported in various journals, news papers and government reports. However, relying 
on the published figures in the form of audited financial statements and drawing conclusion 
from theses figures in the form of accepted financial analysis methods have been considered 
as objective basis of arriving at conclusion. Hence the present research in general aims at 
making profitability analysis of selected Indian Public Sector Enterprises - before and after 
disinvestment. It takes into account the 'impact of economic reforms measures introduced by 
the Government of India and aims at examining the operational efficiency and profitability of 
selected Indian Public Sector and to explain the trends in profitability of the select Indian 
Public Sector in pre and pot disinvestment scenario. 
Data was collected fi"om one sources and that is secondary. The main theoretical source has 
been the RBI annual reports, FEMA / FERA Acts, RBI Bulletins, Disinvestment Manuals, 
Annual Reports of Companies, CMIE publications. Economic Survey, Budget, News letters of 
Banks, Occasional papers from RBI economic department, Research papers published in 
various magazines, Trade Journals, News papers clippings, Text Books on International 
Financial Management the government reports. Main source for financial information has 
been the annual reports of the sectors studied. 
Database: Information was collected from the PROWESS database for financial ratios and 
also from "Database of BSIOOO, India's Corporate Giants" published by Business Standard 
in December 2007. It is the research study of top 1000 companies of India by the Business 
Standard magazine. Quota sampling is used for selection of sample size. The population is first 
segmented into mutually exclusive sub-groups and then the chosen were Textiles, Engineering, 
Pharmaceuticals, Chemicals, Consumer durables. Automobiles, Cement, Steel and Information 
Technology. Then, judgement is used to select the top 10 units/companies from each segment 
based on the assumption that top companies would be engaged in active management of foreign 
exchange exposure and expected to get proper responses to the questioimaire. It is this second 
step, which makes the technique one of non-probability sampling. The advantages of quota 
sampling are the speed with which information can be collected, the lower cost of doing so and 
the convenience it represents. (Business Standard, December 2007) 
Hoi: Post disinvestment PSUs have not made desired progress 
H02: Post disinvestment return on profitability of PSUs has not improved 
H03: Post disinvestment return on capital employed of PSUs has not improved 
H04: Post disinvestment return on equity of PSUs has not improved 
H05: Post disinvestment return on investment of PSUs has not improved 
After financial statements were collected, important ratios were calculated taking pre and 
post disinvestment scenario. The important ratios have further been analysed for specific 
sectors. Based on the calculation of ratios and the resuh thereof, the hypothesis have been 
tested and presented. 
Having calculated the ratios of select PSU in the pre and post disinvestment scenario, statistical 
tests were applied to ascertain if the findings truly reflect the changes or these are by chance 
only. The relevant tests in this regards are F Ratios and their significance has been tested at 
95% level of confidence. First the effect has been measured then tested sector-wise. In most the 
cases the results have been tested on monthly basis too. 
Analysis 
The PSU disinvestment programme, to begin with, merely attempted to raise revenue for the 
government as a part of a soft option to contain its fiscal deficit from becoming unmanageable. 
The stock market in India has not been an effective instrument to raise investment resources for 
private business enterprise let alone public sector investment. There are few takers in the 
Indian private corporate sector who are in a position to take advantage of PSU disinvestment. 
They are neither Avilling nor able to take over the management even profitable PSUs. They do 
not have the funds, technological tools or management skills for rurming the giant industrial 
and contmiercial imdertakings in the public sector. 
The ability of the PSUs to face up to the hostile competition posed by the TNCs has thus been 
crippled. The position of not only PSUs but of even the private Indian domestic corporations 
has also been gravely weakened. This has helped the TNCs to maximise the profitability of 
their operations in India and take over the PSUs cheaply. The sale of the equity of the Gas 
Authority of India and the sale of the Modem Foods company in the public sector by the 
Hindustan Lever a subsidiary of Lever Brothers, a TNC and the privatisation of the 
management of Indian Airlines emphasizes this position very well. 
Disinvestment schemes devised from time to time to raise substantial revenues for the 
government by selling the equity of PSUs has obviously lost its charm for the self-styled 
economic reformers in the government of India, according to Najudappa (1998) The idea of the 
creation of a "special purpose vehicle" for the holding of the government equity in PSUs, 
before their sale at a reasonable price as well as arrangements for buy back and cross holdings 
by PSUs which was toyed with for sometime, has also been dropped. The official policy has 
now been geared' for the outright sale of PSUs to the TNCs. The talk of the, "drain on the fiscal 
resources" of the government because of the setting up of the PSUs is, of course, a myth which 
has been assiduously spread to pave the way for the privatisation-globalisation process to make 
unhindered headway. There really are not any valid economic or social welfare reasons in 
official policy making but ideological preference for privatisation of the economy which the 
ruling elite in India has now accepted and is vigorously pursuing. 
It is a simplistic view of the role of public enterprise in economic development and the 
principles that should govern the measurement of its efficiency that the yardstick of 
commercial profitability alone should be considered. The fact must be reckoned with that while 
public enterprise should operate in such a way as to augment public savings, they have also to 
put up with planned losses in order to provide essential goods and services to the mass of the 
people which the private enterprises, guided by only the profit maximization motive, will not 
do. PSUs indeed provide relatively cheap inputs to the private sector and thus help the 
generation of surpluses in the economy. The point is that PSUs may not directly generate 
financial surpluses. But those who make large profits by using subsidized inputs provided by 
the PSUs to them should be required to contribute a fair part of these profits by way of taxes 
and other savings instruments to augment resources for stepping up overall investment for 
economic growth according to right order of social priorities. It is indeed wrong mindlessly to 
flog the PSUs. The easy path of raising the prices of goods and services provided by the PSUs 
in order to extract surpluses for investment may tend in many cases to be counterproductive 
and self-defeating. Returns from PSUs can be enlarged meaningfully only by improvements in 
the efficiency of their operations and fuller utilisation of their capacity which should not be 
blocked by imports that are competitive to indigenous production capacities, both in the public 
and private sectors. 
One may conclude that the disinvestment posed some major challenges special with reference 
to employees as private sector never wanted a huge wage bill to be paid as it was sure to get 
the same work done with far lesser manpower partly due to efficiencies and partly by 
exploiting them. This resulted in large litigations. All these issue ultimately affected the bottom 
line that is the profitability which we have discussed subsequently 
Critical analysis 
Critical analysis of prospects of disinvestment has been carried out with the help of qualitative 
data. Profitability analysis, return on investment and return on almost all financial parameters 
has been analysed in pre and post disinvestment era. Following parameters were used in 
arriving at the conclusions. 
(A) Return on Total Assets 
1. Earnings before depreciation, interest and tax to Gross Total Assets called Gross 
Surplus Ratio (GSR) 
2. Earnings before interest and tax to Total Assets (EBIT/TA) 
3. Operating Cash Flow to Gross Total Assets (OCF/GTA) 
4. Profit After Tax to Total Tangible assets (PAT/TTA) 
(B) Return on Capital employed 
1. Retained cash flow to Capital employed called Cash Flow Ploughed Back Ratio 
(CFPBR) 
2. Net Profit Before Interest and Tax to Capital Employed (NPBIT/CE) 
(C) Return on Shareholders' Equity 
1. Profit After Tax to Shareholders' Equity {PAT/SHE) 
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2. Operating Cash Flow to Shareholders' Equity (OCF/SHE) 
3. Earnings Before Interest and Tax to Interest Charges (EBIT/Fixed Interest Charges) 
The analysis of the above profitability ratios of selected public sector industries across various 
sectors during before and after disinvestment. Among others, it shows that the gross profit ratio 
of Steel industry reveals an increasing trend in, the pre-disinvestment period was 2.11 in 2007-
08 (the lowest range) and indicates 7.53 in 2008-09 as the highest range barring 2000-01 which 
was 2.11. It implies gradual increase in gross profit to a limited extent. The post-disinvestment 
shows 2.84 in 2001-2002 as the lowest and 13.20 in 2005-06. The average of this ratio is 3.65 
in the pre-disinvestment period, whereas in the post-disinvestment period the average of this 
ratio is 7.20. This shows that the gross profit ratio has improved in the Post-disinvestment 
period. However, this was not significant as per't' value. While considering the whole period, 
the average of this ratio refers to 5.42. The high value of the two periods reveals more 
fluctuations in this ratio in the pre and post disinvestment period. The compound annual 
growth rate of this ratio of Steel industry for the two periods is referred to as 8.05 in pre-
disinvestment period and 9.74 in the post-disinvestment periods. 
In Minerals and Metals industry, the gross profit ratio is ranging fi-om 0.10 in 2001-02 to 24.32 
in 2007-08 barring - 0.41 and - 0.77 respectively for the pre-disinvestment period. For the post-
disinvestment period the Gross Profit ratio ranged between 14.27. The average of this ratio 
before disinvestment is 6.63 and 21.20 for the post-disinvestment period which indicates that 
there is a significant improvement in the gross profit ratio of Minerals and Metals industry 
during post-disinvestment period which is found significant at 1 % level. The average of this 
ratio for the whole period is 14.30 and 09.35 respectively for pre and post disinvestment 
period. The average growth for pre and post disinvestment period in this industry was 6.7 and 
3.9 respectively. 
The range of gross profit ratio in Coal and Lignite industry is 1.71, the lowest being 9.10 and 
the highest for the pre-disinvestment period barring 2001-02 and 2007-08 which shows -4.88 
and 5.66 respectively. The lowest and highest range of gross profit ratio is 7.40 in 2005-06 and 
29.20 in 2007-08 for the post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio is 3.80 and 15.93 
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in the pre and post disinvestment period respectively. The average of this ratio of Coal and 
Lignite is marked with significant improvement in the post-disinvestment period. 
The scenario of power sector reflects that the gross profit ratio in the Power sector in the pre-
disinvestment period is 2.27 as against 6.94 in 2001-02 and 5.00 in 2007-08 during post-
disinvestment period. The average of this ratio before disinvestment was 6.57 against 5.79 in 
the post-disinvestment period. The mean difference between gross profit ratio in the pre— 
disinvestment and post-disinvestment was found to be significant at 5% level. For the whole 
period the average of this ratio computed was 1.90. The decrease in gross profit ratio may be 
due to the reason that the Power industry's operational efficiency was not satisfactory in the 
post-disinvestment period. The average growth for pre and post disinvestment period in this 
industry was 2.09 and 3.01 respectively. 
In Petroleum industry, the gross profit ratio ranged between 9.20 and 14.60 in the pre-
disinvestment period whereas it ranged between 8.91 in 2001-02 to 13.40 in 2007-08 in the 
post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio of petroleum industry stood at 11.88 
against 11.04 in the pre-disinvestment and post-disinvestment periods respectively. For the 
whole period the average of this ratio was 11.46. Both pre and post-disinvestment periods 
registered more consistency in this ratio. The compound annual growth rate in this ratio before 
disinvestment was 0.81 against 2.49 in the post disinvestment period. 
The overall analysis of statistical values of gross profit ratio for these industries suggests that 
among all thei selected industries under review, the difference in mean values between before 
and after disinvestment was the highest in Minerals and Metals followed by Coal and Lignite 
and then Steel. All the three remaining industries registered lesser improvement in this ratio in 
the post-disinvestment period. Thus it is clear from the above analysis that the industries viz. 
Steel, Minerals and Metals and Coal and Lignite's had a better management in post-
disinvestment period than the other industries. 
Similarly all ratios have been calculated and discussed for all industries studies which followed 
over all analysis in pre and post disinvestment scenario. 
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Steel Industry - After Disinvestment 
Here the impact of some parameters of the company's position and performance on the 
profitability related to post disinvestment period (2001-02 to 2007-08) by computing Karl 
Pearson's correlation co-efficient between the profitability measure and the selected ratios 
indicating the company's position and performance has been studies. Results of steel industry 
shows that the correlation co-efficient between CR and ROI is 0.414. It unveils that there is a 
low degree of positive association between the two variables, profitability and CR. The 
correlation Co-efficient value is found to be insignificant at 5% level. The correlation Co-
efficient between QR and ROI is 0.570. It means that there is a moderate degree of positive 
association between QR and ROI. The correlation co-efficient is found to be insignificant. 
There is no association between CITR and profitability which is known through the value of 
correlation co-efficient which is -0.001. The correlation co-efficient is also insignificant iat 5% 
level. The co-efficient of correlation between T A TR and ROI worked out to 0.485 which 
establishes the fact that there is a moderate degree of positive association between profitability 
and T A TR. The coefficient of correlation is insignificant at 5% level. While analysing the 
association between CETR and ROI the table discloses the correlation co-efficient at 0.02002 
which depicts there is a very low degree of positive association between CETR and 
profitability. The correlation co-efficient between FTTR and ROI shows -0.016which uncloaks 
the truth that there is very low negative association between FTTR and ROI. 
From the above analysis, it can be inferred that out of six ratios used for correlating with ROI, 
five ratios viz. CR, QR, CITR, T A TR, CETR showed positive association while the 
remaining FTTR displayed absence of association in the pre-disinvestment period while the 
post disinvestment period's performance is as follows: All the six selected ratios except CITR 
and FTTR, registered positive association viz. CR, QR, TATR and CETR. There was negative 
association between FTTR and ROI. The association between CITR and ROI was absent. 
Minerals and Metals Industry - Before Disinvestment 
The correlation co-efficient between ROI and CR is 0.219 in Minerals and Metals industry. It 
reveals that there is a low degree of positive association between current ratio and profitability. 
The value of correlation co-efficient is found to be insignificant at 5% level. The next ratio 
under analysis is Quick Ratio which indicates there is a moderate degree of positive association 
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between ROI and QR whose value is 0.532 which is insignificant at 5% level. The correlation 
co-efficient between CITR and ROI is 0.625. It discloses that there is a moderate degree of 
positive association between profitability and CITR. It proves that the correlation co-efficient 
appears to be significant at 1% level. The co-efficient of correlation between CETR and, ROI 
is 0.166. It connotes there is a low degree of positive association between the two variables viz. 
profitability and CETR. The Co-efficient of correlation between FTTR and ROI depicts 
moderate degree of positive association of 0.514. It is also insignificant at 5% level. 
Minerals and Metals Industry - After Disinvestment 
In Minerals and Metals industry, the correlation co-efficient between ROI and CR is 0.678. 
This unfolds the fact that there is a moderate degree of positive association between CR and 
ROI. The correlation is found to be insignificant at 5% level. There is a low degree of positive 
association between QR and ROI as the correlation co-efficient shows 0.148, which is 
statistically insignificant at 5% level. The correlation co-efficient between CITR and ROI is -
0.024 which unmasks the truth that there is very low degree of negative association between 
the two variables, profitability and CITR. The co-efficient correlation is found to be 
insignificant. The correlation coefficient between TATR and ROI is 0.756. It uncloaks the fact 
that there 4s moderate degree of positive association between TATR and ROI. The correlation 
co-efficient between FTTR and ROI is -0.120 which implies there is a low degree of negative 
association between profitability and FTTR. The correlation co-efficient is found to be 
insignificant at 5% level. 
The overall analysis of Minerals and Metals industry indicates that none of the selected ratios 
had negative association with Return on Investment (ROI) in the pre-disinvestment period. In 
the post-liberalisation period positive association between ROI and selected ratios was 
recorded in CR, QR, T ATR and CETR. It was negative in CITR and FTTR. 
Coal and Lignite Industry - Before Disinvestment 
In Coal and Lignite industry, the correlation co-efficient between CR and ROI is 0.258. It 
unfolds the fact that there is a low degree of positive association between profitability and 
current ratio. The value of correlation co-efficient is established to be insignificant at 5% level. 
There is a low degree of positive association between QR and ROI which is shown in the table 
at 0.111. It exposes that the value of correlation Coefficient is found to be insignificant. The 
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next ratio under analysis is CITR. Here there is a low degree of negative association between 
profitability and CTTR whose value is -0.208. The value of correlation co-efficient appears to 
be insignificant at 5% level. Correlation co-efficient between TATR and ROI is 0.609. It 
unfolds that there is a moderate degree of positive association between the variables 
profitability and TATR. The value of correlation co-efficient is found to be insignificant at 5% 
level. A moderate degree of positive association is brought to light between CETR and ROI 
which bears the value 0.578. The correlation co-efficient is established to be insignificant. The 
correlation co-efficient between FTTR and ROI is 0.235. It unveils the truth that there is low 
degree of positive association between FTTR and ROI. The value of correlation co-efficient is 
found to be insignificant at 5% level. 
Coal and Lignite Industry - After Disinvestment. 
In Coal and Lignite industry, the correlation co-efficient, between CR and ROI is 0.0417. It 
exposes the truth that there exists very low degree of negative association between ROI and 
CR. The correlation co-efficient is found to be insignificant. There is a high degree of positive 
association between QR and ROI. The value of correlation co-efficient is 0.853 which is 
statistically significant at I % level. The correlation co-efficient at -0.290 between CITR and 
ROI indicates that there is a low degree of negative association. The correlation co-efficient is 
found to be insignificant. There is a low degree of negative association between TATR and 
ROI which is proved through the value of correlation co-efficient at -0.208. The co-efficient 
co-relation is found to be insignificant. The correlation co-efficient between CETR and ROI is 
0.159 which shows that there is a low degree of positive association between CETR and ROI. 
The correlation co-efficient is found to be insignificant. There is a moderate degree of negative 
association between FITR and ROI which is known through the correlation co-efficient at -
0.566. The correlation co-efficient is found to be insignificant. 
From the above analysis it is known that positive association was there in CR, QR, TATR, 
CETR and FTTR while CITR recorded negative association with ROI in the pre-disinvestment 
period. In the post-disinvestment period, positive association was there in QR and CETR while 
the remaining ratios viz. CR, CITR, TATR and FTTR registered negative association with 
ROI. 
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Power Industry - Before Disinvestment 
One of the important among energy producing industries, power shows that there is a moderate 
degree of positive association between ROI and CR as the correlation co-efficient shows 0.569 
which is statistically insignificant at 5% level. The correlation co-efficient between QR and 
ROI is 0.607. This emphasizes that there is a moderate degree of positive association between 
QR and ROI which is found to be insignificant at 5% level. There is a low degree of positive 
association between CITR and FTTR of power industry which is shown in the table as 0.263 
which is also found to be insignificant. In case of correlation co-efficient between TATR and 
ROI, which is laid out at 0.043, there is almost non-existence of association between 
profitability and T A TR. The value of co-efficient of correlation is found to be insignificant at 
5% level. The value of correlation co-efficient between CETR and ROI is 0.568. This shows 
that there is a moderate degree of positive association between CETR and profitability. 
Power Industry - After Disinvestment 
In Power industry, the correlation ' co-efficient between CR and ROI is 0.265 which uncertain 
the truth that there is a low degree of positive association between CR and profitability. The 
correlation co-efficient is found to be insignificant. The co-efficient of correlation between QR 
and ROI is -0.097 which unfurls the truth that there is a negligible degree of association 
between the variables profitability and QR. The value of correlation co-efficient is found to be 
insignificant. The correlation co-efficient between CITR and ROI is 0.394. This shows there is 
a low degree of positive association between CITR and ROI. The value of correlation co-
efficient is found to be insignificant. The Co-efficient of correlation of power industry between 
TATR and ROI is 0.568 which discloses that there is a moderate degree of positive association 
between TATR and profitability. The last ratio under discussion, establishes the association 
between FTTR and ROI at -0.594, which means that there is a moderate degree of negative 
association between profitability and FTTR. 
The scenario of Power industry before disinvestment was as follows: 
CR, QR, CITR and CETR recorded positive association with ROI whereas no association was' 
recorded in TATR and FTTR with ROI. In the post- disinvestment period positive association 
with ROI was recorded in CR, CITR, T A TR and CETR. It was negative and negligible 
association with ROI in FTTR and QR respectively. 
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Petroleum Industty - Before Disinvestment 
In petroleum industry, the correlation co-efficient between current ratio and ROI is 0.846. It 
unmasks that there is a high degree of negative association between profitability and current 
ratio. The value of correlation co-efficient is found to be significant 5% level. Secondly, there 
is a high degree of negative association between QR and FTTR as the correlation co-efficient 
shows -0.853. 
Petroleum Industry - After Disinvestment 
In Petroleum industry, the correlation co-efficient between current ratio and ROI is 0.315 
which explains that there is a low degree of negative association between CR and profitability. 
The correlation co-efficient is found to be insignificant. There is a moderate degree of negative 
association between QR and ROI which shows that there is a low degree of negative 
association between profitability and CTTR. The correlation co-efficient is found to be 
insignificant. The correlation co-efficient between TATR and ROI is 0.733 which displays the 
information that there is a high degree of positive association between TATR and ROI. The 
correlation co-efficient between FTTR and ROI is 0.280 which reveals the fact that there is a 
low degree of positive association between FTTR and Profitability. The correlation co-efficient 
is found to be insignificant at 5% level. 
From the above analysis it is clear that during pre-disinvestment period, positive association 
with ROI was conspicuous in CTTR, TATR and CETR whereas it was negative in CR and QR. 
In case of CETR it showed negligible association with ROI. In the post-disinvestment period 3 
ratios viz. T A TR, CETR and FTTR recorded positive association with ROI while the 
remaining CR, QR and CTTR recorded negative association with ROI. Chemicals and 
Petrochemical Industry - Before Disinvestment 
Chemicals and Petrochemical Industry - After Disinvestment 
In Chemicals and Petrochemical the association between CR and ROI is at the lowest positive 
as the correlation co-efficient is shown at 0.181 which is also statistically insignificant. The 
Correlation co-efficient between QR and ROI is 0.250 which throws some light that there is a 
low degree of positive association between profitability and QR. The Correlation co-efficient is 
found to be insignificant. The coefficient of correlation between CTTR and ROI is 0.228. It 
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leaks out the truth that there is a low degree of positive association between the two variables 
CTTR and ROI which is also statistically insignificant. There is a low degree of positive 
association between TATO and ROI as the correlation co-efficient shows 0.330 which is also 
statistically insignificant. 
Conclusions 
Following suggestions are offered to improve the impact of disinvestment of public sector 
enterprises. Mere disinvestment of PEs is not enough. Entire industries have to be restructured 
to ensure competitiveness. Even for natural monopolies, it will be necessary to introduce 
regulation and supervision to reproduce effective competition. Otherwise, privatised 
enterprises may not be able to reap substantial monopoly profits, leaving consumers, worse off 
Hence, improvements in efficiency do not follow from disinvestment per se, but, from the 
benefits that increased competition in the market place. 
An alternative is to allow foreign capital to bid when PEs are put up for sale. The foreign 
investors would be in a position to bring in additional technology or management skills. 
Foreign investment may partly ease the scarcity of foreign exchange. But, a possible area of 
concern could be the element of control exercised by foreign interests on important sectors of 
the economy. 
To remove the loss of revenue and the survival of uneconomic socially necessary services, 
special provisions have to be incorporated in various laws. 
Disinvestment should not merely mean indiscriminate disinvestment, but efficiency and 
competitiveness in industry. The debate of disinvestment is not question of government or 
private control. It is essentially a question of competitiveness. It is a formidable task requiring 
shared political leadership and vision. 
Evidence suggests that efficiency gains that are needed for improving a country's fiscal 
condition will materialise only if disinvestment is accompanied by extensive industrial 
restructuring. This will be best served if the process is allowed to evolve in a phased manner 
over a period of time. 
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Keeping in view the above observations relating to the study, the following measures are 
suggested which would go a long way to improve the profitability of Indian Public Sector 
Enterprises. 
It is essential to have objective performance appraisal criteria far every public sector 
undertaking. For this purpose, the best way will be to introduce performance audit and revise 
the performance indicators. Commercial performance must take care of all the objectives and 
goals. For this purpose, a suitable system of financial and non-financial objectives must he 
developed. Policymaking should be based on realistic assessment of cost. According to present 
policies, if size aft economy grows, as grows the expenditure on public sector without adequate 
return an investment. Hence, the need for review aft the role of public enterprises in this regard 
is needed. 
In public sector there is invariably over run of cost and time. This over run makes the project 
partly sick at the inception itself. Economy, efficiency and effectiveness in public sector 
enterprises are need of the hour to improve overall performance of the Indian economy. The 
incidence of project failure in public enterprises has got to be curtailed. 
For revamping the units, there is strong need to assign clear targets to ensure accountability of 
the management. Necessary budgetary support either equity are loan based should be provided. 
For each unit, physical and financial targets should be worked out, precisely spelling out how 
many financial resources are needed fi"om the centre and from raising ftinds from the public 
and how much should be these fi"om internal generation of fiinds. Public barrowings may be 
suggested for short term and medium term financial requirements of the public enterprises. 
Also efforts should be made to increase net income contribution of public sector corporations 
which is necessary to compete vdth private sector. 
The overstaffing and overhead personnel cost is a major reason of disappointing profitability of 
Public Sector Enterprises. Employment cost should be controlled through improvement in 
efficiency and productivity of employees. Extra staff should be diverted to other works. All out 
efforts should be made to tune up the efficiency and ensure effectiveness in this regard. On the 
pattern of All India services, a new cadre in the name of public sector services should be 
organized in which professional managers should be selected. Members of this service should 
be posted at the top level management of these corporations in place a bureaucrats. 
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Audit has been playing an important part as an instrument of financial control in public sector 
undertakings. Reforms are also required in the existing pattern, system and method of audit. A 
change in the attitude of the audit control is also highly desirable. The auditors have to be 
trained especially for the purpose reviews of financial accounts and statements of these 
enterprises which have been established with different objectives and it must be seen that these 
aims are fulfilled to the best possible extent. More over, a system of efficiency audit is 
essential. The real need of the hour is efficiency, audit performance appraisal, management 
audit, achievement assessment in relation to public enterprises along with the built in system of 
reward cum punishment for managerial efficiency. It would be, of course a devisable for these 
charged with efficiency audit to be mere forward looking. There is a necessity of reorientation 
in the approach and efforts should be made to judge the management efficiency properly and 
far that there should be increased reliance upon the efficiency audit of these enterprises. 
The formation of holding companies, to improve financial performance, ensure public 
enterprises - Government interface, devote greater functional autonomy to subsidiaries, 
formulate suitable operational policies and attempt greater flexibility in regard to pricing and 
investment are same measures suggested for efficient functioning of public enterprises. The 
financial information system, internal and external should be improved in order to strengthen 
decision making and the one hand and effective financial stability of the public enterprises on 
the other. 
The Bureau of public enterprises should not only act as a clearinghouse of information and 
ideas relating to the public sector but also constitute a pool of experience which could be 
shared by various enterprises. It should help also the government in strengthening the working 
and performance of public sector enterprises. 
The management information system should be systematical in order to assist decision making 
on the one hand and effective control over the public sector undertakings on the other. 
The state government may give a cash grant to those undertakings which have accumulated 
losses and which are likely to improve their profits prospects in future. The central government 
assist for some sort of cash grants say consessional tax, less power tariff etc to revamp the 
already loss making units. Another way of helping out the losing concerns is to reconstruct 
their capital structure, including writing off the capital to the extent of over capitalisation. 
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Some of the public sector undertakings suffer from underutilisation of their capacities because 
of non-materialisation of expectations of demand. There should be a systematic and scientific 
market survey so as to assess the demand correctly before a project is conceived. 
Many of the public sector undertakings have been characterized by delay in commissioning of 
their prospects mainly because of governmental delays in decision making. The Government 
should constitute a committee of secretaries of the concerned departments to expedite the 
setting up of projects in public sector, once they are planned and conceived by the government. 
A control mechanism, based on initial evaluation of expectation, is possibly best suited for 
public enterprises. The evaluation of these enterprises should be based on exclusively on 
financial targets. The methods of exercising accountability and control in public enterprises, 
currently used, are characterized by a plethora of control agencies. Operating without any real 
basis for either locating accountability or control has no meaning. The sine-qua for such 
control that is a set of clearly specified targets and objectives to be handed over to particular 
unit is absent. 
The public enterprises are having poor profitability owing to a variety of factors. One, major 
factor that has proved to be drag on the efficient functioning of the public enterprises is the 
multi point interference in its day to day decision making. The idea of Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) represents a genuine desire to give autonomy to the public enterprises 
management. At the same time, they have to be made accountable for better management and 
efficient operations of the enterprise. The government should be primarily concerned with 
overall strategic planning and policy rather than day to day functioning of the enterprises. Its 
responsibility is to ensure that the public money invested in these enterprises earns an 
appropriate rate of return and that the functioning of these enterprises is consistent with plan 
objectives including these related to employment, fair pricing, regional dispersal, of industries 
and, efficient use of scarce resources. Once the goals have been mutually agreed to, an 
enterprise should be held strictly accountable for its performance in relation the goal set and 
there should be an appropriate mechanism for evaluation of performance. 
Spell out the mission of the enterprise, derive its broad objectives and obligations and delete 
objectives which will have to be evaluated with subjectivity. 
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It is recommended for PSUs to specify objectives which are amenable for performance 
evaluation and identify possible performance parameters for each of the specific objectives. 
Checking the data availability on actual performance v^ ith regard to each of the possible 
performance parameter and specifying performance parameters and their quantifications is a 
must. 
The findings and suggestions are not conclusive as in some cases the performance has 
improved and in other cases it has not. A close look at the analysis reveals that the factors were 
beyond disinvestment. Public perception would have played a major role in the change 
Some of the limitations that the researcher could note are that a study of this kind naturally 
calls for divulging confidential information by companies which was very difficuh to get. 
Therefore, the researcher relied only on secondary data sources which were available in public 
domain like prowess database and companies balance sheets. The personal views of experts in 
a formal maimer could not be obtained though thesis covers them in many other forms. 
Future researcher can be undertaken in the areas covering opinions of experts. An empirical 
study would also be a possibility. Many other ways of measuring performance of PSUs are 
available which too can be studied and the effect of PSUs on competition and their social 
aspect a also be studied. 
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Preface 
Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) have been playing a major role in our economy since 1947 
but they did not perform as expected in a corporate world. The scholars were and still are 
divided on the performance measures of PSUs. Some maintain that the PSUs were not 
established to generate revenue or make surplus but to serve the society while the other argue 
that PSUs have no right to waste the hard earned money of tax payers. The debate continued 
and the government in the year 1991 woke up to liebralisation and privatisation. It started 
taking out some of its share and selling it to public, generally termed as disinvestment. It 
created lots of heat in the political and economic circle of the country. The debate went to the 
extent that government felt a need to establish separate ministry and even a disinvestment 
commission was formed. 
Through this research, an attempt has been made to find out the performance of PSUs after the 
disinvestment. It may, to some extent settle the debate as the findings have proved empirically 
the performance level before and after disinvestment. Established measures of financial 
performance like ratios, return on assets, return on investment and similar financial indicators 
have been used to arrive at some conclusions. 
First chapter provides evolution of Public Sectors in India followed by their contribution in the 
economy, history of PSUs. Thereafter, a brief description of methodology for disinvestment 
has been discussed. Chapter 2 provides background of disinvestment and the need for 
disinvestment, rationale for disinvestment and major Policy Guidelines have been discussed. 
These guidelines include bidding procedures, global scenario and World Bank Guidelines. The 
important features of Disinvestment Commission have also been discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter 3 forms the survey of literature. It starts with organization of literature and then talks 
about economic and political issues, historical perspective. Then disinvestment during the 
period of various governments has been discussed. Importantly it includes Narasima Rao 
Period, United Front Government Period and BJP Government Period. The chapter also 
discusses post sale related issues of select PSUs and post closing adjustments. This has enabled 
the researcher to identify the research gaps. At the end of this chapter summary of literature 
review has been provided. 
Chapter 4 forms the Research Methodology. It includes introduction to research methodology. 
statement of problems and objectives of study, sampling procedure and justification of the 
sample, hypotheses and testing procedure, methodology of data collection, analysis and 
presentation. 
Chapter 5 analyses problems and prospects of disinvestment, major issues, employees related 
issues and legal issues. In chapter 6, critical analysis of prospects of disinvestment has been 
discussed. Economic analysis of select PSUs, critical analysis of select PSUs and major 
problems resulting from disinvestment have been discussed. Thereafter hypotheses have been 
tested. 
Finally in chapter 7, conclusion and suggestions have been given. 
The findings are not conclusive as in some cases the performance has improved and in other 
cases it has not. A close look at the analysis reveals that the factors were beyond disinvestment. 
Public perception would have played a major role in the change. 
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Introduction 
In this chapter an attempt has been made to provide detailed background related to the 
genesis of Public Sector Undertakings in India, right from the evolution till the need for 
reaching a stage where the government of India felt the need to disinvest its holdings 
from some public sectors. The rationale, historical background, contribution of public 
sectors and genesis of disinvestment has been outlined here. 
1.1 Evolution of Public Sector in India 
Prior to 1947 i.e. the independence of our country, there were almost no "Public Sectors" 
in our economy. The only instances which one can find some mention were the Indian 
Railways, The Post & Telegraph, The Port Trust, The Ordnance and the Aircraft Factories 
and a few more Government controlled undertakings. After independence, India adopted 
the road of planned economic development through Five year plans. In this India opted for 
dominance of the Public Sector firmly believing that political independence without 
economic self-reliance would not enable the Government to fiilfill the aspirations of the 
countrymen. The passage of Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 and adoption of socialist 
pattern of society as the national economic goal of the country built the foundation of the 
dominant public sector as we see it today. It was believed that a dominant public sector 
would reduce the inequality in the distribution of income and wealth and advance the 
general prosperity of the nation. 
The second Five Year Plan document clearly stated that "all industries of basic and 
strategic importance, or in the nature 'of public utility services should be in the public 
sector. Other industries, which are essential and require investment on a large scale, which 
only the State, in, the present circumstances, could provide have also to be in the public 
sector". It is fiirther emphasized that, "the pubhc sector has to expand rapidly. It has not 
only to initiate development which the private sector is either unwilling or unable to 
undertake, it has to play the dominant role in shaping the entire pattern of investment in the 
economy". The investment in public sector enterprises has grown from Rs. 29 Crore in 5 
PSU on 01.04.1951 to Rs.2,52,554 Crores in 240 P5U on 31.03.2000 and to the tune of Rs. 
5,55,740 crores in 2009. 
1.2 Economic Contribution of PSUs from 1990 to 1998 
If one examines the achievements of the PSUs by the yardstick of objectives they were 
expected to achieve, one would observe that many of these objectives have, at best, met with 
limited success. The infrastructure for economic development is still inadequate. The return on 
investments in PSUs, at least for the last two decades, has been quite low and the PSUs have 
not been able to generate resources for development. The PSU survey shows that between 
1986-87 and 1997-98, the Central Government owned PSUs, as a whole, never earned post-tax 
profits that exceeded 5 per cent of total sales or 6 per cent of capital employed. Thus, the return 
earned by the public sector was significantly lower than the rate of return for a time deposit of 
one year in commercial banks. Also, the PSUs' highest return on capital employed (6 per cent 
in 1995-96 and 1997-98) is at least 3 per cent points below the interest paid by the Government 
on its borrowings. Thus, adjusted for the effective interest rate, they have actually been giving 
negative return on capital. If the profits of the PSUs working in the monopoly environment are 
excluded, the picture becomes even worse. 
For the period 1988-89 to 1997-98 the imit gross profits and post-tax profits of PSUs in the 
manufacturing sector were significantly lower than the private sector companies, when 
measured as a proportion of sales revenue net of indirect taxes but excluding the profits of 
PSUs in the monopoly areas (petroleum, power, coal and lignite), the post-tax profits turn 
to losses for the manufacturing PSUs for 9 out of the 10 years. Table 1.1 demonstrates the 
above points. 
A close look of the table 1.1 proves that PSUs have always performed very poorly in terms 
of profit. One may argue that this was not the purpose for which these were set up but 
erosion of capital carmot be justified at any cost. Money comes from tax payers and how 
can it be allowed to be wasted. 
Table 1.1 
PSUs Profitability compared to the Private Sector as on 31*' March 
[Profit after tax (PAT)/net sales percent)] 
As on 31 March 
All Non-service 
PSUs 
PSUs 
Pure manufacturing 
PSUs 
Manufacturing 
Private Sector 
92-93 
2.40 
-0.80 
-4.50 
5.70 
94-95 
2.00 
0.10 
-5.30 
4.90 
95-96 
2.20 
-0.10 
-5.40 
4.90 
97-98 
3.00 
-1.20 
-6.90 
6.60 
99-00 
4.40 
1.60 
-2.30 
9.10 
02-04 
4.90 
3.40 
-2.40 
9.00 
04-06 
4.40 
2.70 
-4.30 
7.00 
07-
08 
5.28 
3.08 
3.90 
6.20 
Source: NCAER Study Report 
Table 1.2 shows a comparison between the PSUs and the private sector companies from the point i 
view of the cost structure. Here also, PSUs have performed quite poorly as compared to priva 
sector with regard to various cost parameters. 
Table 1.2 
Comparison of Cost Structure (As Percentage of Sales) 
Parameters / As on 31 March 
Raw materials / Net sales 
PSEs. 
Private sector mfg. 
Power and fuel / Net sales 
PSEs 
Private Sector mfg 
Wages/Net sales 
PSEs 
Private Sector mfg 
Interest / Net sales 
PSUs 
Private Sector mfg 
A. Raw Material differential 
B. Wages + Interest + Power 
differential 
C. Total differential (A+B) 
92-93 
39.5 
44.4 
10.3 
6.8 
18.6 
8.9 
8.8 
6.0 
-4.9 
16.0 
11.1 
94-95 
39.6 
44.1 
10.9 
7.0 
17.3 
8.8 
9.9 
6.7 
-4.5 
15.6 
11.1 
95-96 
39.8 
41.4 
12.7 
6.9 
18.1 
8.6 
11.3 
6.0 
-1.6 
20.6 
19.0 
97-98 
36.3 
42.5 
13.5 
6.6 
17.7 
8.1 
11.5 
5.2 
-6.2 
22.8 
16.6 
99-00 
35.0 
42.9 
12.9 
6.2 
17.6 
7.9 
9.0 
5.2 
-8.7 
20.2 
11.5 
02-04 
35.9 
42.3 
13.3 
6.5 
19.2 
7.9 
9.1 
5.8 
-7.9 
21.4 
13.5 
04-06 
35.9 
42.3 
14.9 
6.6 
19.1 
7.9 
9.8 
5.9 
-6.4 
23.1 
16.7 
07-08 
40.6 
40.4 
19.5 
5.0 
23.3 
6.5 
11.7 
4.7 
0.2 
38.5 
38.7 
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Source: NCAER Study Report. 
The above Table shows that despite huge investment in the public sector the Government 
was required to provide more funds every year. The public sector equity base of about Rs. 
40,000 crores (up to March 1990) yielded Rs. 17,938 crores for the Government as 
dividend in nine years. However, the Government had to invest a further sum of Rs. 61.211 
crore during this period in the form of equity (Rs. 24,829 crore), plan loans (Rs. 26.185 
crore) and non-plan loans (Rs. 10,197 crores), besides providing for the Voluntary 
Retirement Scheme. The average rate of return on the Government investment for these 
years works out between 1 per cent and 6.5 per cent. 
Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs), which were given a special role in India's planned 
economy, grew both in terms of numbers and investment for over four decades from the 
early 1950s. At the commencement of the First Five Year Plan there were five PSUs with a 
total investment of Rs. 29 crores. At the end of the Seventh Plan in 1990; there were 244 
PSUs and the investment in them had gone up to Rs. 99,329 crores. Although 
disinvestments had started from the early 1990s, at the end of the Eighth Plan in 1997, 
investment had soared to Rs.213,610 crores. At the end of the fiscal year 2000-01, PSUs 
had a total investment of Rs.274,114 crores. The PSUs made a significant contribution to 
industrial production, 100 percent in lignite, over 80 per cent in coal, crude oil and zinc, 
almost 50 percent in aluminum and over 30 per cent in finished steel. 
In terms of profitability, the PSUs showed diverse patterns. In 2000-01, 122 enterprises 
made a profit with the top 10 among them - giants such as the Oil and Natural Gas 
Corporation (ONGC), the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC), the Indian Oil 
Corporation (IOC) and the Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited (VSNL) - accounting for close 
to 70 per cent of the total net profit of Rs.I9, 604 crores. Sector-wise, petroleum, power 
and communications contributed to 60 per cent of the profits. During that year, there were 
111 loss-making enterprises with a total loss of Rs. 12,839 crores. 
The major contributors to the losses were Hindustan Fertilizer, the Fertilizer Corporation of 
India (FCI), Bharat Cooking Coal, and some other enterprises dealing with coal. The return 
on investment of all PSUs taken together remained low - post-tax profitability being only 
about 5 per cent on capital employed. According to reports "The public sector in India, 
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which was perceived to be the vehicle of speedy economic development, has run into 
rough waters. It not only failed to produce surpluses which it was expected to generate for 
future growth, but the return on investment remained poor. "The question that is examined 
is whether disinvestment and privatisation can lead to better results. 
At the theoretical level the poor performance of PSUs can be attributed to three factors 
they are not governed by profit maximising considerations; there is no direct equivalent of 
bankruptcy constraint; and since shares are not traded in the market, the discipline that the 
market imposes is absent. The general presumption is that these three factors adversely 
affect the enterprises. However, this is not a matter that can be or should be settled on 
theoretical arguments. 
1.3 Brief History of Public Ownership 
It would be worthwhile to shed some light on the history of ownership of PSUs. Main 
reasons for the State ownership of industries could be stated as under: 
A) The development of public enterprises was seen as an appropriate policy response 
to bring about improvements in the economy, both in the developed as well as the 
developing countries. There appeared to be an economic consensus around the 
world accepting public enterprises as an inevitable part of the economy, specially to 
manage natural monopolies and also the core industry. While the public sector 
contributed significantly to the development efforts, the low rates of return on such 
investments and the inability of governments to finance the growing demands of 
such industries; changed the consensus in favor of economic liberalisation and 
privatization from the 1970's, in almost all countries. 
B) Such industries could not have been developed by private sectors during 1940's or 
1950's as there was not enough money in the money market and entrepreneurship 
was limited. So Government used high rates of taxation and deficit inflationary 
financing to develop public industries. Rescue Missions / Nationalisation - Some 
times Government had to step in to rescue certain enterprises, whose closure could 
result in significant loss of jobs and also because of several other economic and 
social reasons. 
C) Another rationale for State ownership was the behef that State investment in and 
the control of the strategic sectors of the economy was necessary for the economic 
development of those sectors and the security of the country. 
D) A few Public Sector Enterprises were established to balance or replace weak private 
sectors, to develop the industrially backward areas, to generate employment and to 
make goods available at lower cost. 
We all know that the public enterprises have served as the backbone of the Indian economy 
in providing infrastructure facilities, supporting the cause of constitution and trying for a 
meaningftil solution to balance economic and regional growth. Hence, any attempt to 
structurally adjust them must be the product of substantial thought followed up by a strong 
action plan. These were set up both to realize the economic and ideological necessity. To 
some extent they helped in realizing the planned economic growth that had to be 
undertaken at independence and thereafter. Overburdened with social obligations, PSEs 
crumbled financially in many areas of its activities. 
The government had to give a second thought to the relevance of the PSEs in view of the 
gigantic investment in them. Here it may be noted that Mrs. Thatcher, the ex-Prime 
Minister of the U.K., with an ideological zeal in her party's election manifesto first 
brought the wave of privatization in 1979. The term privatization has not been well defined 
as yet. Mukhopadhaya (1988) observed that since the privatization has been recently 
coined there is not single definition as yet universally accepted by one and all. Interpreted 
in a narrow sense, the term privatization mainly means broadly a change of ownership 
from state to the private sector. 
In such short period of a decade or less there was not enough time for the divested 
enterprises to make necessary adjustments, these empirical studies faced two limitations. 
The first was that in many instances the disinvestments were partial, with the government 
retaining management and control. Secondly, for reasons not related to disinvestments as 
such, there was an industrial recession in the second half of the 1990s and the early part of 
the present century, which adversely affected many enterprises, making it difficult to trace 
the impact of disinvestment. 
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Looking at the assessment, out of 38 disinvested enterprises, six recorded losses; they 
include Hindustan Photofilms, Hindustan Machine Tools (HMT), Indian Telephone 
Industries (IT!) and the Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL). On the other hand, 
ONGC, IOC, the Gas Authority of India Limited (GAIL), VSNL, Neyveli Lignite, Bharat 
Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL) and several others increased their profitability. The 
explanation that could be offered was that the fall in profitability was in the case of 
enterprises operating in a competitive environment while improvement in profitability was 
in the case of enterprises operating in a monopoly environment. Employment levels 
dropped following disinvestment, but because voluntary retirement schemes were in 
operation, it was difficult to attribute the fall to disinvestment as such. 
The Government sold minority shareholdings in Central Government PSUs (CPUS) in 
earlier years of disinvestment. It generated an income of Rs.18000 crores till the year 1999. 
It completed strategic sales in four central PSUs in 2000-2001 and attempted to sell Shares 
of PSUs in open market which had not been successful due to lack of depth of Indian share 
market. Even when PSE shares were sold in Indian market most of it had to be bought by 
Indian Financial Institutions. This merely transferred public sector risk from one hand to 
another. UTI bought about Rs.6400 crores worth of PSE shares, which resulted in a' net 
loss of about Rs.5050 crores to the UTI. As recent as in 2009, the government of India 
(TOI, 9"^  Nov) once again reiterated to offload 10% stake from all public sector 
undertakings to which there have been positive reactions (TOI 11''' Nov 2009) 
1.4 Disinvestment Procedures 
From 1991-92, when it started and till 1996-97, disinvestment was handled by the 
Department of Public Enterprises (Ministry of Heavy Industries) and subsequently, from 
1st April, 1997 till 9"' December, 1999, by the Department of Economic Affairs (Ministry 
of Finance). The Department of Disinvestment (DoD) was set up as a separate department 
on 10th December, 1999 and was subsequently renamed as Ministry of Disinvestment 
(MODI) w.e.f. firom 6* September, 2001. From 27th May, 2004, the Department of 
Disinvestment is one of the Departments under the Ministry of Finance. 
The procedures followed for disinvestment have evolved over a period of time. These were 
based on decision- making through inter- ministerial consultations and involvement of 
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professionals and experts, in view of the technical and complex nature of transactions and 
the need for transparency and fair play. The decision making process, the bidding 
procedure and the methods used for valuation of equity of CPSE sold are described below 
for the different modes of sales. 
Decision making process: 
The decision making process consisted of the following steps: 
a) Identification of the CPSE whose shares were to be sold, the percentage of shares to 
be sold and the mode of sale. 
b) Appointment of various advisers who would assist in the process of sale. 
c) Selection of the bidders. 
d) Determination of the reserve price; and 
e) Approval of the price and other terms at which the shares were to be sold 
The details have been provided as under. 
Generally, though not universally, the starting point till May, 2004 was study of the target 
CPSE by the Disinvestment Commission. In June, 1997, the Government decided that the 
recommendations of the Disinvestment Commission would be processed by the 
Department of Economic Affairs (Ministry of Finance) through a Core Group of 
Secretaries on Disinvestment (CGD), chaired by the Cabinet Secretary, for obtaining the 
decision of the Cabinet thereon. At that time, it was also decided that for disinvestment 
transactions exceeding Rs.500 crore, CGD would directly supervise the implementation of 
the Cabinet decision through an inter- ministerial operational group. This group consisted 
of Joint Secretaries from Ministry of Finance, Department of Public Enterprises, the 
administrative ministry concerned and the CMD of the CPSE concerned. In all the cases, 
where CGD was to directly supervise the disinvestment, CGD would recommend the 
timing,' pricing and extent of disinvestment etc., based upon the advice of the inter-
ministerial operational group, to the Finance Minister, Industry Minister and the Minister 
of the administrative ministry for approval. For disinvestment transactions below Rs.500 
crore, the administrative ministry concerned would be responsible for implementing 
Cabinet decisions, though they were to be monitored by CGD. The administrative 
ministries concerned would be provided appropriate technical assistance by the Department 
of Public Enterprises and Ministry of Finance. 
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This system was further modified in 1999 when the Department of Disinvestment 
(converted into Ministry of Disinvestment on 6th September, 2001) was established and 
issues, such as, which company was to be sold, the percentage of shares and the mode of 
sale were decided, on a case-by-case basis, by the Cabinet or one of its committees duly 
authorized in this regard. Generally, DOD/MODI would initiate a proposal for 
consideration of CGD which would further recommend the case to the Cabinet Committee 
on Disinvestment. Thus, there was a three-tier structure for decision- making and 
implementation of decisions: 
- Cabinet Committee on Disinvestment (CCD) at the apex level; 
- Core Group of Secretaries on Disinvestment (CGD) as a recommendatory body; 
and 
- Inter- Ministerial Group (IMG) as a consultative group. 
CCD was chaired by the Prime Minister. The functions of CCD, constituted in 
January, 2000 were as follows: 
a) To consider the advice of the Core Group of Secretaries regeirding policy issues 
relating to the disinvestment programme; 
b) To decide the price band for the sale of Government's shares through 
international/domestic capital market route prior to the book building exercise, and 
to decide the final price of sale in all cases; 
c) To decide the final pricing of the transaction and the strategic partner in case of 
strategic sales; 
d) To decide on cases where there is disagreement between the recommendations of 
the Disinvestment Commission and the views of DOD/MODI; and 
e) To approve the three-year rolling plan and the annual programme of disinvestment 
every year. 
CGD was headed by the Cabinet Secretary. It functioned as the Empowered Group for 
vetting the recommendations of the Disinvestment -Commission, monitored the progress of 
implementation of CCD decisions, in disinvestment transactions exceeding Rs.500 crore 
- 9 -
directly supervised the process of disinvestment and made recommendations to CCD on 
disinvestment policy matters. 
A separate IMG was formed for each case of disinvestment. Generally, it was chaired by 
Secretary, DOD / MODI and comprised the officers of Ministry of Finance, Department of 
Public Enterprises, Department of Legal Affairs, Department of Company Affairs, the 
Administrative Ministry, the CMD and the Director (Finance) of the CPSE concerned. 
IMG was the forum where inter- ministerial consultation took place at the primary level. 
Recommendations of the IMG were considered by the CGD. 
1.5 Summary 
In this chapter, background in which public sectors were created was provided and the role 
these sectors have so far played in the economy of our country was discussed. What went 
wrong and why did the govenunent and policy makers realise that the investment from 
these sectors need to be withdrawn gradually and part of control be given in the hands of 
private sector is a serious matter. Efforts have been made in the subsequent chapter to focus 
on these issues. 
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Chapter - 2 
Disinvestment and Public Sector Undertakings in India 
In chapter one, a brief background was provided about the PSUs and the need for 
disinvestment was briefly discussed. Here it would be pertinent to explain the rationale of 
disinvestment and briefly explain the background that led the entire process. It was 
generally observed in many countries including India, specially in the year 1970 that the 
performance of most of the public enterprises was far below the expectations. The 
weakness and defects of public enterprises started manifesting with grave danger to 
Government and economy in many countries, with no solution in sight. By the mid 1980 
globally the political opinion was veering round to the view that the proportion of GNP due 
to Government economic activity should be reduced to the extent possible and business 
activities should be left to private sector as far as possible. During the 1980s, collapse of 
the socialist economy of the Soviet Block, introduction of economic reforms by Russia, 
East European countries and China knocked the bottom out of protagonists of Government 
intervention in every commercial activity for the benefit of the masses. 
2.1 Background and Need for Disinvestment: 
The government, for almost four decades, was pursuing a path of development in which 
public sector was expected to be the engine of growth. But by mid-eighties their short 
comings and weaknesses' started manifesting in the form of low capacity utilisation, low 
efficiency, lack of motivation, over-manning, huge time and cost overrun, inability to 
innovate and take quick decision, large scale political and bureaucratic interference in 
decision making, etc. But instead of trying to remove these defects and to increase the rate 
of growth of national economy, gradually the concept of self-reliant growth was given a 
quiet burial. The Government started to deregulate the imports by reducing or withdrawing 
import duty in phases. This resulted in dwindling of precious foreign exchange reserve to 
abysmally low level. The foreign debt repayment crisis compelled Government of India to 
raise loan from IMF against physical deposit of RBI gold reserve, on conditions harmful to 
the interest of the coimtry. 
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This paved the way for the reversal of policies towards PSUs. The Industrial policy of 
1991 started the process of delicensing and except 18 industries. Industrial licensing was 
withdrawn. The market was opened up to domestic private capital and foreign capital was 
provided free entry up to 51 % equity in high technology areas. The aim of economic 
liberalisation was to enlarge competition and allowing new firms to enter the market. Thus 
the emphasis shifted from PSEs to liberalisation of economy and gradual disinvestment of 
PSEs. When the crises of foreign debt services was at its peak, a paradigm shift of 
Government's economic policy orientation originated in 1991 which was a turning point in 
this regards. 
2.2 Rationale for Disinvestment: 
Because of the current revenue expenditure on items such as interest payments, wages and 
salaries of Government employees and subsidiaries, the Govenmient was left with hardly 
any surplus for capital expenditure on social and physical infrastructure. Whereas the 
Government should have been spending on basic education, primary health and family 
welfare, huge amounts of resources are blocked in several non-strategic sectors such as 
hotels, trading companies, consultancy companies, textile companies, chemical and 
pharmaceutical companies, consumer goods companies, etc. Not only this - the continued 
existence of the PSEs was forcing the Government to commit further resources for the 
sustenance of many non-viable Public Sector Enterprises. The Government continued to 
expose the taxpayers' money to risk, which it could have readily avoided. To top it all, 
there was a huge amount of debt overhang, which needed to be serviced and reduced before 
money was available for investment in infi-astructure. This made disinvestment of the 
Government stake in the PSEs absolutely imperative. 
Because of burgeoning revenue deficit in Central budget year after year on account of 
current revenue expenditure on items such as interest payments, wages and salaries of 
Govenmient employees and subsidies, the Govenunent was left with hardly any surplus 
for capital expenditure on social and physical infrastructure. Huge amount of public 
resources were blocked in several non-strategic PSEs giving meager return Government is 
forced to commit further resources for sustenance of many non viable PSEs in absence of 
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exit route. Above all it had to service huge amount of outstanding debt before any money 
was available for investment in infrastructure. All these Government economic woes led to 
an obviously straight forward option of divestment of Government stake in PSEs. The 
issues regarding disinvestment which were still being debated in some form or the other 
and which will remain relevant in the coming days are as under 
1. In which areas the disinvestment should not be there. 
2. Whether defense production and services should be disinvested and to what extent 
it is desirable in view of national security. 
3. To what extent the method of divestment can be made open and transparent. 
4. Out of the various methods of divestment which path will lead to fulfillment of 
declared objectives. 
5. Should the foreign private investors be allowed to acquire controlling interest in 
PSEs. 
6. How the social security net be instituted to train and re-employ active and able 
employees retiring under VRS. 
The cornerstone of the case for privatisation is the concept that private ownership leads to 
better use of resources and their more efficient allocation. Through out the world, the 
preference for market economy received a boost after it was realised that the State could no 
longer meet the growing demands of the economy and the State shareholding inevitably 
had to come down. The 'State in business' argument thus lost out and also the presumption 
that direct and comprehensive control over the economic life of citizens from the Central 
government can deliver results better than those of a more liberal system that directly 
responds according to the market driven forces. 
Another reason for adoption of privatisation policies around the globe has been the 
inability of the Govenmients to raise high taxes, pursue deficit / inflationary financing and 
the development of money markets and private entrepreneurship. 
Further, technology and WTO commitments have made the world a global village and 
unless industries, including public industries do not quickly restructure, they would not be 
able to survive. Public enterprises because of the nature of their ownership, can restructure 
slowly and hence the logic of privatisation gets stronger. Besides, techniques are now 
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available to control public monopolies like Power and Telecom, where consumer interests 
can be better protected by regulation competition, and investment of public money to 
ensure protection of consumer interests is no longer a convincing argument. 
The objectives of the disinvestment programme vary from improving efficiency of the 
Public Sector Enterprises to transformation of the society. 
The primary objectives for disinvestment in PSUs can be summarised as under 
• Releasing the large amount of public resources locked up in non-strategic PSEs, for 
redeployment in areas that are much higher on social priority, such as public health, 
family welfare, primary education and social and essential infrastructure 
• Stemming further outflow of these scarce public resources for sustaining the 
unviable non-strategic PSEs. 
• Reducing the public debt that is threatening to assimie unmanageable proportions, 
• Transferring the commercial risk, to which the tax-payers' money locked up in the 
public sector is exposed; to the private sector wherever the private sector is willing 
and able to step in - the money that is deployed in the PSEs is really the public 
money; and, is exposed to an entirely avoidable and needless risk, in most cases. 
• Releasing other tangible and intangible resources, such as, large manpower 
currently locked up in managing the PSEs, and their time and energy, for 
redeployment in areas that are much higher on the social priority but are short of 
such resources. 
The other benefits expected to be derived from disinvestment were: 
• Disinvestment would expose the privatised companies to market discipline, thereby 
forcing them to become more efficient and survive or cease on their own financial 
and economic strength. They would be able to respond to the market forces much 
faster and cater to their business needs in a more professional maimer. It would also 
facilitate in fi-eeing the PSEs from the Government control and introduction of 
corporate governance in the privatised companies. 
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• Disinvestment would result in wider distribution of wealth through offering of 
shares of privatised companies to small investors and employees. 
• Disinvestment would have a beneficial effect on the capital market; the increase in 
floating stock would give the market more depth and liquidity, give investors easier 
exit options, help in establishing more accurate benchmarks for valuation and 
pricing, and facilitate raising of funds by the privatised companies for their projects 
or expansion, in future. 
• Opening up the erstwhile public sectors to appropriate private investors would 
increase economic activity arid have an overall beneficial effect on the economy, 
employment and tax revenues in the medium to long term. 
• In many areas such as the telecom sector, the end of public sector monopoly would 
bring relief to consumers by way of more choices, and cheaper and better quality of 
products and services as has already started happening. 
2.3 Major Policy Guidelines 
The shares of the Public Sector Enterprises (PSEs) listed on the stock exchanges were 
heavily under valued. This was primarily because of the indifferent performance of the 
PSEs as well as the market perception that the Government was not prepared to let go its 
control over the PSEs and introduce corporate governance therein. The price / earning (PE) 
ratios of most of the PSEs were in single digits, generally around 4 or 5 - very much below 
the comparable companies in the private sector in India and abroad. The table below shows 
the comparison between the recent PE ratios of some companies in the public and private 
sectors. 
A very established and acceptable method of valuation of any stock is its PE ratio. 
Comparision of PE ratios of PSUs with that of private sector ion the same industry shows 
the complete picture. The PSUs have not come even closer to that of private one in any 
sector or industry. 
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Table 2.1 
Price/Earning per share (P/E ratios) of Indian Public and Private Sectors in India 
Public Sector 
PSE 
Aluminum Nalco 
Banking SBI 
BankofBaroda 
Corporation Bank 
UTIBank 
Financial IDBI 
Gas GAIL 
Heavy Engg. BHEL 
Housing Finance 
GIC Housing 
Finance 
Info Tech CMC 
Petro Chem IPCL 
Petro-Marketing IBP 
P/E 
Ratio 
7.2 
6.9 
3 
4.6 
4.8 
2.7 
4.4 
7.5 
3.9 
59.4 
8.6 
15.7 
Price 
56.70 
224.75 
58.65 
110.90 
35.70 
29.40 
56.25 
164.95 
9.35 
362.35 
69 
316.9 
Private Sector 
Company 
Hindalco 
HDFC Bank 
ICICI Bank 
IDBI Bank 
ICICI 
Gujrat Gas 
ABB 
HDFC 
Infosys 
Wipro 
RIL 
Castrol 
P/E 
Ratio 
8.3 
30.7 
20.7 
27.3 
7 
15.8 
24.3 
16.8 
64 
91.7 
15.1 
24.2 
Price 
775.60 
250.90 
155.05 
24.00 
94.65 
668.55 
316.95 
592.85 
5,695.35 
2368.65 
402.75 
262.85 
Source: Business Standard - 27.2.2008 
The adverse market perception about the PSEs, which is reflective of their indifferent 
performance and Government control, is also obvious from the following Table which 
shows the comparisons between the book values and the market prices of the listed PSEs. 
As the Table 2.2 shows, the market prices of most of these PSEs are either below or just 
about equal to their book value. 
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Table 2.2 
Book Values vs. Market Prices of some listed PSEs as on 8.2,2008 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
NameofPSE 
BEML 
BEL 
BHEL 
CL 
BRPL 
CPCL(MRL) 
CONCOR 
Dreg. Corp 
EIL 
GAIL 
HOCL 
HPCL 
HZL 
IOC 
IPCL 
ITI 
KRL(CRL) 
MTNL 
NLC 
ONGC 
RCF 
SCI 
SAIL 
VSNL 
BSE/NSE Closing 
Price 
29.75 
80.35 
172.30 
187.75 
11.50 
38.55 
180.00 
91.00 
177.15 
58.65 
9.35 
193.80 
22.85 
171.15 
78.00 
29.50 
55.50 
191.35 
14.30 
154.60 
9.15 
39.55 
8.00 
375.10 
Book Value 
160.52 
65.60 
147.03 
232.98 
30.92 
78.29 
93.52 
122.61 
112.31 
55.88 
36.16 
170.38 
24.72 
180.63 
121.77 
30.07 
185.50 
113.02 
25.33 
188.02 
24.04 
67.95 
12.75 
216.64 
Source: Business Standard - 27.2.2008 
2.3.1 Major Disinvestment Policies 
In September, 1997, Government decided that merchant bankers / global advisers would 
be appointed through 13 global process of competitive selection. The Expressions of 
Interest submitted by the advisers/merchant bankers were first considered by IMG 
comprising representatives from the Administrative Ministry concerned, the Department 
of Public Enterprises, the Department of Economic Affairs and the Chief Executive of the 
CPSE concerned. The recommendations of IMG were considered by CGD and approved 
by the Minister in-Charge of the Administrative Ministry concerned, the Minister of 
Industry and the Finance Minister. 
-17-
The criteria and marking system for selection of Adviser for strategic sale were laid down 
by the CGD in its meeting held on 1st April, 1999. In July, 1999, the Government 
modified the procedure to the extent that intermediary advisers like Legal Advisers, 
Accounting Advisers, Asset Valuers, Environmental Advisers etc. should in future be 
appointed by the CPSE concerned following its internal procedure which would also bear 
ththe related expenditure. On 23rd June, 2000, the Government further modified the 
procedure and decided that Global Advisers would be termed as Advisers and be 
appointed with the approval of Minister of State of the Department of Disinvestment 
instead of the Group of Ministers. 
In February, 2001 the Ministry of Law advised that advisers including the intermediary 
advisers should be appointed by the Goveniment and not by the CPSE concerned. 
Subsequently, the Government decided in July, 2001 that, appointment of intermediary 
advisers would be made by Department of Disinvestment, after making selection from the 
list provided by the General Advisers. The actual appointment of intermediary advisers 
was typically made on the recommendations of an Inter Ministerial Selection Committee 
and with the approval of the Minister in-charge of Department of Disinvestment. The 
criteria and the marking system were further revised with the approval of CGD in January, 
2002. 
2.3.2 Selection of Bidders 
The procedure generally followed for selection of bidders was that IMG constituted for the 
specific disinvestment transaction determined the qualification requirements based on the 
recommendations of the Adviser. Thereafter, Expressions of Interest (Eol) were invited 
through public advertisements in leading business newspapers and also simultaneously 
placing the advertisement as well as the preliminary information Memorandum containing 
the requisite -details including qualification requirements, the format of submission of Eol, 
the last date of submission etc. on the websites of DoD, the administrative ministry and 
CPSE concerned. The IMG concerned decided, on the basis of the recommendations of the 
Advisers, on the eligibility of the bidders to participate fiirther in the process. 
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Determination of Reserve Price 
Valuation was carried out to determine the Reserve Price. The Evaluation Committee (EC), 
generally consisting of the Financial Adviser of the Ministry/Department administratively 
concerned with the CPSE, a representative each from the Administrative 
Ministry/Department concerned, the Department of Economic Affairs, the Department of 
Disinvestment, the Department of Public Enterprises, the Chief Executive and Director 
(Finance), wherever available, of the CPSE concerned, made recommendations regarding 
fixation of the Reserve Price. The recommendations of EC were then considered by the 
IMG which also included the Chief Executive and Director (Finance) and a representative 
each of the Administrative Ministry and the Department of Public Enterprises. The Adviser 
concerned submitted the valuation report and the asset valuation report to the EC and made 
presentations on the values arrived at by different methodologies and merits and demerits 
of the various methods. The Valuation Report of the Advisers contained details of 
assumptions and basis of their recommendations. The CGD considered and forwarded the 
recommendations of IMG to CCD, which approved the valuation. However, MFIL was an 
exception, where the bid submitted by Hindustan Lever Limited was evaluated and 
recommended to CCD, for acceptance directly by EC without fixing the reserve price. 
Offer for Sale 
During February-March, 2004, Government sold its entire residual equity in IBP and CMC 
and the residual equity of 28.945 per cent in the case of IPCL. Government also sold small 
portions of equity in DCI, GAIL and ONGC. To assist the Government in selling its equity. 
Book Running Lead Managers (BRLMs) were appointed; the BRLMs were selected 
through a competitive bidding procedure and appointed after obtaining the approval of the 
Minister- in-charge of the Department .on the basis of the recommendations of CGD and 
IMG. The proposals for fixation of floor price/price band and the offer price were first 
considered by a High-level Committee comprising Secretary, Ministry of Disinvestment, 
Secretary of the Administrative Ministry concerned, Joint Secretary, Department of 
Economic Affairs and Joint Secretary, Department of Disinvestment. The 
recommendations of the High-level Committee were submitted for approval to the Group 
of Ministers constituted for this purpose. 
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Subsequently in June, 2004, the following disinvestment related functions were allocated 
to the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA). 
a) to consider issues relating to disinvestment; 
b) to decide price band for the sale of Government shares through Global Depository 
Receipt/domestic capital market route prior to the book building exercise, and to 
decide the final price of sale in all cases; 
c) to decide the final pricing of the transaction and the strategic partner in case of the 
strategic safes; 
d) to decide on cases where there is disagreement between the recommendations of 
the Disinvestment Commission and the views of the Department of Disinvestment. 
During July, 2004, Government decided to piggyback with an offer for sale on the fresh 
issue of equity that was being undertaken by NTPC. At the time of seeking Government's 
approval, it was considered that the procedure to be followed by NTPC for determining 
and approving the floor price/price band and offer price and sale price would also be 
applicable to the Government shares and this activity would be performed simultaneously 
taking the entire offer as one. DOD would participate in all monitoring level meetings in 
the Ministry of Power. A separate IMG was not to be formed. 
In September, 2004, Government constituted an Empowered Group of Ministers (EGoM) 
to decide all issues related to the price band for the sale of Government's shares through 
GDR/domestic capital market route prior to the book building exercise and to decide the 
final price of sale in all such cases. EGoM comprises the Minister of Finance, the Minister 
of the Administrative Ministry concerned and Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission. 
EGoM would be serviced by Department of Disinvestment. 
Sale of Residual Equity by the Auction Method 
The Government's residual equity of 18.28 per cent in MUL was sold in two trenches of 8 
per cent and 10.27 per cent in January, 2006 and May, 2007 respectively. Another 0.01 per 
cent was sold to employees in March, 2006. 
In the case of sale of 8 per cent Government equity in MUL to public sector financial 
institutions and public sector banks, an IMG finalized its recommendation on appointment 
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of Advisers after going through the presentations made by merchant bankers/investment 
bankers. The recommendations of IMG were later considered by CGD and approved by the 
Finance Minister. The same advisers were retained for the sale of Government's remaining 
stake of 10.27 per cent to public sector financial institutions, public sector banks and Indian 
mutual fimds. 
An Evaluation Committee under the Chairmanship of JS&FA, DoD with JS, DHI; JS. 
DoD; and JS (PSE), Department of Economic Affairs, as members, was constituted for 
recommending the floor price, final sale price and allocation of shares. The Committee's 
reconamendations were submitted to EGoM for approval. 
2.3.2 Bidding Procedure 
Strategic Sale: 
The bidding procedure for strategic sale was evolved keeping in view the principles of 
transparency, administrative simplicity and fair play. Bidding was done in a two-stage 
process. In the first stage, all those bidders meeting the eligibility criteria were shortlisted 
by an IMG and were invited to do the due diligence of the company. Simultaneously, the 
transaction documents were firmed up by the Advisers in consultation with the CPSE 
concerned, the shortlisted and interested parties and IMG. Once the Government approved 
the draft transaction documents, which defined the future rights and obligations of the 
Government and the strategic partner, the conditions for sale of shares etc., financial bids 
were invited from the shortlisted bidders who had completed due diligence. After 
determination of the Reserve Price, the financial bids were opened and the highest eligible 
bidder was recommended by EC/IMG to CGD. The recommendations of IMG together 
with the reconunendations of CGD in regard to sale price and the buyer were placed before 
CCD for approval. 
Offers for Sale 
Since 2003, eight Offers for Sale were concluded. All of them utilized the Book Building 
route. Under this methodology, bids were invited within a pre-determined floor from the 
investors during a specific period. Each investor submitted bid specifying the number of 
shares bid for and the price. After the end of the bidding period, the bids were 
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consolidated and a cut off price was recommended by the Inter-Ministerial Committee, 
constituted separately for each transaction, for approval to the EGoM, which took the 
final decision regarding allocation of shares to investors and the cut-off price. 
Auction Method: 
In the initial phase (December, 1991 to 1995-96), disinvestment of shares of select CPSEs 
was through the auction method. The reserve price was first determined by the Core Group 
of Secretaries and then the bids were invited from pre-determined target group of investors. 
Shares were allotted to the bidders in order of the bid prices, first to the highest bidder and 
then to next and 50 on until the shares were exhausted or the reserve price reached, 
whichever was earlier. 
For the sale of residual shareholding of Government in MUL undertaken in January, 2006 
and May, 2007, the Government first fixed the reserve price and then the bids were invited 
from the target group of investors. The shares were sold through the auction method 
described above. 
Valuation 
As mentioned earlier, valuation was carried out to determine the Reserve Price. The 
objective of valuation was to determine the fair value of an asset, which in turn is based 
on the assessment of its intrinsic value accruing from the fundamentals of the asset on a 
stand-alone basis. A purchase and sale was concluded only when two parties, with varying 
views on the value of an asset, reach an agreement on the same price. Thus the sale price 
were different from the Reserve Price, the latter being a benchmark for evaluation of bids 
received through the bidding process. 
2.3.3 Experience of Other Countries and WTO Issues 
It has been universally recognised that the instrument of public ownership, widely used 
during post-colonial rule and post-war reconstruction period, is no longer the most 
desirable instrument for development. The signing of WTO has also led to severe global 
competitive pressure on national industries with the realisation that they will not survive 
tmless they are competitive in international markets. Further, due to the Government's 
inability to raise taxes and reduce expenditure, the use of taxpayers' money in running 
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industries has come under serious criticism in most of the countries. These pressures have 
led to large-scale privatisations around the world. 
Apart from Britain and France, there are, several other countries where privatisation has 
taken place. Worth mentioning are the privatisations in the erstwhile East Germany, China 
and Chile. While privatisation started in Germany as far back as in 1959, over 14500 
companies were sold by Treuhandstalt (THA) post -1990, following reunification of 
Germany. Privatisation was carried out through public sale, sale by option, trade sale, 
management / employee buy-outs. etc. THA was able to successfully complete its assigned 
job. 
China 
In the case of China, market reforms started in 1998. The reforms included corporatisation 
and listing of large and medium size State Owned Enterprises (SOE) on the domestic and 
foreign stock exchange and permission to foreign investors to invest in various 
infrastructure and utility businesses, such as railways, toll roads, ports and power plants. In 
1978, over 75 per cent of the industrial output was produced by the State sector which is 
reported to have fallen to 34 per cent by 1995. The collective sector is reported to have 
increased from 32 percent to 37 per cent individual sector (small capitalist businesses) from 
1.8 per cent to 13 per cent and others (including all other capitalist enterprises -local and 
foreign) from 1.2 per cent to 16.6 per cent. Thus, the private sector grew at the expense of 
the State sector. At the 15th Party Congress held in September 1997, the Central leadership 
decided to engage in fundamental restructuring of some 300,000 SOEs within a 3-year 
framework by 2000, through mergers, acquisitions, corporatisation/privatisation and 
declaring bankruptcies, injection of fresh capital through the introduction of the joint stock 
system and systematic layoff of excess workers. According to the World Investment Report 
1997, foreign direct inflows to China amounted to US $ 42.3 billion in 1996. The level of 
Foreign Direct Investment inflows in other years were also similar in comparison to annual 
inflows in India, roughly of the order of US $ 1.5 to $3 billion every year. 
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Chile 
Chile is another example of notable privatizations, Deregulations, liberalisation and 
privatisation have been the major elements in the Chilean economic policy smce 1973, 
reversing a long trend of the growth of public sector. Since 1973, it has undergone 4 major 
privatisations the transfer of expropriated enterprises during 1974-75; the extensive 
privatisation during 1975-79 of enterprises that were not expropriated but in which the 
State had ownership ; the privatisation, of bankrupt private corporations (including banks) 
from 1984 to 1986; and finally the privatisation of large public corporations (mainly public 
utilities) which started in 1986 and continued throughout 1988. 
Italy 
Among the specific cases of successful privatisation, the privatisation of ENI (Italy), is 
cited as one of the most successful privatisations. ENI was used by the Italian Government 
as a flagship company for privatisation. In the beginning there was a lot of opposition, but 
the success of the transaction ultimately changed the entire perception about privatisation 
in Italy. The Government stake was sold in four tranches of around 15 per cent each, 
between 1995-'1998'. The sale of each tranche resulted in the improved perception about 
the value of ENI shares. While the first tranche of 15 per cent shares fetched US $ 3.95 
billion in December 1995, the fourth (last) tranche of 13 per cent shares (which resulted in 
ENI becoming a private company) fetched the Government US $ 7.3 billion, that is. more 
than double of the first offering. Post-privatisation, the value of Government shareholding 
increased dramatically to the extent that the Government's remaining stake in ENI (38.6 per 
cent) had about the same market value (US $ 22 billion) as the market value of 85 per cent 
shares after completion of the first offering in December 1995. 
2.3.4 The World Bank's Privatisation Guidelines 
The lessons learnt form the experience of the authors Sunita Kikeri, John Nellis and Mary 
Shirtey, officials of the World Bank, make the point that government's intent on privatizing 
face a challenge: the benefits of efficiency and innovation only materialise if disinvestment 
is carried out correctly. They have provided following checklist. 
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Checklist of privatisation guidelines 
The following checklist provides some basic guidelines: 
• The more market-friendly a country's policy framework - and appropriate policy is 
corrected with capacity to regulate - the less difficulty it will have in privatising on 
State Owned Enterprises (SOE), and the higher the likelihood that the sale will turn 
out positively. 
• SOEs functioning in competitive markets, or in markets easily made competitive, 
are prime candidates for privatisation. Their sale is simple compared with that of 
public monopolies, and they require little or no regulation. 
• An appropriate regulatory framework must be in place before monopolies are 
privatised. Failure to regulate properly can hurt consumers and reduce public 
support for privatisation. 
• Countries can benefit from disinvestment management through management 
contracts, leases, contracting out or concessions. 
• The primary objective of privatisation should be to increase efficiency not to 
maximise revenue (for example, by selling into protected markets) or even to 
distribute ownership widely at the expense of managerial efficiency. 
• Rather than restrict the market by excluding foreign investors and favouring certain 
ethnic groups, governments should experiment with "golden shares" (devices that 
prevents complete takeover by non-government interests without retaining 
management control by government) and partial share offerings. These could help 
to win acceptance for foreign and other buyers. 
• Avoid large new investments in privatisation candidates; the risks usually outweigh 
the rewards. Rather prepare for sale by carrying out legal, managerial and 
organisational changes. 
• Experiences shows that labour does not, and need not, lose in privatization, if 
governments pay attention to easing the social cost of unemployment through 
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adequate severance pay, unemployment benefits, retraining and job search 
assistance. 
• Ideally, let the market set the price and sell for cash. Realisticall}', through 
negotiated settlements and financing arrangements or debt equity swaps may be 
unavoidable. 
• In all privatizations, in all countries, the transaction must be transparent. 
2.3.5 Disinvestment Commission's Recommendations 
The Disinvestment Commission was set up on 23.8.1996 for a period of 3 years with the 
following terms of reference; 
• To draw a comprehensive overall long-term disinvestment programme within 5-10 
years for the Public Sector Undertakings/Enterprises (PSU / Es) referred to it by the 
Core Group. 
• To determine the extent of disinvestment (total/partial indicating percentage) in 
each of the PSU. 
• To prioritise the PSUs referred to it by the Core Group in terms of the overall 
disinvestment programme. 
• To recommend the preferred mode(s) of disinvestment (domestic capital 
markets/international capital markets/auction/private sale to identified investors/any 
other) for each of the identified PSUs. Also to suggest an appropriate mix of the 
various alternatives taking into account the market conditions. 
• To recommend a mix between primary and secondary disinvestments taking into 
account Government's objective, the relevant PSU's funding requirement and the 
market conditions. 
• To supervise the overall sale process and take decisions on instrument, pricing, 
timing, etc., as appropriate. 
• To select the financial advisors for the specified PSUs to facilitate the 
disinvestment process. 
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• To ensure that appropriate measures are taken during the disinvestment process to 
protect the interests of the affected employees including encouraging employees' 
participation in the sale process. 
• To monitor the progress of disinvestment process and take necessary measures and 
report periodically to the Government on such progress. To assist the Government 
to create public awareness of the Government's disinvestment policies and 
programmes with a view to developing a commitment by the people. 
• To give wide publicity to the disinvestment proposals so as to ensure larger public 
participation in the shareholding of the enterprises. 
• To advise the Government on possible capital restructuring of the enterprises by 
marginal investments, if required, so as to ensure enhanced realisation through 
disinvestment. 
The Disinvestment Commission shall act as an advisory body and the Government will 
take a final decision on the companies to be disinvested and mode of disinvestment on the 
basis of advice given by the Disinvestment Commission. The PSUs would implement the 
decision of the Govenunent under the overall supervision of the Disinvestment 
Commission. 
The Commission while advising the Government on the above matters will also take into 
consideration the interests of stakeholders, workers consumers and other having a stake in 
the relevant public sector undertakings. 
Modified terms of reference 
The terms of reference of Disinvestment Commission were modified on 12.1.1998. The 
modified terms of reference were as follows: 
• Disinvestment Commission shall be an advisory body and its role and function 
would be to advise the Government on disinvestment in those public sector units 
that are referred to it by the Government. 
The Commission shall also advise the Government on any other matter relating to 
disinvestment as may be specifically referred to it by the Government, and also 
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carry out any other activities relating to disinvestment as may be assigned to it by 
the Government. 
• In making its recommendations, the Commission will also take into consideration 
the interests of workers, employees and others stakeholders in the public sector 
unit(s). 
• The final decision on the recommendations of the Disinvestment Commission will 
vest with the Government. 
If we look at the number of cases referred to the disinvestment commission we note that 
PSUs that were referred to the Commission, 47 were profit making. The Disinvestment 
Commission gave its report on 58 PSEs, out of which 38 were profit making. In these 58 
PSEs, the following methods of sale were recommended. Please see table 2.3 
Table 2.3 
Methods of Sale and Number of Enterprises sold 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Method of Sale 
Strategic sale 
Trade sale 
Offer of share 
No disinvestment 
Disinvestment deferred 
Closure/Sale of assets 
Total 
No. of PSEs 
29 
8 
5 
1 
11 
4 
58 
Source: Source: Business Standard - 27.2.2008 
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Disinvestment Commission's Recommendations on Valuation 
The Disinvestment Commission, in its Report on Disinvestment: Strategy and Issues, 
submitted in December, 1996, while underlining the ,importance of the subject of 
valuation, discussed three basic approaches to valuation: 
a) Discounted Cash flow (DCF) 
b) Relative valuation. 
c) Net asset value. 
The Commission was of the further view that the use of a particular method of valuation 
would depend upon the health of the company being evaluated, the nature of the industry 
in which it operated and the company's intrinsic strengths. The depth of the capital 
markets would also have an impact on the valuation. 
The Commission also discussed several factors, which impact valuation. Although 
valuation methods itself generate a range of valuations in each case, some discounts may 
need to be applied to arrive at the correct present value. 
The Commission also sought to correct some erroneous perceptions about valuation. There 
is a general perception that since valuation models were quantitative, valuation is 
objective. The Conmiission felt that though valuation does make use of quantitative 
models, the assumptions made as inputs to the model leave plenty of room for subjective 
judgments. At the same time, there is no such thing as a precise estimate of a value. Even 
at the end of the most careful and detailed valuation of a company, there could be 
uncertainty about the final numbers, as they are shaped by assumptions about the future of 
the company's operations. 
Another perception sought to be corrected by the Commission was the relationship 
attributed between valuation and market price. The benchmark for most valuations remains 
the market price (either the company's own price, if it is listed, or that of a comparable 
company). The Commission felt that the valuation done before listing takes into account 
anticipated factors, whereas market price reflects realised events that are influenced by 
unanticipated factors. Moreover, a specific valuation itself may not be valid over a period 
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of time as it is a function of the competitive position of the company, the nature of market 
in which it operates and Government policies. Therefore, it may be appropriate to update 
or revise valuations. 
Valuation Methodologies followed in the case of Strategic Sale 
The following four methodologies were used for valuation of CPSEs: 
a) Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) Method. 
b) Balance Sheet Method. 
c) Transaction Multiple /Comparable Companies/Relative Valuation 
Method. 
d) Asset Valuation Method. 
The Reserve Price was fixed on the DCF method in the case of BALCO, CMC, HTL, 
VSNL, IBP, IPCL, HZL, ITDC and HCI Hotel units. In the case of MFIL, the reserve 
price was not fixed, whereas in the case of PPL, the reserve price was determined by 
giving weightage of two to DCF value and one to the Replacement Value based Asset 
Value. 
A statement indicating the valuation of the CPSEs, which were sold through strategic sale, 
tmder different methods of valuation, the Reserve Price and Sale Price in each case. The 
statement indicated that the bid price realized by the Government was always more than 
the Reserve Price, except in the case of PPL. The statement on Reserve Price and the 
amount realised in respect of disinvestment of hotel properties also deferred significantly.. 
Valuation Methodologies followed in the case of Sale of Small Portions of Equity -
Auction Method: 
During 1991-96 shares were sold by the auction method. The basis of fixation of the 
Reserve Price is given here in under: 
a) In the first year of disinvestment, i.e., 1991-92, Government sold shares in bundles 
belonging to Very Good, Good and Average CPSEs. The auctions were open only 
to financial institutions, mutual funds and public sector banks which were finally 
subjected to a reserve price computed on the basis of the then prevailing formula of 
the Controller of Capital Issues. The second phase of disinvestment was based on 
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reserve prices recommended by the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of 
India. 
b) In the subsequent year (1992-93), the shares were sold individually in auctions 
which elicited more competition with the presence of firms, corporate bodies as 
well as individuals who had permission to buy, hold and sale shares in India. 
Reserve prices at the auctions were fixed with the help of professional advice from 
merchant bankers and only bids in excess of the reserve prices were accepted. 
Shares were allotted in the order of bid prices, first to the highest bidder, then to the 
next and so on until the shares were exhausted or the reserve price reached, 
whichever was earlier. 
c) In 1993-94, the reserve price was the higher of the highest price realized for each 
CPSE's share at the last year's auction or average of the prices indicated by the 
merchant bankers (IDBI and ICICI) for that CPSE. Towards the end of 1993, the 
government offered shares to employees in eight CPSEs where disinvestment had 
already occurred, at a 15 per cent discount to the average price realized by the 
Government at the auctions held during 1992-93. 
d) The formula for fixation of reserve price was revised in 1994-95 as the higher of (i) 
average price indicated by the merchant bankers engaged for that purpose; or (ii) 
average price realized at any preceding auction. Where there was more than one 
previous auction in which the share had been sold individually, the highest of the 
average price realized at any of the preceding auctions was considered. 
e) During 1995-96, the reserve price was taken as the average of the price indications 
given by a panel of three institutions namely, IDBI, ICICI Securities and SBI 
Capital Markets. 
f) In the year 2005-06, the Government sold 8 per cent of the paid equity capital of 
MUL through the auction method to public sector financial institutions and public 
sector banks. A floor price of Rs.620 per share was fixed for the share of the face 
value of Rs.5. The shares were allotted to the bidders in the order of the bid prices, 
first to the highest bidder and then to the next and so on until the shares were 
exhausted at a cut off price of Rs.660 per share. The weighted average price worked 
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out to Rs.678.24 per share in a bid range of Rs.660-725. Another 0.01 per cent was 
sold to employees at the cut-off price of Rs.660 per share. Each employee was 
offered 20 shares. 
g) In May, 2007 the Government sold its residual 10.27 per cent paid up equity capital 
in MUL through the auction method to the public sector financial institutions, 
public sector banks and Indian mutual funds. A floor price of Rs.760 per share was 
fixed for the share of face value of Rs.5. The weighted average price of the shares 
sold worked out to Rs. 797.49 per share in a bid range of Rs. 775- 850. 
Public Offerings: 
a) The Government through the 'Offer for Sale' route, divested all or a portion of its 
equity in six listed companies viz. DCI, CMC, ONGC, GAIL, IBP and IPCL. 
While disinvesting in these six listed companies, the Government was required to 
fix a Floor Price/Price Band. The Floor Price/Price Band was fixed by the Group of 
Ministers on the recommendations of a High-level Inter-Ministerial Committee. 
While making its recommendations, the High level Committee was, by and large, 
guided by the market price and its trends. In some cases, multiples provided by 
BRLMs were also considered for assessing the reasonableness of the recommended 
Floor Price/Price Band. The Floor Price per share recommended in the cases of 
CMC, GAIL, IBP and IPCL was Rs.475, Rs.l85, Rs.620 and Rs.l70 respectively. 
In the cases of DCI and ONGC, the price bands of Rs.385 - 400 and Rs.680 - 750 
per share respectively were fixed. 
b) The IPO of MUL in 2003 consisted only of an Offer for Sale for 27.51 per cent of 
MUL's paid-up equity, out of Government's shareholding. Based on the 
recommendation of the BRLMs, the floor price of the issue for the face value of 
Rs.5 per share was fixed at Rs. 115 per share. 
c) The IPO of NTPC in 2004-05 consisted of an Offer for Sale for 5.25 per cent and 
Fresh Issue of 5.25 per cent of the post-issue paid up equity of NTPC. A price band 
of Rs.52 to Rs.62 per equity share was fixed after studying the ratios pertaining to 
PIE, P/BV, EV/Adjusted EBITDA, Dividend Yield, DCF, etc. 
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2.5 Summary 
The major reasons for disinvestment decision have been explained in this chapter. A brief 
description of the procedure followed while allowing disinvestment and the use of 
proceeds so realised too has been provided. An experience from the other countries of the 
world has also been discussed. Some background has been provided on the problems and 
in line with that prospects have been discussed in the subsequent chapter. 
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Survey of Literature 
Chapter - 3 
Survey of Literature 
In this chapter efforts have been made to study the research work of various scholars on 
the subject. As far as possible attempt has been made to study a wide range of literature 
from the refereed journals, books, news papers and periodicals and business magazines 
such as the Business Standards and Business Today. Political commentary from various 
sources including the library of the parliament and other sources have been scanned. The 
literature so reviewed has been summarised and research gaps have been identified and 
later on addressed in the methodology section in chapter four. 
According to Basu, P.K. (2003) disinvestment became a hall mark of market-oriented 
reforms in many countries across the globe, especially in those countries where 
experimentation with socialism and public sector has not yielded it bountiful returns. The 
public sector enterprises in most of the countries have a substantial share is national saving; 
investment accounts, balance of payments accounts and govenmient receipts and payment 
accoimts. Thus there performance at a micro or firm level has a significant impact at macro 
or national level. As per Clark Gordan (1997) the public sector in many countries including 
India has become an epitome of low profitability, low rate of return, over-employment, 
unnecessary burden on exchequer and political manipulation. The multi dimensional 
objectives of public sector give enough room for criticism. Whatever justification is given 
for the existence of public enterprises, the state of economy and the public sector, colossal 
loss and resource cnmch, call for improvement in there performances. 
Privitisation is an idea, like communalize or socialism. It means the gradual shift of the 
government fi-om owing and nmning industries to only regulating them. By another 
definition privatization means sale through public offer of a part or whole of the capital by 
government out of its total holding of shares, at a fair and reasonable price. The identical 
idea is to transfer the control of the govt, companies to the non-govt. management. But 
privatization of the public enterprise can be no panacea for the economy. According to 
Ramesh, J. R. (2007), the idea of revitalizing three enterprises on the basis of conventional 
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criteria such as returns on investment is pointless. At stake are national priorities - social, 
economic and even political - strategic. 
There can be three alternatives before the Government in India on privatization the whole 
public sector or profit making units or / and loss making units. The first option remains 
outside the preview of consideration as it defeats the welfare objective of the government. 
The choice left is between profit making and loss incurring units. Jagdish, P. C. (1997). 
says that the profit making units call for privatization when the government wants to have 
more resources by selling away such units. In the cases the loss making units, it is because 
they became a burden on the budget and ultimately on the economy. Bakhshi, M. (2007), 
says that in a developing country like India the private sector does not have the capacity to 
buy the share of public enterprises on large scale. This sector has already taken many mega 
projects and hence may not be in a position to finance the take over of the public sector 
projects. It needs to be noted that many of these mega projects are also financed through 
public sector, financial institutions. Gupta, S.L. (1998), says that a frequent criticism of 
privatization is that it is merely a give away of public property at fi-ee in far below a fare 
valuation of assets one of the reasons for the low prices public sector companies fetch is the 
large risk that private investors have to take, besides price controls exercised by the 
government that can prevent a fair return on capital. Handa, R. (1996), says the opponents 
to privatization also raise fear about loss of revenue and strategic supplies, as also the 
survival of uneconomic socially necessary queries. 
According to Gangadhar, V. (2007), in developing country like India privatization cannot 
serve as a remedy for all the ills of public enterprises because they are expected to serve as 
powerfiil instruments for achieving social and economic justice. Mere change of ownership 
from public to private alone does not guarantee efficiency or effectiveness in the 
production and delivery of public goods and services. 
According to Jain, T.K. (2002), economic theory privatization without efficiency gain does 
not impose a country's facial stance. This is because when state-ovraed enterprise is sold at 
a fair market price the value of sales should non or the equal the net present value or future 
after tax earnings Bakhshi, M. (2003) says that when a profitable state owned enterprise is 
privatized, the state obtains sales proceeds but foreign fiature earnings, the opposite is true 
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when a loss-making state owned enterprises is privatized. In either case all that takes place 
is a trade-off between current and future net proceeds. 
In its monthly commentary on Indian eco-condition published in September 2002, it has 
been observed that the claim of the economic reformer that once public mvestment 
especially in industry is withdrawn and industrial development is left to private enterprise, 
the resource constraint on the government for investment in social sectors would be 
removed. This is a false claim. It was also argued by them that disinvestment would benefit 
the mass of the people and make privatization and market drive growth of Indian industry 
expectable and popular. This has not actually happened. As per Jha S (1984) the 
disinvestment and privatization drive has certainly and often were allowed diversion of 
public funds to selected private business corporations. To extract high profits from meager 
investments and take over off public sector undertakings. The privatization of BSNL to the 
TATA house is the case in point. 
Jenkins, R. (1999), observes that it has been further observed in the aforesaid commentary 
on the Indian economic conditions, that the original idea of disinvestment to raise revenues 
for the government for opening on alternative priority area such as education, health, roads 
and irrigation has also been shelved. After the winding up of the disinvestment 
commission, which tended to give some importance to enhancing the market value of 
PSU's before there privatization and collect larger revenue for the exchequer the 
disinvestment policy developed novel features and wider dimensions under the NDA 
government lead by Mr. A.B. Vajpayee. He event tofar in committing himself, in the 
domestic arena as well as the globally, to the privatization-the globalization policy. And his 
disinvestment policies did not win for NDA (National Democrat Alliance), popular 
acceptance. The awareness of the implication and consequences of the so called economic 
reform did show wide spread anger in India and these economic reforms because most 
contention issues for political and electoral contention. This contention did exercise 
dominant influence in the general election and led to the disastrous results for the NDA 
parties. The Minority Congress Government which initiated in 1991, the privatization-
globalization process in India found itself vulnerable in the mid-term of its tenure. The then 
Prime Minister Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao realizing the pulse of the common man halted the 
implementation of market fiiendly economic reforms for the time being and event week to 
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populist gestures in order to be able to improve the poor electoral prospects of his party. 
Like Mr. Vajpayee's party too was routed in the general election. 
It was felt that the entire disinvestment programme and the maimer in which it was being 
implemented at a feverish, break-neck hurry by then disinvestment minister Mr. Arun 
Shourie was not in the larger national interests and at provoke popular opposition, which 
was acquiring mass character. Since then the privatization of PSU had become more 
openly, ideologically inspired rather than based on the criteria of economic efficiency. 
Three decades ago for not processing, Indian crude oil brought matters to head on for the 
contentions issue of the disinvestment of the PSU's. Mr. Georage Fernandes, the NDA 
convener brought the issue of review of the decision not only for the sale of two public 
sector refineries and their marketing networks, but the entire disinvestment programme as 
was being implemented by Mr. Arun Shourie. It was further realized that the sale of the 
govt, equity in PSU's did not work to yield substantial revenue for the government. The 
strategic sale of PSU's to private corporations at negotiated prices caused alarm as it was 
found that the nation assets were being given away at a throw away pull for the dubious 
considerations, ideological and economic. The privatization of the PSU's rightly came 
under serious question as a way to help private monopolies, Indian and foreign to flourish 
at the cost of labour and the consumer. Even the Congress Party which initiated the 
disinvestment process had developed strong reservation on the disinvestment in the case of 
profit making PSU's, some of the partners of them ruling NDA government had misgiving 
about the working the disinvestment ministry. There were also allegations of corruption in 
selective disinvestment deals with business interest, foreign and Indian and it was argued 
that the adverse implication of privatization on Indian economy and polity should be 
entirely examined. 
Disinvestment scheme device firom time to time to raise substantial revenues for the Govt, 
by selling the equity PSU's under the NDA government had obviously lost its charm for 
the self styled economic reformers in the government. 
It appears most of the important economic general opposed the policy of the NDA 
govenmient on disinvestment, whereas many journals simply pointed out the procedure of 
disinvestment. 
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Public enterprises have served as the backbone of the Indian economy in providing 
infrastructure facilities, supporting the cause of constitution and trying for a meaningful 
solution to balance economic and regional growth. Hence, any attempt to structurally 
adjust them must be the product of substantial thought followed up by a strong action plan. 
3.1 Organisation of Survey of Literature: 
Attempt has been made to categorize the articles written on specific themes and discuss 
them at one place. For example the authors who in general have discussed the importance 
of public sectors in the economy and have argued against disinvestment have been clubbed 
together. Similarly, those who support disinvestment have been quoted separately. Also, 
the research work has been placed in chronological order for the ease of following chain of 
events. 
Mukhopadhaya, Debadas (1994) observes that since the privatization has been recently 
coined there is not single definition as yet universally accepted by one and all. Interpreted 
in a narrow sense, the term privatization mainly broadly means a change of ownership 
from state to the private sector. 
The monthly commentary on Indian economic condition in its issues of September 2002, 
July 2000, October 2002 made severe criticism of the policies on disinvestment under 
national democratic alliance government and warned further that if the govt, does not 
change its policies on disinvestment it will face disastrous results in the general elections 
for the national democratic alliance. The NDA govt, did not read the vsriting on the wall 
and proceeded with the disinvestment in the most reckless, irresponsible and dubious 
manner. 
In an article published in Business India Oct 1998, Journal of the Institute of Public 
Enterprise July-September 1997, Southern Economist May 1998, Prestige Journal of 
Management And Research April-October 2002, Journal of The Institute of Public 
Enterprise, Jan-Jxme 2002, an article by Gangadhar, V. and Vadagiri (2002) M Maharana 
and K.K., Ray (2002), published in Indian Journal of Commerce, Prakash Rao and Ramana 
Rao (2001, the authors have by and large argued and case of disinvestment and suggested 
to exercise restraints. Further the articles by Rama Swamy (1997) on disinvestment in 
central public sector enterprises in India in the January-July issue of the journal of Institute 
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of Public Enterprise, by Rath A.K (2001). Disinvestment in central public sector enterprises 
in India, by Sharma, Atul (2002) in India-restructuring and privatization and by Simrit 
Kaur (1998) on public enterprise disinvestment in India-a theoretical and empirical 
framework published in January-Junel998 the authors have gone against making the case 
of disinvestment. 
Trivikram, K. (2001) on disinvestment in Central public sector enterprises-some reflection. 
published in prestigious Journal of the Institute of Public Enterprise, by Shastri Sandeep on 
public sector disinvestments reassessing the role of state (2002), Singh - Pradeep Kumar 
and Khatik S K (2002) on disinvestment in Public Sector Units in India, Stanley, B.J. 
(2001) on critical review-disinvestment in Indian Public Sector, have analysed the 
economic aspects of public sectors have argued the importance of these sectors for the 
economy. 
Narendar, Niketan (2004) has supports the idea of the disinvestment but at the same time 
says that there is very severe criticism of the methods adopted by the NDA Govt, in selling 
the public sector undertaking on a throw away price Balaji, P. (2002), the approach of most 
of the cities of disinvestment of public sector undertaking is very cautious and inspired by 
the patriotic sentiments of throwing away national assets in a distress sale, the role of NDA 
govt, and Mr. Arun Shourie the Disinvestment Minister has be uniformity criticized in 
implementing disinvestment policy. He has appealed to the then NDA Govt, and its leaders 
not to be reckless in pursuing the disinvestment policy and had warned in there articles 
uniformity that if then NDA Govt, continued with its policy of disinvestment in rash and 
feverish way it will meet very disastrous results in elections. 
Prem Shankar Jha (2005) in his book titled "Economic Reforms in India" discusses the 
need for privataisation, in a sense taking money out of public sectors and has made a well 
argued case for the same. Deepak Nayyar (2005) the Vice-Chancellor of Delhi University 
on in his work titled "Intelligent person of guide to liberlisation" too has warned the policy 
makers not to go recklessly vnt disinvestment and has provided useful insight for the 
prospective investors factors to be considered while going for investment in the off loaded 
shares of PSUs. Ribha Mathur (2005) in his work titled "Disinvestment of Public sector 
enterprises in India-Policies and Challenges" has also made a clear case for disinvestment. 
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He has provided a brief historical perspective to the public sector presence then provided 
the reasons for disinvestment. He has critically examined the lessons one should learn from 
West. 
Prakash, Jagdish, Nageshwar Rao and Others (2006) in their work "Administration of 
Public Enterprises in India" in their book have cautioned the government to go slow with 
the process and they have to the extent of saying that after all this is not the last 
government in the country. Roy, R.C. (2006) in his work "State Public Enterprises in 
India" discusses the reasons for unsuccessfiil PSUs and has highlighted the policies of 
government responsible for the failure. Singh, R.K.P (2007) in his work "Organisation and 
Management of Public Enterprises Published" has also argues for the need of 
disinvestment. The thesis he built is around profitability of public and private sector and 
has argued that private sector shall not erode the wealth at all. Anna, K. K. (2007) in her 
work "Management of Public Sector Enterprises India" has emphsised the need for 
professional management of public sectors rather than day to day interference of the 
government. He has in a sense concluded that so long as the bureaucracy does not limit its 
interference, PSUs fimctioning shall continue to be affected adversely. 
Chandrashekhar, C.P. and Jayoti Ghosh (2006) have criticized the disinvestment policy of 
the NDA Govt. In their work titled "The Market that failed" they have discussed the 
reasons as to why the policy of government failed to realise the objective with which PSUs 
were crated. 
A highly valuable piece of document that provides comprehensive account of everything 
one may like to know on the disinvestment is Disinvestment Commission Report. It has 
several reports nmning into hundreds of pages. Attempt has been made to summarize all 
the reports and to provide summary of these reports having a bearing in this thesis. 
In the first report of Disinvestment Commission, it had evolved guidelines on modalities of 
disinvestment on different aspects of the disinvestment process. The objective of evolving 
these guidelines was to enable consistent application across all PSU's and also to serve as 
transparency of the disinvestment process. The Disinvestment Commission submitted its 
report in April 1997 and approving the first report the government made recommendations, 
to strengthen PSU's were appropriate in order to facilitate disinvestment, to protect 
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employee interest, to broad based ownership and to augment receipts for Govt. The 
Disinvestment Commission gave specific recommendations on Bharat Alummum Ltd. 
(BALCO), Bongaigaon Refinery and Petro-chemicals Ltd. (BRPL) 
Disinvestment Commission submitted its subsequent report in May 1997 and observed 
review of progress in disinvestment. The commission has evolved detailed guidelines on 
modalities and procedures of disinvestment specific recommendation in regard to 15 PSU's 
out of the 50 PSU so far refer to it have been submitted in its three reports. It gave specific 
recommendations about Container Corporation of India Ltd (CONCOR), Kundremukh Iron 
Ore Company Ltd. (KIOCL), Mahanagar Telephones Ltd., Oil India Ltd., Oil and Natural 
Gas Corporation Ltd. (ONGC) and Rail India Technical and Economic Services Ltd. 
(RITES) 
The disinvestment commission submitted its report-IV in August 1997. It approved the I, II 
and III reports of the disinvestment commission generally and made specific 
recommendations for Hindustan Copper Ltd. (HCL), Pawan Hans Helocopter Ltd. (PHL), 
Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. (Power Grid) and Shipping Corporation of India 
(SCI) The disinvestment commission in November 1997 submitted its Report-V and has 
taken note of the progress so far in implementing the recommendations about Engineers 
India Ltd. (EIL) Engineering Projects (India) Limited (EPIL), Hindustan Prefab Limited 
(HPL), IBP Company Ltd (IBP), National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) and NEPA 
Limited (NEPA) 
Disinvestment commission submitted its report-VI in December 1997 and made specific 
recommendations about some of the public sector undertakings referred to it. 
1) Electronics, Trade and Technology Development Corporation Ltd. (ET & T). 
2) Hindustan Vegetable Oils Corporation Ltd. (HVOCL) 
3) Hindustan Zinc Ltd. (HZL) 
4) Hotel Corporation of India (HCIL) 
5) National Hydro-electric Power Corporation Ltd. (NHPC) 
6) Pyrites Phosphates and Chemicals Ltd. (PPCCL) 
7) Rehabilitation Industries Corporation Ltd. (RICL) 
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The disinvestment commission submitted its Report-VII in March 1998, in which there has 
been a change in the government's stand. In the VII report the recommendations were 
made with regard to the following PSU's thus taking the total number of PSU's dealt with 
by the commission to 41 out of 43. The remaining two have not be covered in this report. 
These include: 
1) Fertilizers and Chemicals (Travaneore Limited) 
2) India Petrochemical Corporation Ltd. 
3) National Aluminium Company Ltd. 
4) National Fertilizers Ltd. 
5) Neyveli Lignite Limited 
6) Steel Authority of India Limited 
7) Hindustan Latex Limited 
In its VIII Report, submitted in August 1998, its specific recommendations were about Air 
India and Central Electronics Ltd. It is also recommend that priority should be accorded to 
the performance improvement of CEL to make it independent and commercially viable and 
recommended the reduction of manpower by introduction of an attractive Voluntarily 
Retirement Scheme (VRS). 
The disinvestment commission submitted its Report IX in March 1999 and made specific 
recommendation about Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd and State Trading Co-
operation of India. The commission submitted its X report in June 1999. In its VII report it 
observed that in 1996-97 government had referred a total of 50 PSUs to the commission. 
Govt, then withdrew 7 PSUs, effectively leaving 43 PSUs for the commission to examine 
and give its recommendations. Commission had in VIII report submitted its 
recommendation in respect of all these 43 PSU's. The VIII report of the commission was 
submitted in August 1998. The 10 PSU's were defenred to the commission in January 1999, 
and another few in April 1999. Out of these, 5 PSUs were already imder reference of BIFR. 
Thus out of 22 PSU's referred to the commission in 1998 and 1999, five already stood 
referred to BIFR. In the tenth report the commission has given its recommendations in 
respect of 4 PSU's including ONGC on which the commission had earlier suggested that 
disinvestment be deferred. It gives specific recommendations about the following PSUs. 
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1) MMTCLtd 
2) National Mineral Development Corporation Ltd. (NMDC) 
3) Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) 
4) Pradeep Phospates Ltd (PPL) 
5) Project and Equipment Corporation Limited (PECL) 
The Disinvestment Commission Submitted its Report XI in July 1999 and made specific 
recommendations about 
1) Metallurgical and Engineering Consultants India Ltd. (MECON). 
2) The Metal Scrap Corporation Limited (MSTC) 
3) Mineral Exploration Corporation Ltd. (MECL) 
4) Sponge Iron India Ltd. (SIIL) 
The commission had recommended that disinvestment should be deferred in certain PSU's 
which are Oil, ONGC, MOIL, NTPC, NHPC, NLC, and Power Grid, The commission had 
also recommended that the disinvestment be deferred in certain PSU's wiz SAIL, CEL and 
PEC pending fulfillment of certain specified conditions. It made specific recommendations 
about -
1) Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (BHEL) 
2) Hindustan Insecticides Limited (HIL) 
3) Hindustan Organic Chemicals Limited (HOCL) 
4) Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilizers Limited (RCFL) 
5) Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited (RINL) 
To sum up it is submitted that the reports I to XII are the basic document ion the 
disinvestment policy in India and all the issues by the governments were considered by 
seriously and disinvestment commission had examine all the aspects of the disinvestments 
of public sector undertakings. Later the NDA Govt, did wind up the disinvestment 
commission because it had become an obstacle in the way of NDA Govt. The NDA 
government set up a separate ministry of disinvestment, under the leadership of the persons 
belonging to Bhartiya Janta Party. The first disinvestment minister was Mr. Arun Jaitely 
and when there was hue and cry about his policies in parliament and outside, he was 
substituted by the journalist turned politician Mr. Arun Shourie as a disinvestment minister. 
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His policies were also challenged by NDA convener Mr. Goerge Femandes and JD(U) 
leader Mr. Sharad Yadav. There was strong criticism even in the inner coterie of RSS and 
BJP. RSS openly opposed the sale of National assets. The RSS ideologue Govindacharya 
disassociated himself publicly with the policies of A.B. Vajpayee government on 
disinvestment. 
The UPA goverrmient led by the father of liberalization and disinvestment. Dr Manmohan 
Singh after enduring power assured the people of India that National Assets will not be sold 
out in a reckless manner. The disinvestment will continue but due care will be taken to 
protect the national interest and pride. The Govt, led by the Dr Manmohan Singh has 
framed a common minimimi programme of UPA (United Progressive Alliance) which as 
but lot of emphasis on the disinvestment of public sector undertaking and has clearly led 
down that only non-profit making PSU's may be considered for disinvestment with certain 
conditions and strict compliance of procedures. We will consider the basic documents of 
Narsimha Rao govt, which initiated the process of Disinvestment, Common Minimum 
Programme of United Front Govt, and the CMP of NDA and the recommendations and 
reports of disinvestment commission and also the common minimum programme of the 
UPA govt, at appropriate occasion in our thesis. 
Coming the news items appeared in various news papers, business times etc, following 
news items are being considered relevant by the scholar. 
Business Line (28 May 2004) The CMP has stated that profit-making public sectors 
undertakings (PSUs) will "generally" not be privatized and all privatizations "will be 
considered on a transparent and consultative case-by-case basis." The Navratnas (IOC, 
ONGC, HPCL, BPCL, NTPC, BHEL, SAIL etc.) would, in particular, be retained in the 
Public-Sector fold and no PSU would be privatized if it leads to the emergence of a 
monopoly or restricts competition. This virtually rules out the sale of companies such as 
Nalco. Similarly not only public sector insurance companies would be privatized, but also 
the social obligations imposed by regulatory bodies on private banks and msurance 
companies "will be monitored and enforced strictly". Major highlights are as under: 
• Economy to grow by at least 7-8 percent aimually 
• Revenue deficit to be eliminated by 2009 
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Cess on all central taxes for promoting universal education 
SEBI to be strengthened 
Privatisation to be on a case-by-case basis 
'Generally' profitable PSUs not to be privatized 
Special scheme to unearth black money and assets to be introduced 
FDI, FII investments to be encouraged 
Lie, GIC to remain public sector entities 
PSU banks to be given full managerial autonomy 
Automatic hire and fire regime ruled out 
Labour Laws and Industrial Dispute Act to be reviewed 
Business Standard, New Delhi (28 May 2004) in a write up "Thumbs down for many 
reforms" it has been summarised that the United Progressive Alliance's Common 
Minimum Programme (CMP) has put on the backbumer reforms in at least three crucial-
areas-disinvestment of profit-making public sector undertakings, labour law changes and 
privatization of power utilities. Their views on various sector are as under. 
On Power 
• Review Electricity Act 
• Deadline for unbubdling of SEBs to be extended 
On Privatisation 
• No to navratnas sell-off 
• Revival of sick PSUs 
On Employment 
• Act to guarantee job for a minimum of 100 days 
In other place in the same magazine, it is summarised that the UPA government also laid 
special emphasis on the public sector by promising to devolve fiill managerial and 
commercial autonomy to successful, profit-making companies operating in a competitive 
environment. For pensioners and senior citizens, the CMP promised higher interest rates 
-45 
and said that the employees' provident fund (EPF) interest rate would not be changed 
without prior consultation and approval of the EPF Board. 
The Times of India (28 May 2004) in a caption "Reforms, targets stay on track", says that 
the Economic reviews are alive and kicking, that's the central message of the Common 
Minimum Programme (CMP). We will persist with economic reforms, but reforms with a 
human face", as Manmohan Singh summed up the economic policies and programmes. The 
Left hasn't hi-jacked reforms. In all key areas like fiscal consolidation, taxation, 
infrastructure, public sector, industry and labour, the CMP pushes liberal policies. 
There is greater emphasis on redistributive policies, so that benefits touch all sections of the 
people. So, the growth target has been kept at 7-8% armually for 10 years. Nobody's talking 
of double digit growth. Does this point to growth pessimism? No. The PM made it clear 
that the goverrunent will shoot for even higher growth, but not in vacuum. It would device 
policies and programmes to back it. 
The CMP keeps all options open for disinvestment. Profit-making PSUs will not 
"normally" be privatized, the PM said. But government might privatize even profit-making 
PSUs in case they drive their profits in monopoly situations but cannot do so in competition 
with other enterprises. As such, profit-making PSUs will be fi"ee to divest in the market as 
long as their "pubic sector character", meaning government control, remains intact. Same 
would be the case with the nationalized banks. For all other PSUs, the options of 
privatization or handing over them to private sector on management contract would be 
freely exercised. 
The Tribune, Chandigarh (28 May 2004), on the issue of disinvestment and privatization of 
the public sector, the drafting skills of CMP's the authors have ensure that there is room for 
maneuver. This was evident when the Prime Minister maintained that "normally, profit-
making public sector companies" would not be privatized. 
The CMP maintains that all "privatization will be considered on a transparent and 
consultative case by case basis." It also states that the UPA will retain existing "navratna" 
companies in the public sector though they would be allowed to raise resource from the 
capital market. Dr. Singh explained that if a company is making profit because of 
monopolistic conditions, then disinvestment could not be ruled out. 
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The Times of India, New Delhi (28 June 2004) in the caption CMP: A Tale of Deletion and 
Dilution maintains the following. 
Economic growth target of 7-8% 
Legal guarantee for 100 days of employment 
Cess on all central taxes for funding education 
Moderate and stable tax rates 
VAT to be introduced 
Special schemes to unearth black money 
Disinvestment ministry scrapped, will be under finance ministry as a department 
Profit-making PSUs not be privatized but can divest in market; Navratnas to stay 
government controlled. 
Foreign direct investment to be encouraged in infi^ astructure, high technology and 
exports 
Labour laws to be re-examined 
SEBI to be strengthened 
Fill investment to be encouraged, but misuse of tax treaties to be curbed 
Integrated energy policy; energy security to be enhanced. 
A national manufacturing competitiveness council to be set up 
Strengthening public distribution system. 
Review of Electricity act, 2003 
Protect National Interest of Farmers at WTO; play proactive role in G-20 
Trade and investment with China to be enhanced. 
The Statesman, New Delhi (4 June 2004) in the caption "More planned but where's the 
money" summarises that there could be higher buoyancy in terms of more revenue from 
taxed but not a huge amount. To cover for the rest of the expenses will be a problem. There 
is the possibility of reallocations within the current plan which means slashing current 
projects. There could also be an amoimt of dovetailing - for example, the people who cook 
mid day meals could be paid by out of fund under a separate head. The bigger problem is of 
state finances. The total debt is Rs.55,000 crores and what the government will do to 
manage this problem, spiraling out of control also has to be seen commission officials said. 
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The Hindu, Chennai (31 May 2004) under the heading "No Major Policy change Likely in 
the Disinvestment" says that the "Profit making PSUs will not be privatized, generally'; 
What is the need for the appendix, 'generally'? It seems to be a very significant and late 
addition. Again, what is meant by privatization? A PSU can become a private company 
only if the government disinvests more than 50 percent of its holdings or hands over 
administrative control to a private group. If less than 50 percent of the holdings are given 
away and a nominal administrative control is retained, it carmot be called privatization. So, 
massive disinvestment, that has come to be termed as selling family silver, can continue. 
Selling family silver is in itself not bad. It can be a good proposition if the cash received 
from sale is used for generating more wealth. Take the case of LIC of India. It has a huge 
volume of hidden, idle wealth like family silver. It can be utilized to generate more than 
wealth for the nation. This idle wealth, known as the embedded value, is the discounted 
value of future profit flow. This year, the Government will be getting Rs.500 crores as 
dividend and this will be increasing by not less than 10 percent each year. If 20 percent of 
the Government's holding in the LIC is offered to the general public, the money raised can 
not only help the corporation in creating an explicit reserve, but also enable the government 
to have ready access to resources at reasonable cost. 
The Economic Times, New Delhi (29 May 2005) in the caption "States go easy, you've 
less debt burden" says that a fresh package to ease the debit burden of states in on the 
cards. The common minimum programme (CMP) of the United Progressive Alliance 
(UPA) has made a commitment to improve the fiscal health of states by reducing their debt 
burden, lowering the interest on loans and enhancing the states' share in the divisible pool 
taxes. Fiscal consolidation figures as an important agenda in the CMP given the strength of 
the coalition partners in the Congress led govenunent. 
Business Standard, New Delhi (y"* June 2004) in the caption "Long on Farm sector, short 
on PDS reforms" mentions that the Common Minimum Programme (CMP) of the United 
Progressive Alliance (UPA) promises protection to farmers against imports and a jump in 
public investment on agriculture and irrigation. But it does not propose any radical reforms 
in the public distribution system, evoking some adverse comments from the Left parties, 
which are supporting the goverrmient from outside. 
48 
The Hindu Business Line of 8 June 2004 quotes President's Kalam's Speech 'Lest there 
should be any doubt about how this going to be accomplished, the government reiterates its 
commitment to eliminating the revenue deficit of the Central Government by 2009 so as to 
release more resources for investment in social and physical infrastructure. "Subsidies will 
be targeted sharply at the poor and needy. A detailed road map will be prepared for this 
purpose". 
The Government need not waste time in preparing the roadmap on this as its present 
Finance Minister, during his pervious tenure in the North Block, commissioned a detailed 
study on merit and non-merit subsidies, which must perforce be dusted off from the shelf 
for focused action sooner rather than later. 
The Hindu Business Line in its 8 June 2005 issue on disinvestment mentions that the UP A 
government aid considers privatization on a case-by-case basis and developed full 
managerial and commercial autonomy to successful profit-making companies operating in 
a competitive milieu. It further went on to add that public banks would be encouraged and 
nationalized the capital market to raised resources and offer new investment avenues to 
retails investors. 
Former disinvestment Minister Arun Shourie told Business Line in the Central Hall of 
Parliament, "As days pass by, the statement of the Government on Privatisation and 
disinvestment come resemble more and more exactly what was being done by the Vajpayee 
Government and this is to be expected. I have long argued that there is a consensus in 
practice and these changing statements make that very clear every day." 
In sum, the new Government's attempt to balance reforms with human face would compel 
it not to jettison well-tested ideas it practiced in power during the Narsimha Rao 
Government, which it accused the successive governments to have hijacked for electoral 
gains. The cycle has come a full circle. Notwithstanding the jibes and protests from the Left 
parties, some of the opposition leaders in Parliament said. 
Hindustan Times, New Delhi in its report dated 2 June 2006 mentions that "We're not 
against disinvestment as such. But we believe it should be properly prioritized and carried 
out by the finance ministry after consultations with the concerned administrative ministries 
in a transparent manner," the SJM leaders said. Also observing that the Left had got the 
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largest number of MPs ever in the recently concluded Lok Sabha elections, Rao hoped they 
fully realised the responsibility the people had entrusted them with. 
Business Standard, New Delhi in its editorial dated 22 June 2005 says that "Generally' 
profit-making, public sector companies will not be privatised. That pretty much terminates 
existing policies for disinvestment / privatisation. The capital market has certainly taken 
that view and hugely reduced stock valuations of PSUs. Corridor gossip confirms serious 
inactivity in the Department of Disinvestment. As for loss making enterprises, the chances 
of successfiil sales by government are next to nil. Who will have the courage to set reserve 
prices low enough total low successful transactions? 
The quesfion remains, "Who will bid for the PSUs which are loss- making?" It is even 
more intriguing that the CMP is defining the target units for privatisation as those who have 
settled their dues to labour. This will itself mean a burden on the fiscal before even starting 
to privatise. It must be conceded that the door is kept open for the "navaratna" PSUs of this 
category raising fimds fi"om the capital market, presumably through equity offerings. 
In The Tribune, Chandigarh, dated 29 May 2005, it is argued that while in opposition, the 
Congress had opposed the sell off of oil PSUs only. Now it talks of granting managerial 
autonomy to state enterprises. Disinvestment policy stays, privatisation is out. It had 
backed the passing of the Electricity Act and Congress governments in states have been 
pursuing power reforms in accordance with the party's economic agenda. There is an 
about-turn in Andhra Pradesh where the Congress government has announced free power 
for farmers. The Punjab Goveniment too is keenly awaiting the green signal. 1 he party's 
Political compulsions are understandable. 
In The Hindu, Chennai, dated 31 May 2004, in a caption "Good intentions by themselves 
will not help' it has been said that while focusing on growth some critical issues of 
economic policy surface. Policies In the past depended heavily on disinvestments FDI 
service exports. These three areas have become areas of intense scrutiny in the new policy 
envirormient. Disinvestments as a means of resource mobilisation cannot be relied upon 
significantly. The tempo of FDI, especially financial capital inflows, is likely to come 
down. Business process outsourcing and manpower exports, other things being equal are 
likely to be a major reliable source in the coming few years. 
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A better approach will be to divest shares in PSU to the general public and allow these 
companies to become large publicly held companies, with major shareholdings by banks, 
insurance companies, FIIs and mutual funds. This will also allow them to have managerial 
autonomy. Allowing them to remain in the public sector probably destines a number of 
them to a slow death. Governments usually promise autonomy but in practice in India they 
remain handmaidens of the political bureaucratic nexus. There is no particular reason to 
believe that this time it will be different, except perhaps for the new guiding light in the 
form of the Prime Minister. 
Looking at the views expressed by the representatives of the industry is also of prime 
importance. The officials are the nerve of the industry and have wealth of experience with 
them. Some of their comments are in order and are given below. 
CII president Anand Mahindra said that the CMP seeks to address the concerns of all 
sections of society. He welcomed the emphasis on economic growth and reforms. 
Mahindra said the agenda in the CMP would contribute to economic growth and ensure 
that growth percolates to all sections of society. The UPA government's pledge to enact a 
National Employment Guarantee Act as well as commitment to step up public investment 
in rural infrastructure and irrigation should benefit the rural economy, and create 
employment opportunities. 
CII was happy about the m new government's commitment to eliminating the revenue 
deficit by 2009 and to the early introduction of VAT. The CMP's promise of flexible labour 
laws and the pledge to protect the legitimate interests of Indian industry and agriculture at 
the WTO forum is a positive approach, he said. 
The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) said the CMP tie 
provide a clear roadmap for action for the new government and urged the government to 
implement the individual elements of the CMP in a time boimd-maimer. FICCI added that 
commitment of fiscal correction, reforms of the PSUs, speedy implementation of VAT and 
review of labour laws are commendable. The Electricity Act had encouraged private sector 
players by raising their confidence towards increasing investments. So FICCI asked the 
government to exercise caution while reviewing the Electricity Act. 
- 5 1 -
Other chambers Hke ASSOCHAM and PHDCCI also welcomed the CMP. MK Sanghi, 
president of ASSOCHAM, welcomed the CMP and said, "The government should be 
concentrating on developing world-class infrastructure that can attract fresh investments 
and cormect rural India with urban cities enhancing the economic powers of the rural 
masses. 
Sanghi suggested that all the viable public sector undertakings should be given autonomy 
to facilitate them to take commercially viable decision and suggested the government to get 
rid of the loss-making units. 
PHDCCI president Ravi Wig also welcomed government's resolve to improve social 
infrastructure and raise employment. 
In the popular national daily, Business Line October 14, 2003, the imbroglio over the 
attempts to privatise HPCL/BPCL, and now bringing up the issue of splitting up IOC could 
actually jeopardize the entire divestment programme of the Union Government, says 
Paranjoy Guha Thakurta, who looks at the oil PSUs privatisation that threatens to snowball 
into a major crisis within the NDA Government. 
The controversy surrounding the Disinvestment Minister, Mr Arun Shourie's intransigent 
position on privatising public sector petroleimi companies, especially Indian Oil 
Corporation and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited, threatens to snowball into a 
major crisis within the National Democratic Alliance Government. What seems worse for 
Mr Shourie and his mentors, including the Prime Minister, Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee, and 
the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr L. K. Advani, is that the imbroglio over the attempts to 
privatise these two companies could actually jeopardise the entire divestment programme 
of the Union Government. 
In other words, Mr Shourie may well end up cutting his nose to spite his face. By his 
actions, he has not merely antagonised his political opponents but also sharpened the 
criticism of those within the Bharatiya Janata Party-led NDA Gove'mment who had strong 
reservations about the methodology deployed by him to privatise some of the largest, best-
managed and most"" profitable public sector undertakings. One would not be exaggerating 
if one argued that the one individual who contends that he is among the biggest votaries of 
privatisation has willy-nilly become its single biggest enemy. 
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After the September 16 judgment of the Supreme Court restraining the Union Government 
from privatizing HPCL without obtaining Parliament's approval, the Disinvestment 
Minister disingenuously claimed the entire privatisation programme had been derailed. His 
own ministerial colleague, the Petroleum and Natural Gas Minister, Mr Ram Naik, 
however, hailed the judgement as a "historic" one. Thereafter, on October 3, following a 
meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Disinvestment, Mr Shourie contended that the 
Government would seriously consider a proposal to split the country's largest company. 
Indian Oil Corporation, into smaller entities before privatising its marketing arm. 
Newspapers quoted Mr. Naik as saying that something quite different had transpired during 
the CCD meeting. 
It is hardly a secret that the Petroleum Minister had been opposed to the privatisation of 
HPCL but had been overruled by his Cabinet colleagues at the December 9, 2002 CCD 
meeting. Mr Shourie had wanted both HPCL and Bharat Petrpleum Corporation Limited to 
be privatised. However, at that meeting, it was decided that while the larger HPCL would 
be privatised, the shares of the smaller BPCL would be divested to the public. If the 
Cabinet eventually decides to privatise IOC and there is no guarantee that it will - it would 
go back on its own decision not to privatise IOC as well as two other Navratnas (nine 
jewels) the oil PSUs Oil and Natural Gas Corporation and GAIL Limited. 
IOC is India's largest petroleum refining and marketing company with a daily turnover in 
excess of Rs 320 crore. The management had last year lodged a strong protest when it was 
disallowed by the Government from bidding for the shares of its smaller sisters, HPCL and 
BPCL. The former IOC Chairman and Managing Director, Mr M. A. Pathan, had argued 
that it would be clearly discriminatory on the part of the government if a private corporate 
group like Reliance was allowed to bid for Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Limited 
while denying IOC the opportunity to bid for HPCL and BPCL. The Government allowed 
IOC to bid for IPCL - managerial control over which was acquired by the Reliance group 
in May 2002 - but subsequently barred one PSU from bidding for the shares of another on 
the grovmd this did not result in "genuine" privatisation. (IOC had earlier successfully bid 
for managerial control over IBP Limited, formerly Indo-Burma Petroleum) 
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After the Government allowed the Reliance group to control IPCl thereby enabling the 
combine to hog a more than three fourths share of the country's market for a wide variety 
of petrochemical products, Mr Shourie's privatisation methodology started encountering 
concerted opposition from within the BJP and the NDA. It was not merely Mr Naik 
(whose vast empire as Petroleum Minister was sought to be shrunk) who opposed him 
but the Defense Minister and NDA convener, Mr George Femandes, as well who wrote 
to the Prime Minister in protest. What is especially curious is that an attempt should now 
be made to split IOC, the only Indian company in the Fortune 500 list, at a time when 
petroleum companies all over the world over are coming together to become bigger and 
bigger. 
Unlike HPCL and BPCL, both of which were nationalised in the 1970s after taking 
over the assets of foreign oil companies, there is no legal bar on the government 
privatising all but a handfiil of the 236 Central PSUs in India (including the 130 profit-
making ones such as IOC, ONGC and GAIL). Yet, the reactions of Mr. Advani and 
Mr. Shourie make it amply clear that the Government did not believe it would be able 
to muster the support of a majority of the members of both Houses of Parliament to 
change the law of the land. This not only indicated that there were sharp differences of 
opinion on the subject within the NDA but also that there was no political consensus 
cutting across party lines on the modalities of privatising profit-making PSUs. 
Instead of rushing headlong on to a confi"ontation with the Judiciary, the Government 
decided that it would merely ask the Supreme Court Bench that passed the order on 
HPCL to clarify its judgment. The apex court made it dear, that it was not commenting 
on the government's policy of privatisation but merely asking the Executive to go to 
the legislature to change the statute before privatising HPCL. 
The former Disinvestment Commission Chairman, Mr. G. V. Ramakrishna, has 
commented that Mr. Shourie should not have acted in "unseemly haste" by asking 
private groups such as Reliance and Shell to proceed with due diligence of HPCL even 
as the Supreme Court had reserved its judgment after hearing arguments on both sides. 
It is not merely this correspondent but many others who have argued that Mr. Shourie has 
wrongly choosen to focus his attention and energies on a few high-profile, well-performing 
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PSUs to the neglect of others that cry out for immediate attention - particularly chronic 
loss-making companies such as _ National Textiles Corporation. As T. T. Ram Mohan, 
professor at the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, aptly remarked: "Mr. 
Shourie has erred not merely in his choice of firms but in his insistence on a particular 
method, strategic sale (that entails handing over managerial control of a public sector 
company to private promoters) as the norm for disinvestment". 
IOC and HPCL share around three-fourths of the country's market for petroleum 
products. The IOC management recently offered to pick up the government's stake in 
HPCL for roughly Rs 10,000 crore - to make up the shortfall in the budgeted receipts 
from divestment this financial year - adding a new twist to the episode. 
The Reliance and Shell groups are, among others, keen on acquiring the marketing and 
distribution network of either HPCL or IOC. Whereas Reliance has set up one of the 
largest petroleimi refineries in India and Asia, it so far does not possess commensurate 
marketing and distribution facilities. On the other hand, the multinational Shell is hopeful 
of distributing imported petroleum products. It would be expensive for both these groups to 
set up a marketing infrastructure on their own. And as Mr Ramakrishna points out, given 
that many retail outlets of IOC and HPCL are at prime locations, a private group may not 
be able to purchase such property for love or for money. That is why controlling HPCL or 
a part of IOC would make all the difference for Reliance or Shell. That is also the real 
reason why Mr. Shourie's policies are as contentious as they are. 
3.2 Political Issues and Disinvestment - An Introduction 
No other area of economic reforms generated much political controversy in the second-
generation reforms than the disinvestment of public sector units. Whatever was the 
economic rationality behind such reform processes it generated lot of political debates both 
at the intra-party and inter-party levels. At the intra-party level, it rekindled a rift between 
the advocates of market reforms and the left-of-centre approach within the Congress party 
over the pros and cons of the disinvestment policy. On the intra-party front, it was an arena 
of confrontation between the ruling BJP and the opposition parties especially, the Congress 
party. Though, Congress was the initiator of the public sector reforms in the Narasimha 
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Rao regime, it was quite disturbed over the management of public sector under the BJP 
regime. 
The BJP after coming into power carried on the economic reforms initiated by the 
Congress as it had shifted from resisting globaHsation to accommodating it through critical 
collaboration. The Vajpayee government's commitment to economic reforms was more 
evident in the budget 2000-2001 which called for accelerating the 'second generation 
economic reforms'. In the budget the government reiterated the restructuring , and reviving 
of potentially viable Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs), closing down of PSUs which 
cannot be revised, bringing down government equity in all non-strategic PSUs to 26 per 
cent or lower if necessary and for fully protecting the interests of workers. By initiating 
these reforms, the BJP government covmtered the Congress who claimed to be the initiator 
bf reform process in India. Moreover, it proved that there was not much distinction 
between the BJP's governance of the economy and that of the previous Congress party 
government. 
The BJP regime saw the 'privatisation' of public, sector which was replaced by a more 
fashionable word, 'disinvestment' of public sector. The government in a further boost 
to the disinvestment process set up a new department for disinvestment, in March 
2000 to establish a systematic policy approach to disinvestment. The rationale behind 
the policy was that money raised from the sale, of government equity could be used 
for social security measures like health care, education, rural development, poverty 
alleviation or even repaying the public debts. But, in the initial phase of disinvestment, 
the government concentrated on the disinvestment of loss making PSUs, which in the 
course of time' turned towards the profit making PSUs on the ground that private 
buyers will not be interested in picking up loss-making units. Moreover, the 
government handed over the equities to multinationals at much below the market 
value. 
3.2.1 Political and Historical Perspective of Disinvestment 
The policy of disinvestment has evolved over a period of time - beginning from the 
restructuring of PSUs under the Rajiv Gandhi regime - though it did not gain a wider 
currency as the term 'disinvestment' in the present sense. In the mid eighties there 
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aroused criticisms over the functioning of the PSUs. Because the PSUs were 
bureaucratically managed many of them incurred losses the year after. It was argued 
that the state should not be called upon to meet the losses of these enterprises out of. 
tax payers money. The rationale of this view was that since the state had to invest 
more .critical areas, it had to withdraw from, funding the loss making PSUs. 1 aking 
this view into account, Rajiv Gandhi in his reform measures took certain steps to 
restructure the moribund PSUs. The Prime Minister was critical of the inefficient 
public enterprises for gross overstaffmg and low productivity, political interference, 
non-commercial styles of management and economic pricing policies. His objective 
has been to try to engender greater efficiency through free use of imported technology, 
especially advanced electronics, the removal of controls, increased competition and 
improved management in public sector. 
Based on the report of the Arjun Sengupta Committee on Review Policy for Public 
Enterprises appointed by Indira Gandhi, the Rajiv Gandhi government initiated certain 
reform measures in the public sector. The report called for redefining the government 
public enterprises relations and identified certain core sectors like agriculture, irrigation, 
railways etc. in national planning. The government strategically denounced the idea of the 
public sector's monopoly and opened up to high technology and foreign capital. The 
government's role was restricted as it was primarily concerned with overall strategic 
planning and policy, rather than with the day to-day functioning of public enterprises. As 
a first step towards liberalization, the government removed 25 industries from its list of 
those that required a 'license prior to entry, decontrolled some prices and .certain sectors 
which were previously reserved for state control were opened competition. The share of 
public sector investment on total planned, outlays declined from 53 per cent in the Sixth 
Plan to 48 per cent in the Seventh Plan. 
V. Krishnamurthy made suggestions for public sector and based on this, the government 
issued a white paper on public sector suggesting the privatisation or closure of public 
sector undertaking which were making losses recurrently. But the stiff criticism from 
both within the party and the opposition, the trade unions' campaign to 'save the public 
sector' and the fading image of the government in the corruption scandals forced the 
government to not implement its recommendation. It was stated that the politically dam-
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aged Rajiv Gandhi was not eager to provide further ammunition to the opposition to 
attack him, in this instance it was the alleged betrayal of socialism and the Nehruvian 
(policies of Mr. Jawahar Lai Nehru, India's first Prime Minister) legacy. 
Politically, the public sector reforms evoked concern within the Congress party. There 
were wider apprehensions about the total abandonment of the party's longstanding policy 
towards the public sector which was vital for 'the commanding heights of the economy. 
Apprehensions were more explicated among the Members of Parliament that it was a 
deviation from the party's economic policy. In the midst of the augmenting criticism 
against the public sector reforms and the attempt to revive the party's commitment to the 
public sector, a two-day seminar was organized by the Economic Advisory Cell of the 
AICC (I) on 24-25 April, 1986 in New Delhi on "Public Sector on Indian Economy: 
Problems and Prospects". The late Prime Minister. Rajiv Gandhi in his capacity as the 
Congress president reiterated the party's commitment to the public sector. He said: 
" The growth and development of the public sector has been a comer stone of the 
Congress party's economic policy. The public sector has come to occupy a crucial 
position in the economy, and has played a vital role in the building up of the 
infrastructure and in the overall industrial development of various regions, particularly 
the backward areas. Our large and diversified industrial structure today bears a testimony 
to this fact". 
During the last phase of his term, Rajiv Gandhi reiterated that the public sector must give 
the lead. While addressing the Chief Executives of Public Sector units in New Delhi on 14 
January 1988 the Prime Minister urged the public sector to give top priority to generating 
internal resources and not to expect any budgetary support. 
'According to him, the public sector has had and must -continue to have strategic role in 
development. It had to improve its performance and act as the engine of our self-reliance 
and economic independence." Swamy (1994) aptly describes the changing role of the state 
in relation to the weakening role of the PSUs. According to him, 'until 1980, it pursued a 
set of policies that created a favourable environment for the expansion of public sector. 
Thereafter, it gradually detached public enterprises from budgetary support, leaving them 
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to finance their expansion through funds raised from the capital market as also opening 
their 'reserved' sectors to private enterprises'. 
3.2,2 Disinvestment under Sri Narasimha Rao Period 
In the economic reform measures of Narasimha Rao government public sector reform 
constituted one of the important issue areas. Mainly two factors influenced the 
government's reforms in public sector. Firstly, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
setback of communist regimes in East European countries overshadowed the significance 
of PSUs in the economic development. Secondly, the altering role of the State and market 
in economic development reversed the role of the public and private sectors. Privatisation 
and deregulation, the twin components of the economic reforms affected the dominant role 
of the public sectors. The government was quite critical of the performance of PSUs in the 
reform process. Its argument was that though public sectors has contributed significantly 
to the diversification of India's industrial structure, its contribution in terms of generating 
internal resources for further expansion had fallen short of expectations, and its inability to 
do so had become a major constraint on economic growth. According to government 
sources, the performance of the public sector deteriorated sharply in 1990-91 when the net 
profit (after tax) of all non-departmental central public sector enterprises declined to Rs. 
2368 crore from the level of Rs, 3789 crore reached in 1989-90. The poor performance 
continued in 1991-92. The government's view was that not only the budgetary support to 
public sector enterprises should be scales down and thereby financial discipline maintained 
in their operation but it should also be exposed to competition. 
In 1991-92 the government undertook a limited disinvestment of a part of the public sector 
equity through public institutions and mutual funds in order to raise non-inflationary 
finance for development. The objective of disinvestment was stated to be providing further 
market discipline to the performance of public enterprises. It has to be remembered that in 
the reform budget of 1991, the government proclaimed that 'in order to raise resources, 
encourage wider public participation and promote greater account ability, up to 20 per cent 
of government equity in selected public sector undertakings would be offered to mutual 
funds and investment institutions, in the public sector, as also to workers in these firms. It 
hoped that such a limited disinvestment would bring greater public accountability and help 
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to create a new culture in their 'Working and thereby improve efficiency. Keeping this 
view, the government experimented Umited disinvestment in certain public sector 
enterprises. For example, some of the profit making public enterprises such as National 
Aluminium Company Limited (NAICOL), Hindustan Zinc Limited (HZL), Indian 
Petrochemicals Corporation Limited (IPCL), Bharat Heavy Electricals limited (BHEL), 
Hindustan Machine Tools (HMT), and National Thermal Power Corporation Limited 
(NTPC) sold about 20 percent of their equity holdings. 
Politically the public sector reforms generated an intra-party debate on the approach of, 
the Congress as most of the provisions in the reforms seemed to be antithetical to the 
interest of the party. For instance, the replacement of Industrial. Disputes Act by a new 
industrial relation act weakened organised workers. Secondly, the policy of 
denationalisation resulted in the loss of much of the concessions which the employees 
enjoyed for a long time. Since these sections constituted the important political 
constituencies of the Congress, the public sector reforms adversely affected its support 
base among them. It has to be seen that even with the pressure from the international 
financial agencies for more public sector reforms, the presence of organised labour in 
India was a constraint to public sector reform due to two reasons: existence of labour laws 
and the importance of labour unions as political constituencies. In other words, 'while 
external pressures served primarily as an impetus for the public sector reform, internal 
economic and political factors have functioned primarily as constraints to reforms. The 
Congress plenary session in Tirupati in 1992 saw an ideological debate on the issue of 
public sector reforms. The advocates of the left-of-centre approach charged that the 
reforms diluted the party's commitment to the public sector in its economic policy and 
strategy. But the advocates of reforms tried to legitimise it with the election manifesto for 
the year 1991. According to them the party in its manifesto while affirming its faith in the 
role of public sector hinted at certain reforms. The manifesto emphasised that 'the public 
sector is crucial to the growth of the Indian economy, industry and employment. However, 
over a period of time some public sector companies have become lethargic, inefficient and 
expensive. This situation needs to be set right. However, at the end of the session a 
consensus was arrived at that the restructuring of PSUs intended to restore its heath and 
profitability. 
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3.2.3. Disinvestment under the United Front Government: 
In the mid nineties when the Congress space in Indian politics was shrinking, new 
coalitions were formed at the central level. On 1 June, 1996 the United Front (UF) and the 
Left Front coalition government under the leadership of H.D. Deve Gowda came into 
power with the outside support of the Congress party. The economic management under 
the UF government generated concerns among the advocates of economic reibrms. This 
was because the sustainability of the government depended on the outside support of the 
pro-reform Congress and the critique of the reforms, the left parties, especially the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist) 
The restructuring of the public sector was one of the key areas of reform of the UF 
government. As a new direction on the reforms in public sector on 23 August. 1996, the 
United Front goverrunent set up a five-member disinvestment commission in pursuance of 
a promise made in the CMP. It was set up for a period of three years with an objective to 
determine the extent of disinvestment in each of the PSUs, to prioritise the PSUs referred to 
it by the Core Group in terms of the overall disinvestment programme, etc. Its major 
objectives were; using disinvested funds for social and infrastructural purposes, increasing 
efficiency and productivity of enterprises by exposing them to the discipline of the market 
and reducing political interference in running these enterprises and lending 
professionalism. It was an advisory body to the government in matters relating to the final 
decision on the companies to be disinvested and also the mode of disinvestment. The 
privatisation of public enterprises had been limited to partial disinvestment with the 
government retaining control. In a significant move the goverrunent referred 40 PSUs to 
the commission for advice. 
3.2.4. Disinvestment under the BJP Government: 
The post Rao phase saw the emergence of BJP from the role of the main opposition party to 
the ruling party at the Centre. BJP formed the government for a short span of 13 days after 
the 1996 election and doubts arose about the continuation of the economic policies initiated 
by the previous Congress government. It has to be remembered that the BJP, when it was in 
opposition, criticised the Rao government on many policy initiatives related to economic 
reforms. On 17 May, 1996 a day after the Vajpayee government assumed power, the new 
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Finance Minister Jaswant Singh stated that Rao's economic reform was safe if the B JP was 
allowed to continue in power beyond 31 May (the deadline for proving its ma,iority in the 
House). He not only endorsed the previous government's reforms, but also promised to 
accelerate them and create conditions for easier inflow of foreign investment. He stated that 
there would be a continuity of policy and that all the contractual obligations of the previous 
government would be honoured. According to him, 'swadeshi' (country made) was not an 
anti-reform word. His view on foreign investment was that India would remain the 
favourite destination for investment. 
In fact, the BJP's perception on economic reforms was similar to that of the Congress in a 
way. For instance, reflecting the Congress' approach, the Industry Minister added, 'We 
have reached a stage where we cannot go on subsidising the PSUs as we have other 
pressing areas like social sectors including health, education and sanitation where we will 
have to spend more ... the public sectors will have to learn to survive on their own'. 
The first budget (1998-99) of the second Vajpayee govenunent was presented on 1 June, 
1998 by the Finance Minister, Yashwant Sinha. The budget decided to bring down its 
share holding in the PSUs to 26 per cent in most of the cases. At the same time, it clarified 
that the government would retain majority holding in PSUs involving strategic 
considerations and the interests of the workers would be protected in all cases. In order to 
expedite the disinvestment process, the government had decided to disinvest specified 
portions of equity from Indian Oil Corporation (IOC), Gas Authority of India Limited 
(GAIL), Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited (VSNL) and Container Corporation of India 
(CONCOR). 
The BJP government intensified the economic reforms at various sectors. The 
'privatisation of the public sector' was replaced by a more fashionable phrase 
'disinvestment of public sector'. One of the main strategies of the budget 1999-2000, as 
pointed out by the Finance Minister, was to 'deepen and widen economic reforms in all 
major sectors and accelerate internal liberalisation to release productive energies, 
creativity of farmers, manufactures, trade and service providers'. The government's 
strategy towards public sector enterprises, as claimed by the government, 'encompass a 
judicious mix of strengthening strategic units, privatising non-strategic ones through 
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gradual disinvestments or strategic sale and devising viable rehabilitation strategies for 
weaker units. 
In a drastic move in public sector policy, on 16 March, 1999 the government classified the 
public sector enterprises into strategic and non-strategic areas for the purpose of disinvest-
ment. The strategic public sector enterprises included, the areas of defense and 
communication and allied items of defense equipment, defense aircrafts and warships, 
atomic energy and railway transport. All other RSUs were considered non-strategic. The 
government decided to reduce its stake to 26 per cent in the non-strategic areas. It was 
decided to restructure and revive potentially viable PSUs and to close down those PSUs 
which could not be revived. 
The period of the BJP rule saw a receding ideological opposition to economic 
liberalisation between the ruling party (the BJP) and the main opposition party, the 
Congress. The Congress raised its resentment over the public sector reforms and it was 
seen that it came out of its political compulsion rather than political conviction. 
The important milestones in the approach of the Congress on the disinvestment policy were 
the Economic Introspection, Group (EIG) headed by Sri Pranab Mukherjee and the 
Bangalore plenary session of 2001. Both proclaimed at the party was committed to the 
strengthening of the PSUs and pronounced the crusade against the disinvestment policy of 
the government. The EIG emphasized that the party had 'objected to the present ideological 
assault on the public sector'. It did not to see privatisation as a panacea for the crisis in the 
PSUs and pronounced that the disinvestment policy must be put in place with the approval 
of Parliament before pursuing the kind of massive across-the-board operations as posed by 
the present government. The party claimed that the public sector that had built up India's 
Industrial and technological muscle, developed the backward areas, promoted social jus-
tice, and made available job reservations for the disadvantaged communities, was being 
subjected to an ideological assault. While opposing the govenunent's approach to disinvest-
ment of the profit making PSUs, the party viewed that public enterprises that were making 
healthy profits on a continuous basis in a competitive environment should be provided 
opportunities for further grovrth. On the other hand, it favoured the closing down of 
chronic, non.-profit making PSUs in a humane manner by protecting the interests of 
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workers. Jairam Ramesh further clarified that the party was opposed to arbitrary 
disinvestment, I especially to meet the fiscal deficit. It opposed the same criterion for disin-
vestment being applied to both profit and loss making PSUs. The Navratnas, which later 
became Dashavatar - Indian Oil Corporation (IOC), Bharat Petroleum Corporation limited 
(BPCL), Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL), Oil and Natural Gas 
Commission (ONGC), Gas Authority of India Limited (GAIL), Mahanagar Telecom 
Nigam Limited (MTNL), Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited (VSNL), Bharat Heavy Electrical 
Limited (BHEL), National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) and Steel Authority of 
India Limited (SAIL) should not be disinvested. 
The Congress party, in the second generation reforms, tried to bring back various alienated 
sections into its fold and thereby strengthen its mass base. The party forums and policy 
debates saw renewed efforts to address the interests of the socially marginalized sections 
like Dalits and Tribals (lower cast). Though, the party played a 'constructive' role in 
Parliament, in helping out the government in the economic reform process, it publicly 
dissociated itself from the privatisation process, terming it 'anti-lower caste' because of the 
loss of reserved jobs in the public sector. This stand was further elaborated in the Shimla 
Declaration of the party. It says 'the start of a purposeful dialogue with private industry 
was based on how best India's social diversity could be reflected in the private sector in 
different ways like reservation and fiscal incentives, low privatisation were inevitable to 
protect the welfare of the weaker sections of society and. how government procurement 
can promote entrepreneurship among dalits and divasis'. Thus, the party attempted to 
coimter the propaganda that it deviated from: its commitment to these sections by 
implementing market-oriented, economic reforms. 
A micro analysis of the debates and discussions in the party forums and the divergent 
views expressed by the party leadership show that the Congress is still contemplating the 
merits and demerits of the disinvestment policy. Even though resolutions after resolutions 
reiterated that the profit making PSUs should not be privatised and the equity for 
disinvestment in the loss making PSUs should be below 50 per cent, pro-reformists are 
sceptical about this view. Just as the opinions of Vajpayee, Arun Shourie and Arun Jaitely 
can be contrasted with those of Murali Manohar Joshi, Ram Naik and Uma Bharati in the 
BJP together with George Femandes and Sukhdev Singh Dhindsa, the views of Jairam 
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Ramesh and Mani Shankar Aiyar, Vayalar Ravi and Pranab Mukherjee represent dia-
metrically opposite poles within the Congress_ For instance, Jairam Ramesh viewed, 'as 
far as privatisation is concerned, Vajpayee government has taken bold steps although only 
one deal relating to the sale of Modem Foods to Hindustan Lever has been consummated 
so far. 
3.2.5. Conclusioa of Political Issues 
Whatever may be the official version, the Congress party in the second-generation 
reform is in a quandary after the BJP government 'hijacked' its economic agenda. 
Though it was the initiator of the reform process and subsequently the principle 
opposition party under the economic management of the BJP government, the 
Congress had not taken a clear-cut stand on the economic policy matters, especially on 
the disinvestment policy. It was yet to draw a dividing line between its approach and 
that of the BJP government. It is obvious that the Congress lacked clarity in its 
approach to the second-generation reforms. 
The dilemma of the Congress can be seen in the context that it wants to project before the 
people that it did not want to become a B-team for the BJP government in the oITl alters of 
economic policy and was not prepared to give all credit to the BJP in the reform process. 
The view of both the advocates of pro-liberalisation like Manmohan Singh and Jairam 
Ramesh and the protagonists of the left-of-centre like Vayalar Ravi and Pranab Mukherjee 
often contradict each other and thereby plunged the party into an ideological dilemma. But 
it can be seen that the difference of opinion emanating fi-om various leaders were due to 
political compulsion rather than conviction. The nature of criticism against reforms 
depends on the political base of the leaders. The states where the opposition against 
reforms was strong, the leaders from those states usually became more critical of the 
reform process. For example, the anti liberalisation stand of the communists in Kerala and 
West Bengal reflected in that of the Congress leaders from these states like Vayalar Ravi, 
Pranab Mukherji and P.R. Dasmimshi to harp on pro-poor approach. It is clear that the 
political existence of these leaders forced them to take different voices on reforms within 
the party. This politics played a vital role in the approaches of both BJP and the Congress 
in the disinvestment policy rather than economic rationality. 
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3.3 Post Sale related Articles 
In all cases of strategic sale, (except hotel properties of ITDC and HCI), 
Govemment/BBUNL (in the case of UMC and JCL being the holding company) retained 
a part of the equity with it, though management control was transferred to the strategic 
partner. The percentage of shares sold in the first instance to the SP varied from case to 
case. Except for the SHAs of HTL and UMC, other SHAs, provided for the manner of sale 
for the residual equity. In some cases a 'Put' option was made available to the Government 
under which it was compulsory for the SP to buy the shares being offered by the 
Government. In some cases a 'Call' option was made available to the SP. In some other 
cases, both 'Put' and 'Call' options were made available. In all the cases of both 'Put' and 
'Call' options, the period in which or the date firom which the option could be exercised 
was pre-defined. The principles for determining the price at which the options were to be 
exercised was also predefined in the SHA. The procedure of exercising the option was 
also provided in the SHA. 
The Government retained at least 26 per cent shareholding of the divested CPSE with it for 
a certain length of time. These were sold through strategic sale, specifying the percentage 
of shares associated with the option, the time period as well as the basis of pricing. 
A CPSE -wise summary of how 'Put' / 'Call' options were exercised in the past is 
given below. 
MFIL, an imlisted CPSE was privatised in January, 2000 through a sale of 74 per cent of 
the paid up equity. 26 per cent of the equity was left with the Government. The SHA 
provided for a 'Put' option to the Government to sell the residual shares to the SP from 
January, 2001 at higher of the Fair Market Value or the price at which shares were sold in 
the strategic sale. 
The 'Put' option was followed by a 'Call' option to SP. The 'Put' option was exercised by the 
Govenmient on 28th November, 2002. The Government's residual equity was sold at the 
strategic sale price, i.e. Rs.11,489.56 per share, whose Face Value was Rs. 1,000 realising an 
amount of Rs,44.07 crore. 
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BALCO is an unlisted CPSE in which 51 per cent of the equity was sold by the 
Government in March, 2001. A 'Call' option for the residual 49 per cent shares -exercisable 
from 3rd March, 2004 at the higher of the Fair Value or the strategic sale price plus 14 per 
cent annual interest compounded half yearly after giving credit for dividend received by the 
Government, was available to SP. "In the context of the Call"- option exercised by SP on 
22nd March, 2004, the Attorney General for India (AG), in his opinion dated 27th April, 
2006, advised that the 'Call' option provisions in the SHA place restriction on the right of 
the GO! to transfer its shares freely and such a restriction would be void and unenforceable. 
A final decision on sale of the 'Called Shares' is yet to be taken as AG has opined against 
the validity of the Call Option provisions and the matter is under dispute. 
CMC was a listed CPSE, when Govenmient disinvested 51 per cent of the paid up equity 
through strategic sale in October, 2001, leaving a residual equity of 32.31 per cent with the 
Government, which got reduced to 26.25 per cent after sale of shares to employees? The 
SHA provided for a 'Put' option for the Government effective from 16th October, 2002 to 
15th October, 2003 not exceeding 10 per cent of the paid up equity out of the residual 
shares and from 16th October, 2003 to 15th October, 2004 for some or all of the remaining 
shares at Fair Value as defined in the SHA. The 'Call' option was provided to the SP from 
16th October, 2004 to 15th October, 2006 at higher of the Fair Value or the Market Value 
of the called shares. In February, 2004 the entire residual shareholding of 26.25 per cent 
was sold through an Offer for Sale to the public after getting the concurrence of the SP 
under the 'Right of First Refusal' clause of the SHA. The Govermnent realised an amount 
of Rs. 190,44 crore fi-om this transaction. 
VSNL was a listed CPSE when the Government disinvested 25 per cent of the paid up 
equity capital through strategic sale in February, 2002, leaving a residual shareholding 
of 27.97 per cent. Out of the residual shareholding, 1.85 per cent shareholding was sold 
to the employees. As per the SHA, the SP could exercise a 'Call' option for the entire 
residual shareholding of the Government, except one share, during the period from 13th 
February, 2006 to 12th February, 2007 at Fair Value of the called shares, to be 
determined as per SHA. However, the SP did not exercise the 'Call' option and the 
period of one year, during which the SP could have exercised the call option, expired on 
12th February, 2007. 
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IBP: The Government disinvested 33.58 per cent of the paid up equity in February, 
2002 in this listed CPSE leaving a residual shareholding of 26 per cent. The SHA 
provided for a 'Put' option to the Government from 8* February, 2003 to Ih February, 
2005 at Fair Value "and a 'Call' option to the SP from 8th February, 2005 to 11 "^  
February, 2007 at Fair Value. However, Government sold its entire residual 
shareholding through an Offer for Sale to the public in February, 2004. 
PPL: The Government sold 74 percent of the paid up equity capital in February, 2002 
through strategic sale in this unlisted CPSE leaving a residual shareholding of 26 per 
cent. The shareholding of the Government in PPL came down to 19.55 per cent, 
consequent to a Rights Issue by the company, which was not subscribed to by the 
Government. The SHA provides for a 'Put' option right to the Goverrmient for some or 
all of the residual shares held by the Goverrmient at the time it exercises the put option 
at the fair value of the put shares. It frirther provides for a Call Option right to the SP 
from 1st March, 2005, requiring Goverrmient to sell to the SP all but not less than all of 
the equity shares held by the Government on date of issue of the Call Option Notice at 
a price which is higher of the fair value of the called shares or, if the company is listed, 
the highest price of the equity shares (during the period 15-days prior to the date of the 
call option notice) as quoted in the Stock Exchange or the price at which the shares 
were sold to SP at the time of strategic sale. In view of the opinion of AG referred to in 
Para 4.3.2 the Government has decided to repudiate the Call Option if and when 
exercised. 
HZL: The Government sold 26 per cent of the paid up equity capital of the company 
through a strategic sale in April, 2002, retaining a shareholding of 49.92 per cent in this 
listed CPSE. Out of the residual shareholding, 1.465 per cent shareholding was sold to 
the employees. The SHA provided for the first 'Call' option to the SP from 11'*' 
October, 2002 to 10* October, 2003 for 18.92 per cent of the equity at higher of the 
Market Value of the shares or strategic sale price. This option was exercised by the SP 
in August, 2003 against which Government realised Rs.323.88 crore at the strategic 
sale price. A 'Put' option was available to the Government from 11th October, 2004 to 
10th April, 2005 at higher of the Market Value of the shares or the strategic "sale price 
for the shareholding in excess of 26 per cent. The Government decided not to exercise 
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the 'Put' option. The residual shareholding of the Government is now 29.535 per cent 
for which a 'Call' option is available to the SP from Uth April, 2007 at the Fair 
MarketValue. In view of the opinion of AG referred to in Para 4.3.2 the Government 
has decided to repudiate the Call Option if and when exercised. 
IPCL; The Government sold 26 per cent of the equity in this listed CPSE through 
strategic sale in June, 2002 leaving a residual shareholding of 33.95 per cent for which 
the SHA provided a 'Put' option to the Government from 4th June, 2004 to 3rd June, 
2005 and a 'Call' option to the SP from 4th June, 2005 to 3rd June, 2006 both at Fair 
Value. However, in February, 2004 the Government, after obtaining concurrence of the 
SP under the 'Right of First Refiisal' clause of the SHA, sold 28.95 per cent through an 
Offer for Sale to the public realising Rs.l203 crore and the residual holding of 5 per 
cent was offered to the employees of IPCL at discounted price, out of which 4.58 per 
cent shares were actually allotted. The existing shareholding of the Government in 
IPCL is 0.42 per cent. 
JCL: At the time of strategic sale, BBUNL, a CPSE held 99 per cent of the paid up 
equity capital of JCL, a listed company. BBUNL sold 72 per cent of the paid up equity 
through the strategic sale to Indo-Wagon Engineering Limited (IWEL), leaving a 
residual shareholding of 27 per cent. The SHA provided for a 'Put' option to BBUNL 
from 29* August, 2004 to 28* August, 2006 and a 'Call' option to the SP from 29th 
August, 2006 to 28th August, 2008 both at Fair Value, to be determined as per the 
SHA. The shareholding in JCL got further reduced from 27 per cent to 4.16 per cent, 
consequent to a Rights Issue made by JCL in 2005 which was not subscribed by 
BBUNL. IWEL exercised the 'Call' option on 4th September, 2006. In view of the 
opinion of AG referred to in Para 4.3.2, the Govenmient has decided to repudiate the 
Call Option already exercised by SP. 
MUL was an unlisted Company when the Government renounced a Rights Issue of 4.21 
per cent of the paid up equity in June, 2002, in favour of SMC, thereby reducing its 
shareholding to 45.79 per cent. SMC paid Rs.lOOO crore as control premium to the 
Government for renouncing the Rights Offer. The RJVA provided for a 'Put' option from 
8* November, 2003 to 8th July, 2005 at a price to be determined through a pre-defined 
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formula. The Government, however, sold 27.51 per cent out of its shareholding through an 
IPO in July, 2003 realizing Rs.993.30 crore. Out of the residual shareholding of 18.28 per 
cent, the Government sold 8 per cent equity of MUL to public sector financial institutions 
and public sector banks in January, 2006 for Rs.1,567.60 crore and 0.01 per cent equity to 
the employees of MUL for Rs.2.08 crore in March, 2006. In May, 2007, the Government 
sold its residual 10.27 per cent shareholding in MUL for the consideration of Rs.2, 366.94 
crore to public sector financial institutions, public sector banks and Indian mutual funds. 
Sale of Shares to Employees. 
Five SHAs relating to strategic sale provided for offer of shares to employees. These are 
discussed as imder. 
BALCO; The SHA provided for an offer of up to 5 per cent equity of the company out of 
the residual shareholding of Government to the employees. In case of CMC SHA provided 
for an offer of not more than 6.31 per cent of the equity of the company out of the residual 
shareholding of Government to the employees. The strategic sale was completed in 
October, 2001 and the offer of shares to the employees was completed in June/July, 2002 
at a price of Rs.66 per share i.e. at one-third of the strategic sale price oi Rs.l97 
approximately. All regular employees of the company including fijU time functional 
Directors of the company, on the specified date, were eligible to acquire shares under this 
scheme. 3,208 employees availed of this offer, realizing Rs.6.07 crore for the Government 
by subscribing to 6.06 per cent of the equity. The offer involved a sacrifice of around 
Rs. 12.04 crore for the Government vis-a-vis the strategic sale price and an average benefit 
of Rs.0.38 lakh per employee. The shares were nontransferable/non-tradable for one year 
from the date of issue. 
For VSNL, the SHA provided for an offer up to 2 per cent shares of the company out of 
the Government's residual shareholding to. the employees. -The company ceased to be a 
Govenmient company in February, 2002 and the offer to the employees was made in the 
same month at one-third of the price offered by the strategic partner or l/3rd of listed 
market value calculated as the average of the closing price on BSE for 30 days, whichever 
was less, subject to a minimum of par value of Rs.lO per equity share. 52,64,555 shares 
representing 1.85 per cent equity of the company were subscribed by the employees. The 
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shares were offered at Rs.47.85 per share against the strategic sale price of Rs.202 per 
share, involving a sacrifice of Rs.81.15 crore by the Government and an average benefit 
of Rs.2,71,304.00 per employee. The shares were made nontransferable/tradable for one 
year. 
The SHA provided for an offer of upto 5 per cent equity of the company to the employees 
out of the residual shareholding of the Government. It was decided to offer the shares at 
one-third of the Listed Market Value or one third of strategic sale price whichever was 
lower subject to a minimum of the face value. Accordingly, in November, 2002 the shares 
were offered at the face value of Rs.lO per share against a prevailing Listed Market Value 
of Rs.22.52 per share and strategic sale price of Rs.40.50 per share. 61.90 lakh shares or 
1.465 per cent of the equity was subscribed by the employees. This transaction involved a 
sacrifice of Rs. 18.88 crore by the Government and an average benefit of Rs.0.66 lakh per 
employee visa-vis the strategic sale price. The shares were non transferable/non-tradable 
for one year. 
For IPCL; The SHA provided for an offer up to 5 per cent equity of the company out 
of Govenmient residual shareholding to the employees. The strategic sale was 
completed in June, 2002. Thereafter, the offer of shares to the employees was made in 
April, 2004 at one-third of the price at which the shares were sold in February, 2004 
through an Offer for Sale i.e. Rs.l70. 
Accordingly, 5 per cent shares were offered to employees, out of which 4.58 per cent 
shares were actually allotted at Rs.57 per share. This involved a sacrifice of Rs. 197.85 
crore for the Government vis a vis the strategic sale price of Rs.231. An average benefit 
of Rs.1.61 lakh accrued to each employee. The shares were non-transferable/non-
tradable for three year. 
While the terms and conditions of sale of shares to employees varied, there are some 
common features. A matrix of distribution of shares among employees was adopted. 
Secondly, the ratio of distribution from the lowest to the highest level ranged between 
1:2.75 and 1:5. Thirdly, the regular employees including the fiinctional Directors of the 
Board at the time of disinvestment were eligible for subscribing to the shares. Fourthly, 
in all the schemes, the shares were offered at a discount to the prevailing price. 
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3.4 Post Closing Adjustments 
In the case of unlisted companies and the hotel properties of HCI and ITDC, the Share 
Purchase Agreement/Agreement to Sell provided for a Post Closing Adjustment to 
cover the change in the financial status of the company between the date upto which the 
audited accounts were provided to the parties at the time of due diligence and the date 
of actual disinvestment. The difference in the Net Assets on the date of the last audited 
balance sheet and the closing date was called post closing adjustment and depending on 
whether there was an accretion or depletion of the Net Assets, this amount become 
payable to the Government. 
The details of cases where Post Closing Adjustments were provided for in the Share 
Purchase Agreement/relevant transaction agreement and the status of each case as given 
below: 
MFIL; MFIL was disinvested through sale of 74 per cent Govenunent's equity to HLL 
for an amount of Rs. 105045 crore. Financial bids were invited/received on the basis of 
audited accounts of MFIL as on 31st March, 1999. The transaction agreements were 
executed on 31st January, 2000. The appointed accounting firm had submitted a 
statement on 26th April, 2000 which required the Government to pay Rs. 17.48 crore to 
the SP but the Govenunent accepted a claim amounting to Rs. 12.64 crore and released 
payment of Rs. 10.94 crore in October, 2000 and Rs.1.70 crore in November, 2001. 
HLL, the purchaser still claims Rso4043 crore under post closing adjustment on 
account of gratuity and recovery from U.P. 
BALCO: 51 per cent equity of SALCO was disinvested in favour of SIIL on 2"^ 
March, 2001 for an amount of Rs.551. 50 crore. The SHA and SPA were signed on 2"*^  
March, 2001 and the SP took over the management control. The SPA pro\'ided that 
within 90 days following the Closing Date, the Government and the Purchaser shall 
jointly select an accounting firm to prepare a statement showing the Closing Date Net 
Assets Amount. If the Closing Date Net Assets Amount were higher than the Adjusted 
Net Assets Amount on 31st March, 2000 (Rs.590.95 crore), the Purchaser shall pay 51 
per cent of the difference to the Government and if the Closing Date Net Assets 
Amount was lower than the Adjusted Net Assets Amount, the Government shall pay 
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51 per cent of the difference to the Purchaser. In terms of the SPA, the Government 
and the SP jointly appointed Price Waterhouse to compute the Closing Date Net Assets 
Amount. Price Waterhouse initially computed the Net Assets of SALCO as on 2nd 
March, 2001 at Rs. 478.08 crore which was subsequently increased to Rs.558.17 crore 
as against the Adjusted Net Assets of Rs.590.95 crore as on 31st March, 2000. The 
matter is under examination in the Ministry of Mines. 
PPL; Financial bids for the disinvestment of 74 per cent of the equity in PPL were invited 
on the basis of audited accounts of the company as on 31st March, 2001. Only one 
financial bid of Zuari Maroc Phosphate Pvt. Limited (ZMPPL) was received. The 
transaction agreements for strategic sale were executed on 28th February, 2002. As per the 
joint audit, on thel post closing claim, initially conducted by Price Waterhouse, Kolkota, 
the total deterioration in the net assets of PPL between 31st March, 2001 and 28th 
February, 2002 was at Rs.204.80 crore (approx.) out of which Rs.lSl.SS crore was due to 
ZMPPL. No agreement could be reached between ZMPPL and the Government on the 
amount of the post-closing claim. Thereafter, the Government appointed Patro & Co. who 
arrived at a post-closing claim of Rs. 108.8 crore. In view of the discrepancies in the reports 
of the two auditors mentioned above, KPMG Private Limited was jointly engaged for 
conducting a full audit. In the report of KPMG, the amoimt payable to ZMPPL was 
computed to be Rs. 141.32 crore. While this case was under examination of the Department 
of Fertilizer, ZMPPL initiated arbitration proceedings under the SPA. 
HTL: 74 per cent equity of HTL was disinvested through Strategic Sale to HFCL on 16th 
October, 2001. The Post Closing adjustment claim filed by the strategic partner in terms of 
the provisions of SPA was not acceptable to the Department of Telecommunications. 
HCI: HCI is a subsidiary of Air India Limited. Transactions relating to two hotel 
businesses of HCI, viz.. Hotel Centaur Juhu Beach Mumbai and Centaur Hotel Mumbai 
Airport, Mumbai and a subsidiary, hotel of HCI, vjz., Indo Hokke Hotels Limited, Rajgir 
were based upon the audited accounts of 31st March, 2001. The transfer dates of these 3 
hotels were: mdo Hokke Hotels Limited, Rajgir - 26th March, 2002, Hotel Centaur Juhu 
Beach, Mumbai, May 2002 and Centaur Hotel Mumbai Airport, Mumbai - 5th June, 2002. 
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Post closing adjustment in terms of the provisions of SPA was completed in respect of 
Indo Hokke Hotels Limited, Rajgir. HCI paid an amount of Rs.4.33 lakh to the purchaser 
in settlement of the claim. 
In the case of Centaur Hotel Mumbai Airport, Mumbai, the purchaser raised a claim of 
Rs.23S.67 lakh, whereas HCI raised a claim of Rs.497. 71 lakh to be recovered from the 
purchaser. Since both the parties have disputed the claims of each other, the matter has 
been referred to arbitration. 
In the case of Hotel Centaur Juhu Beach, Mumbai, the post closing adjustments in respect 
of (i) additional provision towards doubtful debts, (ii) additional provision towards leave 
encashment and gratuity and (iii) insurance claim and advances paid to suppliers have not 
been concluded. The parties have mutually agreed to refer the matter to Ministry of Civil 
Aviation (MoCA) for the award. MoCA informed that Additional Secretary and Financial 
Adviser, MoCA was appointed as the Arbitrator. The purchaser did not agree to this. HCI 
after taking legal opinion from their solicitors issued legal notice to the purchaser in 
October, 2005. The Board of HCI decided in March, 2006 to go ahead with arbitration 
proceedings. In June, 2006, HCI requested Arbitrator to proceed jfurther in the matter. 
3.5 Research Gap: 
A perusal of work done by the learned scholars shows that much has been researched on 
contribution of public sectors, pros and cons of having them in the economy or not. The 
social aspect of their existence too has been elaborated. But the effect of disinvestment on 
sectors has not been quantitatively measured like in which direction their stocked moved. 
What was the impact on their Price Earning Ratio and for that matter on many financial 
parameters which are considered as nerves of any organization? Hence the researcher 
thought it fit to study this rather less explored area and efforts have been made in this 
direction. 
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3.6 Summary: 
The articles reviewed by the researcher so far more or less confirm that no study has been 
conducted to find out the effect of disinvestment from financial angle especially with 
reference to improvement in ratio as a measure of financial analysis. Hence the researcher 
could find a research gap which has been tried to be filled in through this research. How 
has the researcher tried to fill in this gap, has been done has been discussed in the 
subsequent chapter on research methodology. 
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Chapter - 4 
Research Methodology 
Chapter - 4 
Research Methodology 
From the academic point of view, outcome of any research is not as important as the 
approach followed by researcher in conducting the research. If the problem has been 
approached in an approved method, the chances are very high that the outcome shall not 
be biased. The researcher has made sincere efforts to ensure that the approved research 
methodology is followed. 
4.1: Introduction 
Research Methodology plays an important role in setting the tone for conducting the 
research. This important chapter was conceived after careful thoughts and detailed 
discussion with supervisor. The chapter first provides basics of research methodology, 
need for research, objectives, hypotheses, instruments used, sources of data, sampling 
used and procedures followed, methods of analysis and finally presenting the findings. 
This is followed by the specific method used in the present research. As far as possible, 
detailed jusfification has been provided for using a particular method of conducting 
research. 
4.2 Objectives of the study 
As concluded in the survey of literature that these exists a gap in the researches carried out 
by various learned scholars. Majority of them have heavily relied on the theatrical 
construct and financial information of the firms has rarely been sued to measure the effect 
of disinvestment. Adequate efforts have not been made to find out what happened in the 
market prior to the announcement of disinvestment and after the announcement. 
Hence following objectives have been outlined for this research. 
(i) To study and measure the profitability of PSUs after and before 
disinvestment using ratio as a measure in analysis in general and ratio 
analysis of specific sectors 
(ii) To study the return on total assets pre and post disinvestment 
(iii) To study the return on Capital Employed of PSUs 
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(iv) To study the return on shareholder's equity of PSUs ^ ^ ^ J « / I B I U n V * ^ ^ ^ 
(v) To study the Return on Investment (ROI) of PSUs in pre and post 
disinvestment scenario 
(vi) To test the hypothesis in respect of above and conclude 
Justification: 
The problems and prospects of disinvestment in PSUs can be studied from many angles. 
One can conclude based on the related researches conducted in the area and the critical 
analysis of experts reported in various journals, news papers and government reports. 
However, relying on the published figures in the form of audited financial statements and 
drawing conclusion from theses figures in the form of accepted financial analysis methods 
have been considered as objective basis of arriving at conclusion. Hence the present 
research in general aims at making profitability analysis of selected Indian Public Sector 
Enterprises - before and after disinvestment. It takes into account the 'impact of economic 
reforms measures introduced by the Government of India and aims at examining the 
operational efficiency and profitability of selected Indian Public Sector and to explain the 
trends in profitability of the select Indian Public Sector in pre and pot disinvestment 
scenario. 
The study covers 6 enterprises among the total 13 enterprises viz. Steel, Minerals and 
Metals, Coal and Lignite, Power, Petroleum and Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals. These 
six enterprises augment more than 505 of the total investment made by the Central 
Government in the public sector. For the purpose of the study necessary data on 
profitability and other related variables were collected for the period 1991-2007. The 
financial statements used are mainly the profit and loss account and balance sheets 
published by the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), Ministry of Finance, Govemment of 
India, New Delhi. The study used a variety of financial ratios to accomplish the objectives. 
It employed various statistical tools such as mean, co-efficient of variation, range, 
correlation, the study also used linear regression analysis to analyse the relationship 
between size and profitability, multiple regression analysis to determine the factors which 
influence the profitability and chi-square test and ANOV A has been used to study the 
trend of profitability. 
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Research Plan: Sources of Data 
Data has been collected from one sources and that is secondary. The main theoretical 
source has been the RBI annual reports, FEMA / FERA Acts, RBI Bulletins, 
Disinvestment Manuals, Annual Reports of Companies, CMIE publications. Economic 
Survey, Budget, News letters of Banks, Occasional papers from RBI economic 
department, Research papers published in various magazines. Trade Journals, News papers 
clippings. Text Books on International Financial Management the government reports. 
Main source for financial information has been the annual reports of the sectors studied. 
Database: Information was collected from the PROWESS database for financial ratios and 
also fi-om "Database of BSIOOO, India's Corporate Giants" published by Business 
Standard in December 2007. It is the research study of top 1000 companies of India by the 
Business Standard magazine. Quota sampling is used for selection of sample size. The 
population is first segmented into mutually exclusive sub-groups and then the following 
industries were chosen. 
(i) Textiles, 
(ii) Engineering, 
(iii) Pharmaceuticals 
(iv) Diversified 
(v) Chemicals 
(vi) Consumer durables 
(vii) Automobiles 
(viii) Cement 
(ix) Steel 
(x) Information technology 
Then, judgement is used to select the top 10 units/companies from each segment based on 
the assumption that top companies would be engaged in active management of foreign 
exchange exposure and expected to get proper responses to the questionnaire. It is this 
second step, which makes the technique one of non-probability sampling. The advantages 
of quota sampling are the speed with which information can be collected, the lower cost of 
doing so and the convenience it represents. (Business Standard, December 2007) 
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4.4 Hypotheses tested: 
Based on the literature surveyed, following are hypotheses and they are tested using 
appropriate tools. All hypotheses have been given as null hypothesis and alternate ones 
have not been stated. 
Ho I: Post disinvestment PSUs have not made desired progress 
H02: Post disinvestment return on profitability of PSUs has not improved 
H03: Post disinvestment return on capital employed of PSUs has not improved 
H04: Post disinvestment return on equity of PSUs has not improved 
Hos: Post disinvestment return on investment of PSUs has not improved 
4.5 Method of Analysis 
Once the financial statements have been collected, important ratios were calculated 
taking pre and post disinvestment scenario. The important ratios have further been 
analysed for specific sectors. Based on the calculation of ratios and the result thereof, 
the hypothesis have been tested and presented. 
Time Span, Scope and Contribution of this Research 
The time span for the research study is between late 1991 and early 2009 and this 
commensurate with the introduction of financial sector reforms. However, the base year 
for most of the data would be 1992-93 as the effect of liberalizations had started 
trickling down fi-om that year. 
This research study is expected to contribute for understanding the genesis of PSUs in 
India, background of disinvestment and specially the pre-and post performance of the 
PSUs which will either accept or reject the hypothesis that disinvestment has been 
successfiil or otherwise. 
Data analysis: 
Having calculated the ratios of select PSU in the pre and post disinvestment scenario, 
statistical tests were applied to ascertain if the findings truly reflect the changes or these are 
by chance only. The relevant tests in this regards are F Ratios and their significance has 
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been tested at 95% level of confidence. First the effect has been measured then tested 
sector-wise. In most the cases the results have been tested on monthly basis too. 
Data presentation: 
After the analysis data has been presented in two forms. For ratio analysis, running 
commentary has been provided giving calculations and their interpretations. E-fforts have 
been made to make the discussion as elaborate as possible. The calculation is followed by 
possible justification of the changes in the performance pre and post disinvestment. Efforts 
have also been made to find out the changes in private sector belonging to the same product 
category as to how their stocked moved as and when there sere some announcements. This 
necessitated monthly calculation and testing. 
Having discussed the effect in the above form, calculations have been tabulated and 
presented in various tables. The significance level of various F ratios has been shown and 
null hypothesis if accepted has been explained. In case alternate hypothesis has been 
accepted, it has not been mentioned. 
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Chapter - 5 
Analysis of Problems and Prospects of Disinvestment 
Introduction 
Having discussed the methodology followed in conducting the present research; in this 
chapter efforts have been made to provide major issue resulting from the decision of policy 
makers to disinvest from PSUs. Legal issues, employees related issues and other 
miscellaneous issues have been discussed followed by the effect of disinvestment in 
subsequent chapters. 
5.1 Major General Issues 
The toll of the public sector disinvestment is becoming forbidding. The decision to sell the 
equity of the Gas Authority of India, a company in the public sector listed as a Navratna, to 
foreign business interest at a heavily discounted price of Rs 70 as against the market value 
of more than Rs 300 per share was remarkable. This has been followed up by the sale under 
a privately negotiated deal of it PSU to Hindustan Lever, subsidiary of a 1 ransnational 
corporation already operating in India and the move to hand over the management control 
of Indian Airlines to private business interest with the only 26 per cent stake in its equity. 
The disinvestment of the goverrunent equity in commercial and industrial undertakings has 
been underway as a part of what is called the "structural adjustment" of the Indian economy 
which was initiated in 1991 under the policy guidance of the IMF/World Bank combine. It 
was designed for the step-by-step transfer to transnational corporations (TNCs) the 
majority holding of the equity and management control of the country's public sector 
undertakings (PSUs) which were set up and developed after India gained political 
independence and embarked on a path of socio-economic development on a self reliant 
basis. The objective of the disinvestment of the PSUs is to bring the Indian economy, 
especially its industrial sector, xmder the domination of TNCs. 
The PSU disinvestment programme, to begin with, merely attempted to raise revenue for 
the government as a part of a soft option to contain its fiscal deficit from becoming 
unmanageable Jha, A. (2003). The stock market in India has not been an effective 
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instrument to raise investment resources for private business enterprise let alone public 
sector investment. There are few takers in the Indian private corporate sector who are in a 
position to take advantage of PSU disinvestment. They are neither willing nor able to take 
over the management even profitable PSUs. They do not have the funds, technological 
tools or management skills for running the giant industrial and commercial undertakings in 
the public sector. 
The move to sell government equity in PSUs (Nanjundapa 2002) to shore up the revenue 
position of the government has not achieved the desired results either. But it has held up 
public investment for the development of the economic and social infrastructure in India. 
The sharp cut in government funding as well as the failure to generate internal savings in 
the existing PSUs 'has. blocked their expansion and modernisation. 
The ability of the PSUs to face (Nanjundapa 1998) up to the hostile competition posed by 
the TNCs has thus been crippled. The position of not only PSUs but of even the private 
Indian domestic corporations has also been gravely weakened. This has helped the TNCs to 
maximise the profitability of their operations in India and take over the PSUs cheaply. The 
sale of the equity of the Gas Authority of India and the sale of the Modem Foods company 
in the public sector by the Hindustan Lever a subsidiary of Lever Brothers, a TNC and the 
privatisation of the management of Indian Airlines emphasizes this position very well. 
Disinvestment schemes devised from time to time to raise substantial revenues for the 
government by selling the equity of PSUs has obviously lost its charm for the self-styled 
economic reformers in the government of India, according to Najudappa (1998) The idea of 
the creation of a "special purpose vehicle" for the holding of the government equity in 
PSUs, before their sale at a reasonable price as well as arrangements for buy back and cross 
holdings by PSUs which was toyed with for sometime, has also been dropped. The official 
policy has now been geared' for the outright sale of PSUs to the TNCs. The talk of the, 
"drain on the fiscal resources" of the govenmient because of the setting up of the PSUs is, 
of course, a myth which has been assiduously spread to pave the way for the privatisation-
globalisation process to make unhindered headway. There really are not any valid 
economic or social welfare reasons in official policy making but ideological preference for 
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privatisation of the economy which the ruling elite in India has now accepted and is 
vigorously pursuing. 
Public investment to build industrial and commercial undertakings was inspired by the 
imperative need to serve social and economic priorities and overcome the impediments left 
behind by colonial rule in the way of the growth of the Indian economy and mass welfare 
(Pandey 2001). The "multiple objectives" of the PSUs, which are so vociferously derided 
by the votaries of the privatisation, globalisation process, are all about import-substitution 
in critical areas of the economy, optimal utilisation of domestic resources, material and 
human, opening up of. economically backward areas, development of indigenous 
capabilities in construction of large projects and technological skills, especially in respect 
of infrastructure for economic growth and social advance on a broad front. This visibly 
helped the growth of productive enterprise both in the public as well as private sector in the 
two decades after India had won political freedom. The effort made in these directions is 
now; being emasculated. The public sector industries and services are being systematically 
demolished. 
The question of strengthening the management autonomy and efficiency of PSUs, for long 
a matter of concern, has lost all relevance in government policy. It is facile and deceptive to 
talk of it being preferable to close down the large public sector undertakings employing 
more than four lakh workers and save the Rs 15,000 crore which may be required for their 
rehabilitation for new 'investment to create as many as 15 lakh new jobs. Whatever revenue 
is raised by the sale of the assets of PSUs or whatever losses are avoided by closures so far 
has not been used for meaningfiil investment on the basis of a well-conceived order of 
priorities Nayyar, B.R. (1992). Deceptive, too, is the talk of creating and enlarging 
opportunities for gainfiil employment by scaling down public investment and finding 
resources for the development of the social infrastructure, priority in the design of 
development. What has been happening really, is the transformation of the role of the 
Indian state from an agency of development and equity into an instrument of law and order 
so that the private business interests, Indian and foreign thrive and those who sell their 
labour do so meekly N ayyar, B.R. (2001). Considering the debilitated conditions and 
nature of 'private Indian business enterprise, it is the foreign TNCs, if and when and to the 
.extent they come to India, which are making the maximvim gains. 
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There is, of course, a strong and sound case for adequate returns from investment in public 
enterprises and generating surpluses for reinvestment to accelerate the development 
process. There is also no manner of doubt that returns from investment in industrial and 
commercial enterprises so far have not been adequate. But this no alibi to absolve the 
political authority in India of the responsibility to provide adequate budgetary support for 
planned development. Even sensible Indian private business interests want are indeed 
clamoring for step up of public investment for the development of economic infrastructure 
for them to function efficiently and face foreign competition in the domestic market. 
It is a simplistic view of the role of public enterprise in economic development and the 
principles that should govern the measurement of its efficiency that the yardstick of 
commercial profitability alone should be considered. The fact must be reckoned with that 
while public enterprise should operate in such a way as to augment public savings, they 
have also to put up with planned losses in order to provide essential goods and services to 
the mass of the people which the private enterprises, guided by only the profit 
maximization motive, will not do. Pathak (2001) suggests that the PSUs indeed provide 
relatively cheap inputs to the private sector and thus help the generation of surpluses in the 
economy. The point is that PSUs may not directly generate financial surpluses. But those 
who make large profits by using subsidized inputs provided by the PSUs to them should be 
required to contribute a fair part of these profits by way of taxes and other savings 
instruments to augment resources for stepping up overall investment for economic growth 
according to right order of social priorities. It is indeed wrong mindlessly to flog the PSUs. 
The easy path of raising the prices of goods and services provided by the PSUs in order to 
extract surpluses for investment -may tend in many cases to be counterproductive and self-
defeating. Returns from PSUs can be enlarged meaningfully only by improvements in the 
efficiency of their operations and fuller utilisation of their capacity which should not be 
blocked by imports that are competitive to indigenous production capacities, both in the 
public and private sectors. 
Disinvestment Blues 
Mr. George Femandes, the honorable Union Minister for Defense and the convener of the 
ruling coalition, has thrown a spanner in the way of Mr. Arun Shourie riding the high horse 
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in the disinvestments ministry. Disinvestment blues to emerge in the mid-term for the NDA 
government is very disconcerting for the so-called economic reformers inside and outside 
the government. 
The frantic search by Mr. Arun Shourie for "strategic partners" with the help "global 
advisors" to hand over the management control of the PSUs to big Indian and 
multinational corporations was bound to create problems. This was conceived as the first 
step for eventual transfer of ownership of PSUs to private hands with moderate investment 
and takeover their huge assets and market value. This suits the corporates far more than 
disinvestment of government equity in drip lets at competitive market prices. 
The strengthening of the management and operating efficiency of PSUs too is then loses its 
appeal, even relevance, for official policy on disinvestments of PSUs which are driven into 
sickness for want of investment for renovation to become attractive pickings for selected 
Indian and foreign corporations on payment of negotiated prices in installments. The 
original idea of disinvestments to raise revenues for the government for spending on 
alternative priority areas, such as education, health, roads and irrigation has also been 
shelved. After the winding up of the Disinvestment Commission, which tended to give 
some importance to enhancing the market value of PSUs before their privatisation and 
collect larger revenue for the exchequer, the disinvestments policy has now indeed 
developed novel features and wider dimensions. 
The entire scheme of disinvestment privatisation as has been implemented by Mr. Shourie 
is inspired by ideological preferences and not cost or efficiency criteria. There was, 
therefore, I bound to be stronger political-ideological opposition to the disinvestment 
policy of the NDA government sooner than later. The working people and their trade union 
have opposed PSU divestment sharply and unreservedly. So have the left parties. But 
Congress Party, which initiated the disinvestment process, too has now developed 
reservations on the disinvestment in the case of profit-making PSUs. Some of the partners 
of ruling coalition and elements close to the BJP have misgivings about the working of the 
department of disinvestment. There too are allegations of corruption in disinvestment deals 
with foreign and Indian big business interests. 
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The case for public investment in general and development of large industrial, commercial 
and financial infrastructure in the public sector in particular for economic gro^\th process is 
however sound. Its fundamental basis is of social equity and sustainability at the present 
level and stage of India's social, economic and political development. The returns from 
public investment in some industrial and commercial undertakings may not have been so 
far adequate. But this can be no alibi for absolving the Indian State to divest itself of the 
responsibility to mobilise necessary resources, material, human and financial, for economic 
growth on the basis of the right-order of economic and social priorities. Even sensible 
Indian private business interests clamor from time to time for a step up of public 
investment in PSUs for providing a reliable infi-astructure to enable them to function and 
face foreign competition in the domestic and global markets Pathak, R. (2002). 
The talk of loss-making and profit-yielding PSUs is gibberish. It is a simplistic, indeed 
misleading and mischievous view to measure the efficiency of PSUs in the narrow term of 
commercial profitability. The fact that must be reckoned with is that while PSUs should 
operate in such a way as to augment public savings. Many well managed PSUs do make 
profits. But they are also required to put up with planned losses in the larger public interest 
economic as well political. 
In order to provide essential goods and services to the mass of the people, for instance, 
PSUs are often called upon to suffer losses' which private business is unable and unwilling 
to accept. The support and protection of the State too is necessary for the development of 
private industry, after India gained political independence from colonial rule. PSUs arid 
public financial institutions have provided this support and protection to the private 
business enterprise in India to develop. The PSUs have provided essential inputs on a large-
scale at low the cost of production to private industry. 
It is indeed not fortuitous that PSUs and private corporates as well as small-scale industry 
grew in tandem during the era of planned economic development. This laid the foundation 
for strong and stable industrialisation. The disinvestment and prjvatisation of PSUs can 
only undermine this foundation. ITiis has. in fact already resulted in serious set-back to 
machine-making and manufacturing industry as well as the research and development 
effort for industrial development on sound, steady and sustainable basis. What is happening 
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is that while pubHc investment and management and technological enterprise is being 
strangulated, private big business is going away from productive enterprise into trading, in 
imported goods and services, speculation in stocks and shares and junior partnership with 
multinational corporations. 
The claim Rajesh, J. (2002) of the economic reformers that once public mvestment, 
especially in industry is withdrawn and industrial development is left to private enterprise. 
the resource constraint on the government for investment in social sectors would be 
removed. This is a false claim. It was also argued by them that disinvestment would benefit 
the mass of the people and make privatisation and market driven growth of Indian industry 
acceptable and popular. This has not actually happened. The .disinvestment and 
privatisation drive has certainly and often wantonly allowed diversion of public funds to 
selected private business corporations to extract high profits firom meager investment in 
takeover of PSUs. The privatisation of VSNL to the Tata House is a case in point.. 
The fimds raised by PSU Ramkirshnan. C, (1997) disinvestment have been absorbed into 
the general budgets mainly of the central and partly also of the state governments which 
have recycled these fimds back to the private corporations through financial institutions and 
cut in tax demand on large incomes and wealth. No part of the revenue raised by PSU 
disinvestments or saved by the government by scaling down public investment in industrial 
growth has gone to the development of the social sector. 
The privatisation, Rangarajan, C. (1997) side by side, of trade in public goods, among them 
electricity and drinking water as well as commercialization of education, health services 
public transport and communications has far-reaching implications, not only economic and 
social but also political. Essential goods and services under this policy dispensation are 
reserved for only those who can afford to pay for them. This has barred the access to these 
goods and services for the mass of the people without adequate incomes and purchasing 
power. It is not at all surprising or fortuitous, that rural electrification, rural telephony and 
even drinking water schemes have been being' given, low priority in the development of 
urban and rural infi-astructure as compelling obligations of the public authority. But, 
generous concessions and special fiscal steps have been taken for the satisfaction of the 
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consumerist urges of the upper and middle classes, among them entertainment, leisure, 
travel and fashion. 
The move to arrange the return to India of the Royal Dutch Shell, one of the notorious 
seven partners in the international oil cartel, which was expelled, along with two other 
international oil companies', from India three decades ago for not processing Indian crude 
oil in their refineries has now brought matters to head on for the contentious issue of the 
disinvestment of PSUs. Mr. Femandes deserves compliments for bringing up for review 
not only the sale of two public sector refineries and their marketing networks but the entire 
disinvestment programme and the manner it is being implemented at a feverish, break-neck 
hurry by Mr. Arun Shourie. 
Mid-term review of policies and performance for the incumbent political authority in a 
democratic set up is always ticklish and even painful. The minority congress government, 
which initiated in 1991 the privatization globalisation process in India, found itself 
vulnerable in the mid-term of its tenure. The then prime minister, the wily Mr. Narasimha 
Rao, simply halted the implementation of the market-friendly' economic reforms for the 
time being and went back to populist gestures in order to be able to improve the poor 
electoral prospects of his party. He failed to achieve the desired objective. 
The option to halt the market-friendly policy and. return to popularism is, however too 
risky for Mr. A. B. Vajpayee to even contemplate. Mr. Vajpayee has gone too far in 
committing himself, in the domestic arena as well as globally, to the privatisation-
globalisation policy. He can only try to stall to gain, time with small adjustments in the 
implementation of the policy, which are not likely to win for him popular acceptance. 
The awareness of the implications and consequences of the so-called economic reforms has 
become widespread and strong in India. Economic reforms have indeed become the most 
contentious issue for political and electoral contention. This contention is likely to exercise 
dominant influence over party- political alignments and re-alignments before the general 
election and response of the electorate. 
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5.2 Employees Related Issues 
Post Disinvestment employees issues in privatized CPSEs. 
There are two primary employees' issues, which are voiced with respect to 
disinvestment. First there is a concern about change in the terms of sers'ices of 
employees and secondly there is a concern that the reservation policy of the 
Government for the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes and other categories would be 
diluted. 
Terms and Conditions of Services 
The concern of the employees regarding alteration in the terms and conditions of the 
services were sought to be addressed through provisions in the Shareholders 
Agreement/Share Purchase Agreement entered into with the Strategic Partner at the time 
of strategic sale. The typical provisions are given below: 
Recitals: 
Subject to the substantive clauses in this regard, to all employees of the Company on 
the date hereof will continue in the employment of the Company. 
Substantive Clauses 
The SP covenants with the Government that: 
a) notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Agreement, it shall not 
retrench any of the Employees of the Company for a period of 1 (one) year 
from the Closing Date other than any dismissal or termination of Employees of 
the Company from their employment in accordance with the applicable staff 
regulations and standing orders of the Company or applicable Laws. 
b) notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Agreement, but subject to Sub-
Clause (a) above, any restructuring of the labour force of the Company shall be 
implemented in the manner recommended by the Board and in accordance with 
all applicable Laws; 
c) notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Agreement, but subject to Sub-
Clause (a) above, in the event of any reduction of the strength of the 
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Company's Employees, the SP shall ensure that the Company ofl'ers its 
Employees an option to voluntarily retire on terms that are not, in any manner, 
less favourable than the VRS applicable before disinvestment. 
Reservation Policy 
In the strategic sale transactions, the interest of SC/ST employees were also sought to 
be protected through the provisions in the Shareholders' Agreement. A typical Recital 
clause provided in the SHA is reproduced below: 
"The SP recognizes that the government in relation to its employment policies follows 
certain principles for the benefit of the members of the Scheduled Castes / Scheduled 
Tribes, physically handicapped persons and other socially disadvantaged categories of 
the society. The SP shall use its best efforts to cause the Company to provide adequate 
job opportunities or such persons. Furth.er, in the event of any reduction in the 
strength of the employees of the Company, the SP shall use its best efforts to ensure 
that the physically handicapped persons are retrenched at the end". 
5.3 Disinvestment Related Legal Cases 
Review of Legal Cases 
Ninety-six disinvestment related lawsuits, including transfer petitions, have been filed 
between December, 1999, (when the Department of Disinvestment was established) and 
30th June, 2007. Out of these, sixteen writ petitions were transferred to the Supreme Court 
from different High Courts. At the end of July, 2007, twenty four matters were pending 
before different High Courts and two matters before the Supreme Court, details of which 
are given below in table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 
Summary of Legal Cases 
SI. 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
Court 
Supreme Court 
Kamataka High Court 
Delhi High Court 
Chattisgarh High Court 
Madras High Court 
Allahabad High Court 
Patna High Court 
J & K High Court 
Calcutta High Court 
Rajasthan High Court 
Kerala High Court 
Orissa High Court 
Bombay High Court 
Bombay High Court 
(Nagpur Bench) 
Bombay High Court 
(Aurangabad Bench) 
High Court of MP (Gwalior 
Bench) 
High Court of MP at 
Jabalpur 
Gujarat High Court 
Andhra Pradesh High Court 
Punjab & Haryana High 
Court 
Jharkhand High Court 
Total 
Total Number 
filed (including 
transfer cases 
15 
5 
19 
1 
7 
3 
2 
1 
10 
6 
1 
5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
2 
1 
1 
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Disposed/ 
Dismissed 
13 
4 
13 
Nil 
2 
Nil 
2 
Nil 
4 
3 
1 
2 
Nil 
Nil 
Nil 
1 
2 
Nil 
2 
1 
NIL 
54 
Transferr 
ed to 
Supreme 
court 
NA 
1 
4 
I 
2 
2 
Nil 
1 
1 
1 
Nil 
Nil 
Nil 
Nil 
Nil 
Nil 
Nil 
Nil 
Nil 
Nil 
1 
16 
Number 
Pending 
2* 
Nil 
2 
Nil 
3 
1 
Nil 
Nil 
5 
2 
Nil 
3 
1 
1 
1 
Nil 
1 
1 
Nil 
Nil 
Nil 
26 
*2 matters consisting of transferred cases (i) 5 writ petitions involving issues arising out of 
the Supreme Court judgment in HPCL/BPCL case and clubbed together and (ii) 1 writ 
petition relating to HZL transferred from Rajasthan High Court. 
Source: www.disinvestment.gov.in/legal/html last visited on June 6 2007 
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Out of the cases which were either disposed or dismissed by various courts, there are three 
important judgments of the Supreme Court. These are the judgments dated 10th December, 
2001 in the BALCO matter, the judgment dated 16th September, 2003 in the Centre for 
Public Interest Litigation and Others vs. Union of India and Others in HPCL BPCL matter 
and the judgment dated 31st October, 2006 in the matter of All India ITDC Workers 
Union & Others viz. ITDC and Others. 
The Supreme Court in its judgment dated 10th December, 2001 in the BALCO case (AIR 
2002 SC 350) has observed as follows: 
"In a democracy, it is the prerogative of each elected Government to follow it's 
own policy. Often a change in Government may result in the shift in focus or 
change in economic policies. Any such change may result in adversely affecting 
some vested interests. Unless any illegality is committed in the execution of the 
policy or the same is contrary to law or mala fide, a decision bringing about 
change caimot per se be interfered with the Court. 
Wisdom and advisability of economic policies are ordinarily not amenable to 
judicial review unless it can be demonstrated that the policy is contrary to any 
statutory provision or the Constitution. In other words, it is not for the Courts to 
consider relative merits of different economic policies and consider whether a 
wiser or better one can be evolved. For testing the correctness of a policy, the 
appropriate forum is the Parliament and not the Courts. Here the policy was tested 
and the Motion defeated in the Lok Sabha on 1 st March, 2001. 
Thus, apart fi'om the fact that the policy of disinvestment cannot be questioned as 
such, the facts herein show that fair, just and equitable procedure has been 
followed in carrying out this disinvestment. The allegations of lack of 
transparency or that the decision was taken in a hurry or there has been an 
arbitrary exercise of power and without any basis. 
The offer of the highest bidder has been accepted. This was more than the reserve 
price which was arrived at by a method which is well recognized and, therefore, 
we have not examined the details in the matter or arriving at the valuation figure. 
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Moreover, valuation is question of fact and the Court will not interfere in matters 
of valuation unless the methodology adopted is arbitrary. 
In the case of a policy decision on economic matters, the courts should be very 
circumspect in conducting any enquiry or investigation and must be most 
reluctant to impugn the judgment of the experts who may have arrived at a 
conclusion unless the Court is satisfied that there is illegality in the decision 
itself" 
In the matter of Centre for Public Interest Litigation versus Union of India and Another 
challenging the disinvestment in regard to HPCL/ BPCL, the Supreme Court, through the 
judgment delivered on 16th September, 2003 (AIR 2003 SC 3277) upheld the challenge to 
the proposed Strategic Sale of HPCL and the proposed dilution in equity in the case of 
BPCL to below 51 per cent through an Offer for Sale of the Government's equity. The 
Supreme Court took the view that, since both these companies were established through 
Acts of Parliament under which the undertakings and assets of private companies were 
acquired and transferred to these Government Companies, it was not open for the 
Government to proceed with disinvestment that would result in HPCL and BPCL ceasing 
to be Government Companies without appropriately amending the statutes concerned. The 
Court also held that setting up of Government Companies is by way of Parliamentary 
approval for expenditure from the Consolidated Fund of India and hence privatisation of 
Government Companies can therefore be only with approval of Parliament. This Judgment 
laid down principles, which would apply to all cases of privatization of Government 
companies. Subsequentl y, several ongoing disinvestment proposals were challenged in 
various High Courts. On petitions filed by the Government under Article 139A of the 
Constitution, 6 writ petitions (in the cases of Bum Standard Company Limited, Shipping 
Corporation of India Limited, Hindustan Copper Limited, Hindustan Zinc Limited) 
pending in various High Courts were transferred to the Supreme Court. Further, four Writ 
Petitions were directly filed before the Supreme Court. All the transferred cases and the 
Writ Petitions directly filed before the Supreme Court were tagged with the Civil Appeal 
SLP (C) No. 12203/2003 (Civil Appeal No. 6780/2004) filed by Jessop & Co Limited Staff 
Association, in which the Government, through its Counter Affidavit dated 11th 
November, 2003, sought reconsideration of the ratios of the judgment dated 16th 
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September, 2003 in the Centre for Public Interest Litigation case (HPCL/BPCL). The 
Supreme Court on 11th October, 2004 passed orders (1) granting the Special Leave to 
Jessop &. Co Limited Staff Association; (2) allowing the transfer petitions filed by the 
Union of India; and (3) admitting the Writ Petitions filed by EIL Officers' Association, 
NFL Officers' Association and Khetri Tamba Shramik Sangh. The Court also observed 
that, in view of the importance of the issues involved, a larger bench should hear these 
matters. Subsequently, the writ petitions filed by EIL Officers' Association, NFL Officers' 
Association were dismissed as withdrawn and the writ petition filed by Khetri Tamba 
Shramik Sangh was dismissed as premature. Jessop & Co. Staff Association filed an 
application in June, 2007 seeking permission for withdrawing the Civil Appeal No. 6780 of 
2004. The Supreme Court has through orders dated 24th July, 2007 allowed the application 
and dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. Rest of the matters and the transferred cases are 
before the Supreme Court. 
In the matter of All India ITDC Workers' Association Vs. ITDC & Others [Transfer Case 
(Civil) No. 73 of 2002 along with Transfer Case (Civil) No. 76 of 2002], the Supreme 
Court, through the judgment delivered on 31st October, 2006, upheld the disinvestment in 
Hotel Agra Ashok. The Supreme Court has, referring to and relying on the judgment dated 
10th December, 2001 in BALCO matter, observed inter-alia that disinvestment was a 
policy decision of the Government of India and the said policy decision should be least 
interfered injudicial review. 
5.4 Summary 
The above discussion leads one to believe that the disinvestment posed some major 
challenges special with reference to employees as private sector never wanted a huge wage 
bill to be paid as it was sure to get the same work done with far lesser manpower partly due 
to efficiencies and partly by exploiting them. This resulted in large litigations. All these 
issue ultimately affected the bottom line that is the profitability which we have discussed in 
next chapter. 
94 
Chapter - 6 
Critical Analysis of Problems and Prospects of Disinvestment of PSUs 
Chapter - 6 
Critical Analysis of Problems and Prospects of Disinvestment of PSUs 
As explained in chapter four on research methodology and again in chapter five, this 
chapter shall focus on the explaining the effect of disinvestments in PSUs; taking financial 
data of the select sectors. All the accepted methods of measuring profitability of an entity 
shall be discussed. The discussion shall be based on the calculations made from the 
financial statements, in case of the firms and from the data available on the sites of NSE 
concerning specific sectors. 
6.1 Concepts of Profitability and Disinvestment: 
Profitability of a business enterprise is one of the most important parameters and absolute 
profitability has no meaning as the size and other parameters also differ. Hence it has been 
calculated using ratios which are simple to calculate and easy to understand. A single 
profitability ratio in itself does not convey much of the sense. Further, there is no 
international standard for financial ratios against which results can be compared. If several 
profitability ratios are used, it is possible that they may yield different conclusions for the 
same firm. 
The numbers of profitability ratios that one can compute from financial statement are 
almost unlimited. Because within each of the main categories of profitability ratios; there 
are minimum four ratios. Further, different authors use different bases for finding out the 
ratios. Most of the profitability ratios under each of the main categories overlap in the 
information they provide about profitability. In this research, an attempt has been made to 
measure the profitability of each individual enterprise before disinvestment which covers a 
period of pre and post disinvestment which covers a period of 10 years. 
On the basis of literature available in standard text book on the subject, following main 
ratios under different heads have been identified which will be subject to empirical testing 
for their degree of association. These ratios are: 
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(A) Return on Total Assets 
1. Earnings before depreciation, interest and tax to Gross Total Assets called Gross 
Surplus Ratio (GSR) 
2. Earnings before interest and tax to Total Assets (EBIT/TA) 
3. Operating Cash Flow to Gross Total Assets (OCF/GTA) 
4. Profit After Tax to Total Tangible assets (PAT/TTA) 
(B) Return on Capital employed 
1. Retained cash flow to Capital employed called Cash Flow Ploughed Back Ratio 
(CFPBR) 
2. Net Profit Before Interest and Tax to Capital Employed (NPBIT/CE) 
(C) Return on Shareholders' Equity 
1. Profit After Tax to Shareholders' Equity {PAT/SHE) 
2. Operating Cash Flow to Shareholders' Equity (OCF/SHE) 
3. Earnings Before Interest and Tax to Interest Charges (EBIT/Fixed Interest Charges) 
The analysis of the above profitability ratios of selected public sector industries across 
various sectors during before and after disinvestment period has been discussed in the 
following paragraph. 
Gross Profit Ratio 
It expresses the relationship between gross profit and net sales. It is obtained by dividing 
gross profit by net sales and is usually expressed in percentage. A higher gross profit ratio 
indicates a sign of good management as it implies that the cost of production is kept at a 
low level. It may also indicate a higher sale price without a corresponding increase in the 
cost of goods sold. A relatively low gross profit ratio is a danger signal. It may be due to 
increase in the cost of production without a corresponding increase in the sales price or 
even decrease in the sales price without a corresponding decline in the cost of production. 
The gross profit ratios for the selected Indian public sector undertakings viz. Steel, 
Minerals and Metals, Coal and Lignite, Power, Petroleum and Chemicals and 
Petrochemical have been discussed. 
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Table 6.1 
Gross Profit Ratio; Prior to and after Disinvestments 
Sectors 
Steel 
Mineral and 
Metals 
Coal and 
Lignite 
Power 
Petroleum 
Lowest 
Pre 
2.11 
-0.41 
1.71 
2.27 
9.20 
Post 
2.84 
-0.77 
9.10 
6.94 
14.60 
Highest 
Pre 
7.53 
0.10 
7.40 
5.00 
8.91 
Post 
13.2 
24.32 
29.20 
3.00 
13.40 
Average 
Pre 
3.56 
6.63 
3.80 
6.57 
11.88 
Post 
7.2 
21.20 
15.93 
5.79 
11.04 
CAGR 
Pre 
8.05 
14.30 
6.7 
2.09 
0.81 
Post 
9.74 
9.35 
3.9 
3.01 
2.49 
CAGR: Compound Annul Growth Rate 
The gross profit ratio of Steel industry reveals an increasing trend in, the pre-disinvestment 
period. Reference to table 6.1 shows that it was 2.11 in 2007-08 (the lowest range) and 
indicates 7.53 in 2008-09 as the highest range barring 2000-01 which was 2.11. It implies 
gradual increase in gross profit to a limited extent. The post-disinvestment shows 2.84 in 
2001-2002 as the lowest and 13.20 in 2005-06. The average of this ratio is 3.65 in the pre-
disinvestment period, whereas in the post-disinvestment period the average of this ratio is 
7.20. This shows that the gross profit ratio has improved in the Post-disinvestment period 
However, this was not significant as per 't' value. While considering the whole period, the 
average of this ratio refers to 5.42. The high value of the two periods reveals more 
fluctuations in this ratio in the pre and post disinvestment period. The compound annual 
growth rate of this ratio of Steel industry for the two periods is referred to as 8.05 in pre-
disinvestment period and 9.74 in the post-disinvestment periods. 
In Minerals and Metals industry, the gross profit ratio is ranging from 0.10 in 2001-02 to 
24.32 in 2007-08 barring - 0.41 and - 0.77 respectively for the pre-disinvestment period. 
For the post-disinvestment period the Gross Profit ratio ranged between 14.27. The average 
of this ratio before disinvestment is 6.63 and 21.20 for the post-disinvestment period which 
indicates that there is a significant improvement in the gross profit ratio of Minerals and 
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Metals industry during post-disinvestment period which is found significant ai 1 % level. 
The average of this ratio for the whole period is 14.30 and 09.35 respectively for pre and 
post disinvestment period. The average growth for pre and post disinvestment period in this 
industry was 6.7 and 3.9 respectively. 
The range of gross profit ratio in Coal and Lignite industry is 1.71, the lowest being 9.10 
and the highest for the pre-disinvestment period barring 2001-02 and 2007-08 which shows 
-4.88 and 5.66 respectively. The lowest and highest range of gross profit ratio is 7.40 in 
2005-06 and 29.20 in 2007-08 for the post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio 
is 3.80 and 15.93 in the pre and post disinvestment period respectively. The average of this 
ratio of Coal and Lignite is marked with significant improvement in the post-disinvestment 
period. 
The scenario of power sector reflects that the gross profit ratio in the Power sector in the 
pre-disinvestment period is 2.27 as against 6.94 in 2001-02 and 5.00 in 2007-08 during 
post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio before disinvestment was 6.57 against 
5.79 in the post-disinvestment period. The mean difference between gross profit ratio in the 
pre-disinvestment and post-disinvestment was found to be significant at 5% level. For the 
whole period the average of this ratio computed was 1.90. The decrease in gross profit ratio 
may be due to the reason that the Power industry's operational efficiency was not 
satisfactory in the post-disinvestment period. The average growth for pre and post 
disinvestment period in this industry was 2.09 and 3.01 respectively. 
In Petroleum industry, the gross profit ratio ranged between 9.20 and 14.60 in the pre-
disinvestment period whereas it ranged between 8.91 in 2001-02 to 13.40 in 2007-08 in the 
post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio of petroleum industry stood at 11.88 
against 11.04 in the pre-disinvestment and post-disinvestment periods respectively. For the 
whole period the average of this ratio was 11.46. Both pre and post-disinvestment periods 
registered more consistency in this ratio. The compound annual growth rate in this ratio 
before disinvestment was 0.81 against 2.49 in the post disinvestment period. 
The overall analysis of statistical values of gross profit ratio for these industries suggests 
that among all the selected industries under review, the difference in mean values between 
before and after disinvestment was the highest in Minerals and Metals followed by Coal 
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and Lignite and then Steel. All the three remaining industries registered lesser improvement 
in this ratio in the post-disinvestment period. Thus it is clear from the above analysis that 
the industries viz. Steel, Minerals and Metals and Coal and Lignite's had a better 
management in post-disinvestment period than the other industries. 
Earnings before Depreciation, Interest and Tax (EBDIT) to Sales Ratio 
EBDIT to sales ratio is otherwise known as Gross earnings ratio. It shows the amount left 
after making all the expenses excluding depreciation, interest and tax out of every hundred 
rupees of the net sales. It indicates the manufacturing efficiency of a company. The 
determinants of the ratio are earnings before depreciation, interest and tax and net sales. It 
is obtained by dividing earnings before depreciation, interest and tax by net sales and is 
expressed in percentage. The use of earnings before depreciation, interest and tax is an 
attempt to eliminate the effect of changing depreciation policy of a firm over years, varying 
methods of financing the capital employed by different industries, varying opportunities in 
availing tax incentives and the taxes paid which are not controllable by the management. 
Hence this ratio will be more effective in cross sectional comparison of firms. 
Table 6.2 
Earning before Depreciation, Interest and Taxes prior to and after Disinvestments 
Sectors 
Steel 
Coal and 
Lignite 
Power 
Petroleum 
Lowest 
Pre 
2.71 
3.05 
9.70 
12.37 
Post 
14.77 
15.50 
7.35 
19.31 
Highest 
Pre 
13.53 
11.42 
18.59 
11.42 
Post 
19.65 
25.21 
19.78 
28.44 
Average 
Pre 
10.56 
8.31 
54.35 
16.57 
Post 
16.47 
11.36 
8.49 
16.53 
CAGR 
Pre 
9.55 
6.07 
-0.81 
0.75 
Post 
2.05 
3.85 
2.86 
3.81 
As shown in table 6.2, earnings before depreciation, interest and tax to sales ratio of Steel 
industry shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 2.71 in 
2001-02 to 14.77 in 2007-08. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating 
trend. This ratio ranged fi-om 13.53 in 1991-92 to 19.65 in 2000-01. The average of this 
ratio was 10.56 in the pre disinvestment period whereas it was 16.47 in the post-
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disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period was 13.51. The 
compound annual growth rate in this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was 
9.55 and 2.05 respectively. 
Earnings before depreciation, interest and tax to sales ratio of Coal and Lignite industry 
shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 3.05 in 2001-02 to 
15.50 in 2007-08. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend which 
ranged from 13.05 in 2007-08 to 38.15 in 2008-09. The average of this ratio was 11.42 in 
the pre disinvestment period whereas it was 25.21 in the post-disinvestment period. The 
compound annual growth rate in this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was 
6.07 and 3.85 respectively. 
Earnings before depreciation, interest and tax to sales ratio of Power industry shows a 
fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 9.70 in 2001-02 to 7.35 in 
2007-08. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in this ratio 
which ranged from 8.59 in 2007-08 to 19.75 in 2007-08. The average of this ratio was 4.35 
in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was 8.49 in the post-disinvestment period. The 
compound annual growth rate in this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was -
0.81 and 2.86 respectively. 
Earnings before depreciation, interest and tax to sales ratio of Petroleum industry shows a 
fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 12.73 in to 19.3. In the 
post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in this ratio which ranged from 
11.42 in 2001-02 to 28.44 in 2007-08. The average of this ratio was 16.57 in the pre 
disinvestment period whereas it was 16.53 in the post-disinvestment period. There is a 
slight reduction in this ratio in the post-disinvestment period. The compound annual growth 
rate in this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was 0.75 and 3.81 respectively. 
From the above discussion it is clear that an improvement in the earnings before 
depreciation, interest and tax to sales ratio was there in four industries which are ranked as 
Coal and Lignite, Mine rals and Metals, Steel and Chemicals and Petrochemical. This 
indicates that the manufacturing efficiency of the above said industries has improved in the 
post-disinvestment period over the pre-disinvestment period. On the other hand Power and 
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Petroleum industries which showed negative deviation were marked with lower 
manufacturing efficiency during the study period under review. 
Operating Cash Flow to Net Sales 
Operating Cash Flow (OCF) has been taken as the sum of Profit After Tax (PAT) and 
depreciation provided during the year. It is calculated by taking operating cash flow as 
numerator and net sales as denominator. 
Table 6.3 
Operating Cash Flows to Net Sales; Prior to and after Disinvestments 
Sectors 
Sectors 
Steel 
Mineral and 
Metals 
Power 
Petroleum 
Lowest 
Pre 
0.96 
0.68 
33.74 
3.90 
Post 
9.87 
26.26 
43.56 
10.27 
Highest 
Pre 
1.96 
5.01 
27.13 
1.30 
Post 
12.07 
29.63 
41.63 
18.14 
Average 
Pre 
5.85 
10.2 
36.2 
6.74 
Post 
6.26 
21.85 
32.59 
8.85 
CAGR 
Pre 
16.07 
37.27 
1.37 
-6.82 
Post 
-9.57 
-3.58 
1.81 
-11.87 
The ration of operating cash flow to net sales, as shown in the above table registered in 
Steel Industry shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 
0.96 in 2001-02 to 9.87 in 2007-08 in the pre disinvestment period. In the post-
disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in Steel industry which ranged from 
1.96 in 2000-01 to 12.07 in 2007-08. The average of this ratio was 5.85 in the pre 
disinvestment period whereas it was 6.26 in the post- disinvestment period. The change in 
this ratio was not found significant. The average of this ratio for the whole period 
accounted for 6.05. In both pre and post-disinvestment periods more fluctuation in this ratio 
was observed. The compound annual growth rate in: this ratio in the pre and post-
disinvestment period was 16.07 and -9.57 respectively. 
The operating cash flow to net sales registered in Minerals and Metals industry shows a 
fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.68 in 2001-02 to 26.26 in 
2007-08 in the pre disinvestment period. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a 
fluctuatmg trend in Minerals and Metals industry which ranged from 15.01 in 2001-02 to 
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29.63 in 2007-08. The average of this ratio was 10.20 in the pre disinvestment period 
whereas it was 21.85 in the post-disinvestment period. There was remarkable improvement 
in this ratio in the post-disinvestment period which was found to be significant at 1% level. 
The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 16.42. In Minerals and Metals 
industry there was more consistency in this ratio in the post-disinvestment period whereas 
there was less consistency in the pre disinvestment period. The compound annual growth 
rate in this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was 37.27 and -3.58 respectively. 
The operating cash flow to net sales registered in Power industry shows a fluctuating trend 
in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 33.74 in 2001-02 to 43.56 in 2007-08 in the 
pre disinvestment period. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating 
trend in Power industry which ranged from 27.13 to 41.63. The average of this ratio was 
36.2002 in the pre disinvestment period whereas it was 32.59 in the post-disinvestment 
period. There was reduction in the average of this ratio. However, the difference in mean 
was foimd to be significant at 5% level. The average of this ratio for the whole period 
accounted for 34.63. There was more consistency in this ratio in both pre and post-
disinvestment periods. The compound aimual growth rate of this ratio in the pre and post-
disinvestment period was 1.37 and 1.81 respectively. 
The operating cash flow to net sales registered in Chemicals and Petrochemical industry 
shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 3.90 in 2001-02 to 
10.27 in 2007-08 in the pre disinvestment period. In the post-disinvestment period also 
there was a fluctuating trend in Chemicals and Petrochemical industry which ranged from 
1.30 to 18.14. The average of this ratio was 6.74 in the pre disinvestment period whereas it 
was 8.85 in the post-disinvestment period. The difference in mean value of this ratio was 
found to be insignificant. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 7.80. 
The compound annual growth rate in this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was 
-6.82 and -11.87 respectively. In both the pre and post-disinvestment there was negative 
deviation in the growth performance. 
The overall appraisal of operating cash flow sales ratio depicts that it has improved over the 
post-disinvestment periods in all the selected industries except Power and Petroleum which 
are marked with negative results. It may further be noticed that operating cash flow to net 
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sales was more in Minerals & Metals industry followed by Coal and Lignite. Steel and 
Chemicals and Petrochemical. 
Profit before Tax to Sales Ratio: 
The ratio of before tax and sales are also very important to study the trend. Following table 
shows the effect. 
Table 6.4 
Ratio of Profit before Tax to Sales before and after Disinvestments 
Sectors 
Steel 
Mineral and 
Metals 
Coal and 
Lignite 
Power 
Lowest 
Pre 
0.03 
1.16 
1.49 
Post 
3.31 
10.88 
13.37 
Highest 
Pre 
4.87 
1.14 
9.97 
Post 
6.05 
22.23 
21.49 
Average 
Pre 
1.35 
0.10 
-4.85 
Post 
-3.18 
3.96 
14.74 
CAGR 
Pre 1 Post 
11.06 
20.13 
4.94 
-20.97 
-11.84 
The profit before tax to sales ratio in Steel industry showed a fluctuating trend in the pre 
disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.03 in 2001-02 to 3.31 in the pre disinvestment 
period. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in Steel industry 
which ranged from 4.87 to 6.05. All the remaining years in the post-disinvestment period 
registered negative values. The average of this ratio was -1.35 in the pre disinvestment 
period whereas it was -3.18 in the post-disinvestment period. The mean difference was 
found to be insignificant. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 2.26. 
The compound annual growth rate in this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was 
11.06 and -20.67 respectively. 
The profit before tax to sales ratio registered in Minerals and Metals industry shows a 
fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 1.49 in 2001-02 to 13.37 in 
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2007-08 in the pre disinvestment period. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a 
fluctuating trend in Minerals and Metals industry which ranged from 6.97 to 21.49. All the 
remaining years in the post-disinvestment period registered negative values. The average of 
this ratio was -4.85 in the pre disinvestment period whereas it was 14.74 in the post-
disinvestment period. The mean difference was foimd to be significant at 1% level. The 
average Profit before tax to sales ratio for the whole period accoimted for 4.94. 
The profit before tax to sales ratio registered in Power industry shows a fluctuating trend in 
the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 3.34 to 3.52 in the pre and post disinvestment 
period. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in Power 
industry which ranged from 15.58 to 25.43. The average of this ratio was 25.84 in the pre 
disinvestment period whereas it was 20.06 in the post-disinvestment period. The mean 
difference of this ratio was found to be insignificant. The average of this ratio for the whole 
period accounted for 22,80. Compound growth was 13.26 and 15.78 respectively in pre and 
post disinvestment era. 
The profit before tax to sales ratio registered in Chemicals and Petrochemical industry 
shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 1.16 in 2001-02 to 
10.88 in 2007-08, all the remaining year registered only n«lgative ratio in the pre 
disinvestment period. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in 
Chemicals and Petrochemical industry which ranged firom 1.14 in 2001-02 to 22.23 in 
2007-08 barring 2007-08 wherein it registered negative ratios. The average of this ratio was 
0.10 in the pre disinvestment period whereas it was 3.96 in the post-disinvestment period. 
The mean difference was found to be insignificant. The average of this ratio for the whole 
period accoimted for 2.03. The compound annual growth rate in this ratio in the pre and 
post-disinvestment period was 20.13 and -11.84 respectively. 
Steel industry's performance in both pre and post-disinvestment period shows negative 
values which implies that the interest burden of the industry have increased fi-om year to 
year. Hence in the twenty years period the industry could not show improved performance 
in this ratio. Minerals and Metals and Coal and Lignite's performance has improved in the 
post-disinvestment period. Interest expense being the major factor which has an important 
bearing on the profitability of the industries, its burden could be felt in Power, Petroleum 
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and Chemicals and Petrochemical which is evident through the reduction in the average of 
this ratio. 
Net Profit Ratio 
It shows the relationship between the net profits and sales of a concern. It indicates what 
portion of net sales is left for the shareholders after all the costs, charges and expenses have 
been deducted. It is obtained by dividing profit after taxes by net sales and expressed in 
percentage. It is the ultimate measure of efficiency of management or in other words this 
ratio helps in determining the efficiency vAth which the affairs of the business are being 
managed. A high net profit ratio only means adequate returns to the owners. This enables a 
firm to withstand intense competition when the selling price is declining or cost of 
production is rising. A low net profit ratio on the other hand indicates inadequate returns to 
the owners. Table given below shows the calculations 
Table 6.5 
Net Profit Ratio; Prior to and after Disinvestments 
Sectors 
Steel 
Mineral and Metals 
Coal and Lignite 
Power 
Petroleum 
Chemicals & 
Petrochemical 
Industry 
Lowest 
Pre 
0.60 
1.33 
2.38 
0.35 
3.2 
0.44 
Post 
2.60 
12.52 
2.66 
33.64 
3.16 
1.35 
Highest 
Pre 
4.50 
0.06 
1.56 
0.01 
4.22 
0.35 
Post 
6.01 
19.66 
10.08 
24.86 
7.55 
1.39 
Average 
Pre 
-1.24 
-2.99 
-4.27 
24.79 
6.44 
-1.2 
Post 
-1.00 
11.00 
4.83 
17.12 
5.77 
2.38 
CAGR 
Pre 
1865 
33.87 
-25.28 
11.14 
6.53 
5.70 
Post 
7.39 
14.83 
-7.2 
-12.60 
-0.85 
-11.12 
The net 'profit ratio registered in Steel industry shows a fluctuating trend in the pre 
disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.60 in 2001-02 to 2.60 in 2007-08. In the post-
disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in Steel industry which ranged from 
4.50 in 2001-08 to 6.01 in 2007-08. All the remaining years showed negative ratios. The 
average net profit ratio was -1.24 in the pre disinvestment period whereas it was -1.00 in 
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the post-disinvestment period. The compound annual growth rate in this ratio in the pre and 
post-disinvestment period was 18.65 and 7.39 respectively. 
The net profit ratio registered in Minerals and Metals industry shows a fluctuating trend in 
the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 1.33 in 2001-02 to 12.52 in 2008-09 in the pre 
disinvestment period. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in 
Minerals and Metals industry which ranged from 0.06 in 2007-08 to 19.66 in 2007-08. The 
average of this ratio was -2.99 in the pre disinvestment period whereas it was 11.00 in the 
post-disinvestment period. The compound armual growth rate in this ratio in the pre and 
post-disinvestment period was 33.87 and 14.83 respectively. 
The net profit ratio registered in Coal and Lignite industry shows a fluctuating trend in the 
pre-disinvestment period. It ranged from 2.38 in 2001-02 to 2.66 in 2001-02, all the 
remaining years showed negative ratios. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a 
fluctuating trend in Coal and Lignite industry which ranged from 1.56 in 2002-2003 to 
10.08 in 2001-2002. The average of this ratio was -4.27 in the pre disinvestment period 
whereas it was 4.83 in the post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the 
whole period accounted for 0.28. There was more variation in the net profit ratio in both 
pre and post-disinvestment period. The compound annual growth rate in this ratio in the pre 
and post-disinvestment period was -25.28 and -7.20 respectively. 
The net profit ratio registered in Power industry shows a fluctuating trend in the pre-
disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.35. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a 
fluctuating trend in Power industry which ranged from 0.01 in 2001-2002 to 24.86 in 2007 
- 08. The average of this ratio was 24.79 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was 
17.12 in the post-disinvestment period. The average net profit ratio for the whole period 
accounted for 20.75. The compound annual growth rate in this ratio in the pre and post-
disinvestment period was 11.14 and -12.60 respectively. 
The net profit ratio registered in Petroleum industry shows a fluctuating trend in the pre-
disinvestment period. It ranged from 3.20 in 2001-02 to 9.16 in 2007-08. In the post-
disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in Petroleum industry which ranged 
from 4.22 in 1991-92 to 7.55 in 2007-08. The average of this ratio was 6.44 in the pre 
disinvestment period whereas it was 5.77 in the post-disinvestment period. The average of 
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this ratio for the whole period accounted for 6.10. The mean difference was found to be 
insignificant. The compound annual growth rate in this ratio in the pre and post-
disinvestment period was 6.53 and -0.85 respectively. 
The net profit ratio registered in Chemicals and Petrochemical industry reflects a 
fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.44 to 1.13 in 2001 -02, all 
the remaining years showed negative. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a 
fluctuating trend in Chemicals and Petrochemical industry which ranged from 0.35 to 1.39 
in this period. The average of this Ratio was -1.2002 in the pre disinvestment period 
whereas it was 2.38 in the post-disinvestment period. The average of this Ratio for the 
whole period accounted for 0.25. The mean difference was found to be insignificant. CV 
value reflects very high degree of variability in their Net Profit earnings during the post-
disinvestment periods. In the pre-disinvestment period also there was high fluctuation. The 
compound annual growth rate in this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was 
5.70 and -11.12 respectively. 
From the above said analysis it could be inferred that the efficiency with which the industry 
was nm is more because of increased net profit ratio in Minerals and Metals followed by 
Coal and Lignite and Chemicals and Petrochemical. All the remaining three industries viz. 
Steel, Power and Petroleum industries reduction in the Net Profit Ratio indicates 
inadequate retiims to owners. 
(B) Return on Total Assets (ROTA) 
The return on total assets measures the overall efficiency of the management in generating 
profits given for a given level of assets at its disposal. The ROTA essentially relates the 
profits to the size of the fiml (which is measured in terms of the assets). If a firm increases 
its size but is imable to increase its profits proportionately, then the ROTA will decrease. In 
such a case, increasing the size of the assets i.e. the size of the firm will not by itself 
advance the financial welfare of the owners. Under this heading fall the following ratios. 
• Earnings Before Depreciation, Interest and Tax (EBDIT) to Gross total Assets 
(GTA) Ratio 
• Gross Profit to Total Assets Ratio 
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• operating Cash Flow to Gross Total Assets Ratio (OCF/GT A) 
• Profit After Tax to Total Tangible Assets Ratio (PAT/TTA) 
Now these ratios have been taken into account for discussion. Earnings Before 
Depreciation, Interest and Tax (EBDIT) to Gross Total Assets (GT A) Ratio. It is otherwise 
called Gross Surplus Ratio. The gross surplus ratio reflects how much the firm has earned 
on the investment of all the financial resources committed to the firm. The overall 
profitability of a firm may be appropriately judged by this measure if one considers 
eliminating the effect of different methods firms use in the financing of assets. This ratio is 
considered to be one of the very effective measures of the management's performance in 
cost effectiveness and measures how effectively total assets are being utilised by a firm. 
This ratio takes into account the non-operating income which is fairly substantial in some 
companies. Therefore Gross Surplus Ratio is a precise and effective measure of the 
profitability. It reflects the combined effect of both operations and financing activities of a 
company. It has been defined as the ratio of Earnings Before Depreciation, Interest and Tax 
(EBDIT) to Gross Total Assets and expressed in percentage. The reason for using EBDIT 
has already been explained in the Gross Earnings Ratio. The use of GTA (Gross Total 
Assets) as the denominator is an attempt to eliminate the effect of different methods used in 
financing of assets as well as to take care of the effect of depreciation which may change 
over the years. Hence, this ratio will be quite usefiil in cross sectional comparison. 
Accordingly to study the overall profitability by a single measure this ratio has been used in 
the study. 
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Table 6.6 
Return on total assets; Prior to and after Disinvestments 
Sectors 
Steel 
Mineral and 
Metals 
Coal and 
Lignite 
Power 
Petroleum 
Chemicals & 
Petrochemical 
Lowest 
Pre 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.0 
0.08 
0.02 
Post 
0.36 
0.12 
0.06 
0.06 
0.18 
0.13 
Highest 
Pre 
0.04 
0.06 
0.05 
0.05 
0.07 
0.05 
Post 
0.45 
0.11 
0.10 
0.13 
0.29 
0.08 
Average 
Pre 
0.07 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.13 
0.06 
Post 
0.09 
0.09 
0.08 
0.08 
O.ll 
-
CAGR 
Pre 
9.48 
14.87 
4.15 
14.32 
-8.71 
-2.15 
Post 
13.47 
2.94 
2.00 
11.17 
10.2 
6.83 
The earnings before depreciation interest and tax to gross total assets registered in Steel 
industry shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.01 to 
0.36 in the post-disinvestment period and also there was a fluctuating trend in Steel 
industry which ranged between 0.04 in 2001-01 to 2007-08 and 0.45 thereafter. The 
average of this ratio was 0.07 in the pre disinvestment period whereas it was 0.09 in the 
post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 
0.08. The compound annual growth rate in this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment 
period was 9.48 and 13.47 respectively. 
The earnings before depreciation interest and tax to gross total assets registered in Minerals 
and Metals industry shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged 
from 0.01 in 2001-02 to 0.12 in 2007-08. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a 
fluctuating trend in Minerals and Metals industry which ranged from 0.06 in 2007-08 to 
0.11. The average of this ratio was 0.04 in the pre disinvestment period whereas it was 0.09 
in the post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted 
for 0.07. The compound annual growth rate in this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment 
period was 14.87 and 2.94 respectively. 
The earnings before depreciation interest and tax to gross total assets registered in Coal and 
Lignite industry shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 
0.01 in 2001-02 to 0.06 in 2007-08. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a 
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fluctuating trend in Coal and Lignite industry which ranged from 0.05 in 2000-01 to 0.10. 
The average of this ratio was 0.04 in the pre disinvestment period whereas it was 0.08 in 
the post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 
0.06. The compoimd armual growth rate of this ratio in the pre and post-dismvestment 
period was 4.15 and 2.00 respectively. 
The earnings before depreciation interest and tax to gross total assets ratio registered in 
Power industry shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 
0.0 in 2001-02 to 0.06 in 2007-08. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a 
fluctuating 'trend ' in Power industry which ranged from 0.05 in 2007-08 and 2001-02 to 
0.13 in 2008-09. The average of this ratio was 0.04 in the pre disinvestment period whereas 
it was 0.08 in the post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period 
accounted for 0.06. The compound armual growth rate of this ratio in the pre and post-
disinvestment period was 14.32 and 11.17 respectively.: 
The earnings before depreciation interest and tax to gross total assets ratio registered in 
Petroleum industry shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged 
from 0.08 in 2001-02 to 0.18 in 2007-08. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a 
fluctuating trend in Petroleum industry which ranged from 0.07 to 0.27. The average of this 
ratio was 0.13 in the pre disinvestment period whereas it was 0.11 in the post-disinvestment 
period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 0.12. The compound 
annual growth rate in this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was -8.71 and 10.2 
respectively. 
The earnings before depreciation interest and tax to gross total assets ratio registered in 
Chemicals and Petrochemical industry shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment 
period. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in Chemicals and 
Petrochemical industry which ranged from 0.02 in 2001-02 to 0.13 in 2007-08. The 
average of this ratio was 0.05 in the pre disinvestment period whereas it was 0.08 in the 
Post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 
0.06. The compoimd annual growth rate in this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment 
period was -2.15 and 6.83 respectively. 
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The overall analysis of earnings before depreciation interest and tax to 'gross total assets 
ratio implies that except petroleum industry there was effective utilisation of total assets in 
the concerned industries during the study period under review. Because earnings before 
depreciation interest and tax to gross total assets ratio have improved in all the industries 
except petroleum which was marked with negative ratio in the post disinvestment period. 
Gross Profit to Total Assets Ratio 
Gross Profit is the excess of the Net Sales proceeds over the cost of sales. It reflects the 
efficiency with which naanagement produces each unit of product. Total Assets have been 
taken as sum of all the assets net of depreciation. The ratio is computed by dividing gross 
profit to total assets. Calculations show the effect prior to and after disinvestments on the 
next page 
Table 6.7 
Ratios of Gross Profit to Total Assets; before and after Disinvestments 
Sectors 
Steel 
Mineral and 
Metals 
Coal and 
Lignite 
Power 
Petroleum 
Chemicals & 
Petrochemical 
Industry 
Lowest 
Pre 
0.78 
0.02 
0.59 
1.39 
8.88 
1.27 
Post 
4.41 
10.2 
3.78 
5.45 
22.21 
4.64 
Highest 
Pre 
1.09 
4.67 
3.61 
4.39 
7.45 
3.88 
Post 
5.17 
12.06 
11.46 
12.29 
15.2 
14.40 
Average 
Pre 
1.67 
2.21 
1.58 
4.04 
10.77 
2.79 
Post 
3.38 
8.50 
6.99 
7.56 
13.11 
7.34 
CAGR 
Pre 
11.13 
50.82 
6.56 
13.23 
-9.54 
5.68 
Post 
8.87 
6.80 
5.67 
12.47 
8.25 
1.18 
The gross profit to total assets ratio registered in Steel industry shows a fluctuating trend in 
the pre disinvestment period. It ranged fi-om 0.78 in 2001-02 to 4.41 in 2007-08. In the 
post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in Steel industry which ranged 
from 1.09 in 2001-02 to 5.17 in 2007-08. The average Gross Profit to Total Assets Ratio 
was 1.67 in the pre disinvestment period whereas it was 3.38 in the post-disinvestment 
period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 2.53. The mean 
difference was found to be significant at 1 % level. CV values in both Pre and Post-
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disinvestment period reflects high fluctuation in gross profit to total assets ratio. The 
compound annual growth rate in this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was 
11.13 and 8.87 respectively. 
The gross profit total assets ratio registered in Minerals and Metals industry shows a 
fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.02 in 2001-02 to 10.2002 
in 2007-08. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in Minerals 
and Metals industry which ranged from 4.67 in 2007-08 to 12.06. The average of this ratio 
was 2.21 in the pre disinvestment period whereas it was 8.50 in the post-disinvestment 
period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 5.36. The Compound 
Annual Growth Rate in this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was 50.82 and 
6.80 respectively. , 
The gross profit to total assets ratio registered in Coal and Lignite industry shows a 
fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.59 in 2001-01 to 3.78 in 
2007-08. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in Coal and 
Lignite industry wWch ranged from 3.61 in 2001-02 to 11.46. The average of this ratio was 
1.58 in the pre disinvestment period whereas it was 6.99 in the post-disinvestment period. 
The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 4.29. The compound annual 
growth rate in this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was 6.56 and 5.67 
respectively. 
The gross profit to total assets ratio registered in Power industry shows a fluctuating trend 
in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 1.39 in 2001-02 to 5.45 in 2007-08. In the 
post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in Power industry which 
ranged from 4.39, in 2007-08 to 12.29 in 2008-09. The average of this ratio was 4.04 in the 
pre disinvestment period whereas it was 7.56 in the post-disinvestment period. The average 
of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 5.2002. The compound armual growth rate 
in this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was 13.23 and 12.47 respectively. 
The gross profit to total assets ratio registered in Petroleum industry shows a fluctuating 
trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 8.88 in 2001-02 to 22.21 in 2007-08. 
In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in Petroleum industry 
which ranged from 7.45 in 2001-02 to 15.20 in 2007-08. The average of this ratio was 
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15.46 in the pre disinvestment period whereas it was 10.77 in the post-disinvestment 
period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accoimted for 13.11. The compound 
annual growth rate in this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was -9.54 and 8.25 
respectively. 
The gross profit to total assets ratio registered in Chemicals and Petrochemical industry 
shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 1.27 in 2001-02 to 
4.64 in 2007-08. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in 
Chemicals and Petrochemical industry which ranged from 3.88 in 2001-02 to 14.40 in 
2007-08. The average of this ratio was 2.79 in the pre disinvestment period whereas it was 
7.34 in the post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period 
accoimted for 5.07. The compound annual growth rate in this ratio in the pre and post-
disinvestment period was 5.68 and 1.18 respectively. 
It can be inferred from the above analysis that the mean difference between pre and post-
disinvestment period showed improved performance except petroleum industry which 
indicated poor performance in this ratio when compared with the pre-disinvestment period. 
Among the industries which showed positive difference, Minerals and Metals industry's 
average was the highest followed by Coal and Lignite, Chemicals and Petrochemical, 
Power and Steel. This shows the production efficiency of these industries has increased due 
to open market refomls introduced by the Government of India. 
Operating Cash Flow to Gross Total Assets Ratio (OCF/GTA) 
Operating Cash Flow has been taken as the sum of Profit After Tax and Depreciation 
provided during the year. The sum of all the assets net of depreciation has been taken as 
gross total assets. The ratio is computed by taking operating cash flow as the numerator and 
gross total assets as the denominator. 
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Table 6.8 
Ratio of Operating Profit to Total Assets; Prior to and after Disinvestments 
Sectors 
Steel 
Mineral and 
Metals 
Coal and 
Lignite 
Power 
Petroleum 
Chemicals & 
Petrochemical 
Industry 
Lowest 
Pre 
0.01 
0.02 
0.02 
0.03 
0.06 
0.01 
Post 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.05 
0.20 
1.24 
Highest 
Pre 
0.01 
0.03 
0.01 
-
0.02 
0.01 
Post 
0.02 
0.11 
0.07 
-
0.08 
0.07 
Average 
Pre 
0.02 
0.02 
0.01 
-
0.08 
0.02 
Post 
-
0.06 
0.05 
0.04 
0.06 
0.03 
CAGR 
Pre 
9.88 
20.66 
2.48 
6.67 
2.52 
-6.05 
Post 
7.96 
4.33 
-6.23 
7.2 
0.48 
-10.34 
The operating cash flow to gross total assets ratio, as shown in table 6.8 registered in Steel 
industry shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.01 in 
2001-02 and 2007-08 to 0.03. In the post-disinvestment period a constant increase of 0.01 
could be noticed all through the 7 years period. The average of this ratio was 0.02 which is 
the same for pre and post-disinvestment period. The whole period's average is 0.02. The 
compound annual growth rate in this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was 
9.88 and 7.96 respectively. 
The operating cash flow to gross total assets ratio registered in Minerals and Metals 
industry shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.02 in 
2001-02 to 0.03 in 2007-08. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating 
trend in Minerals and Metals industry which ranged from 0.03 in 2001-02 to 0.11 in 2007-
08. The average of this ratio was 0.02 in the pre disinvestment period whereas it was 0.06 
in the post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted 
for 0.04. The compound annual growth rate in this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment 
period was 20.66 and 4.33 respectively. 
The operating cash flow to gross total assets ratio registered in Coal and Lignite industry 
shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.02 in to 0.03 in 
2001-02 and 2008-09. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in 
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Coal and Lignite industry which ranged from 0.01 in 2000-01 to 0.07 in 2007-08. The 
average of this ratio was 0.01 in the pre disinvestment period whereas it was 0.05 in the 
post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 
0.03. The compound annual growth rate in this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment 
period was 2.48 and -6.23 respectively. 
In Power industry the operation cash flow to gross total assets ratio showed cyclical 
variations in the pre-disinvestment period. In the post-disinvestment period also its 
performance was in the same manner. The average of this ratio was 0.03 in the pre 
disinvestment period whereas it was 0.05 in the post-disinvestment period. The average of 
this ratio for the whole period accounted for 0.04. The compound annual growth rate in this 
ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was 6.67 and 7.20 respectively. 
The operating cash flow to gross total assets ratio registered in Petroleum industry shows a 
fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.06 in 2001-02 to 0.20 in 
2007-08. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in Petroleum 
industry which ranged from 0.02 in 2001-02 to 0.08 in 2007-08. The average of this ratio 
was 0.08 in the pre disinvestment period where as it was 0.06 in the post-disinvestment 
period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accoimted for 0.07. The compound 
annual growth rate in this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was 2.52 and 0.48 
respectively. 
The operating cash flow to gross total assets ratio registered in Chemicals and 
Petrochemical industry shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged 
from 0.01 in 2001-02 to 1.24 in 2008-09. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a 
fluctuating trend in this ratio which ranged from 0.01 in 2007-08 to 0.07 in 2008-09. The 
average of this ratio was 0.02 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was 0.03 in the 
post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 
0.02. The mean difference was found to be insignificant in the both pre and post-
disinvestment periods. The compoxmd annual growth rate in this ratio in the pre and post-
disinvestment period was -6.05 and -10.34 respectively. 
Except Petroleum industry and Steel industry which registered reduced and constant values 
in the post-disinvestment period when compared with pre-disinvestment period all the 
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remaining industries performance in the Operation Cash Flow to Gross Total Assets have 
improved. 
Profit After Tax to Total Tangible Assets Ratio (PAT/TTA) 
Return on Total Tangible Assets has been defined as the percentage of profit to total 
tangible assets. The use of total tangible assets is an attempt to eliminate the effect of 
intangible assets, which may have the least potential sales value. This rate of return shows 
the productivity of the total tangible assets after meeting all the expenses including taxes. 
Calculations are shown in table 6.9 
Table 6.9 
Ratio of Profit after Tax to Tangible Assets; Prior to and after Disinvestments 
Sectors 
Steel 
Mineral and 
Metals 
Coal and 
Lignite 
Power 
Petroleum 
Chemicals & 
Petrochemical 
Industry 
Lowest 
Pre 
-
0.03 
0.01 
0.01 
0.04 
0.01 
Post 
-
0.05 
0.05 
0.32 
0.07 
0.01 
Highest 
Pre 
-
0.03 
0.01 
0.02 
0.02 
Post 
-
0.14 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
Average 
Pre 
-
0.05 
0.01 
0.05 
0.06 
Post 
-
0.03 
0.02 
0.04 
0.04 
CAGR 
Pre 
-6.88 
24.22 
-8.68 
36.74 
-3.25 
-1.22 
Post 
-7.55 
-3.16 
6.17 
9.41 
8.16 
-7.03 
The profit after tax to total tangible assets ratio in Steel industry indicates very bad shape of 
the condition prevailing in the industry. It is fiirther proved that the industry is in a worst 
condition because all values viz. mean, CAGR showed negative values throughout the 
period of study which is evident through the analysis. The mean difference was fovmd to be 
insignificant. Both pre and post-disinvestment periods registered high CV values which 
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indicate high fluctuation during those periods. The compound annual growth rate in this 
ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was -6.88 and -7.55 respectively. 
The profit after tax to total tangible assets ratio registered in Minerals and Metals industry 
shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged fi-om 0.03 in 2001-02 to 
0.05 in 2007-08 . In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in 
Minerals and Metals industry which ranged from 0.03 in 2001-02 to 0.14 in 2007-08. The 
average Profit after Tax to Total Tangible Assets Ratio was negligible in the pre-
disinvestment period whereas it was 0.05 in the post-disinvestment period. The average of 
this ratio for the whole period accounted for 0.03. The compound annual growth rate in this 
ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was 24.22 and -3.16 respectively. 
The profit after tax to total tangible assets ratio registered in Coal and Lignite industry 
shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.01 in 2001-82 to 
0.05 in 120025-86. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in 
Coal and Lignite industry which ranged from 0.01 in 1991-92,2001-02and 2000-01 to 0.05 
in 2001-2002. The average of this ratio was 0.01 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it 
was 0.02 in the post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period 
accounted for 0.02. The mean difference was found to be insignificant. In the both pre and 
post-disinvestment periods registered high CV values which implies high fluctuations 
during those periods. The compound annual growth rate in this ratio in the pre and post-
disinvestment period was -8.68 and 6.17 respectively. 
The profit after tax to total tangible assets ratio registered in Power industry shows a 
fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.01 in 2001-02 to 0.32 in 
2007-08. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in Power 
industry which ranged from 0.02 in 2001-02 to 0.05 in 2007-08. The average of this ratio 
was 0.05 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was 0.04 in the post-disinvestment 
period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 0.04. The mean 
difference was found to be insignificant. The compoimd aimual growth rate in this ratio in 
the pre and post-disinvestment period was 36.74 and 9.41 respectively. 
The profit after tax to total tangible assets ratio registered in Petroleum industry shows a 
fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period, ft ranged from 0.04 in 2001-02 to 0.07 in 
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2007-08. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in Petroleum 
industry which ranged from 0.02 in 2001-02 to 0.05 in 2007-08. The average of this ratio 
was 0.06 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was 0.04 in the post-disinvestment 
period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 0.05. The compound 
annual growth rate in this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was -3.25 and 8.16 
respectively. 
In Chemicals and Petrochemical the profit after tax to total tangible assets ratio showed 
very poor performance in the pre as well as post-disinvestment periods. The average pf this 
ratio was 0.01 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was 0.01 in the post-
disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 0.01. 
The mean difference was found to be insignificant. High CV value in both the pre and post-
disinvestment periods reflects more fluctuations. The compound annual growth rate in this 
ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was -1.22 and -7.03 respectively. 
By observing the above analysis, it can be concluded that significant improvement could be 
noticed only in Minerals and Metals and Coal and Lignite industries. In all other industries 
under review there were no remarkable changes due to disinvestment measures. Hence the 
productivity of the total tangible assets was more in Minerals and Metals followed by Coal 
and Lignite, Chemicals and Petrochemical barring Steel, Power and Petroleum. 
(C) Return on Capital Employed 
Return on capital employed establishes the relationship between the profits and the capital 
employed. It is the primary ratio and is mostly widely used to measure the overall 
profitability and efficiency of a business. The term Capital Employed refers to the total 
investment made in a business. The various ratios which are considered as effective 
measurement of return on capital employed are listed as under 
• Retained Cash Flow to Capital Employed (RCF/CE) 
• Net Profit Before Interest and Tax to Capital Employed (NPBIT/CE) 
Retained Cash Flow to Capital Employed 
The preservation and increased generation of cash flow is judged by several schools of 
thought to be one of the primary functions of a business. The cash flow ploughed back 
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analysis goes straight to the heart of any business enterprise and measures the abihty to 
invest in future growth activities. Growth companies are usually characterized with a 
higher retention rates. The cash flow ploughed back which is the other name for retained 
cash flow provides information about how effectively and efficiently the capital (owners as 
well as outsiders) is being utilised to generate cash for future growth purpose. A high ratio 
indicates efficient utilisation of capital. The ratio is obtained by dividing retained cash flow 
by gross capital employed and expressed in Percentage. 
Table 6.10 
Ratio of Retained Cash Flows to Capital Employed; prior to and after Disinvestments 
Sectors 
Steel 
Mineral and 
Metals 
Coal and 
Lignite 
Power 
Petroleum 
Chemicals & 
Petrochemical 
Industry 
Lowest 
Pre 
0.03 
0.02 
0.01 
0.04 
0.12 
0.06 
Post 
0.06 
0.09 
0.07 
0.10 
0.26 
0.19 
Highest 
Pre 
0.02 
0.06 
0.05 
0.07 
0.11 
0.01 
Post 
0.05 
0.09 
0.72 
0.11 
0.17 
0.11 
Average 
Pre 
0.04 
0.05 
0.05 
0.07 
0.19 
0.06 
Post 
0.02 
0.08 
0.13 
0.09 
0.13 
0.04 
CAGR 
Pre 
4.59 
7.38 
-2.53 
3.41 
-7.36 
-3.43 
Post 
-14.40 
-1.04 
-22.26 
5.57 
-0.41 
-15.82 
As shown in table 6.10 above, the retained cash flow to capital employed registered in Steel 
industry shows a fluctuatmg trend in the pre dismvestment period. It ranged from 0.03 in 
2001-02 to 0.06 in 2008-09. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating 
trend in Steel industry which ranged fi-om 0.02 in 2001-02 to 0.05 in 2007-08. The average 
of this ratio was 0.04 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was 0.02 in the post 
disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period is less than 1.0 i.e. 03. 
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The compound annual growth rate of this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period 
was 4.59 and -14.40 respectively. 
The retained cash flow to capital employed registered in Minerals and Metals industry 
shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.02 in 1. 20 to 
0.09 in 2001-02. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in 
Minerals and Metals industry which ranged from 0.06 in 2002-2003 to 0.09 in 2007-08. 
The average of this ratio was 0.05 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was 0.08 in 
the post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 
0.06. The compound annual growth rate of this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment 
period was 7.38 and -1.04 respectively. 
The retained cash flow to capital employed registered in Coal and Lignite industry shows a 
fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.01 in 1.20 to 0.07 in 
2007-08. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in Coal and 
Lignite industry which ranged from 0.05 in 2001-02 to 0.72 in 2007-08. The average of this 
ratio was 0.05 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was 0.13 in the post-
disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 0.09. 
The mean difference was found to be insignificant. The compound armual growth rate of 
this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was -2.53 and -22.26 respectively. 
The retained cash flow to capital employed registered in Power industry shows a 
fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.04 in 2001-02 to 0.10 in 
2008-09. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in Power 
industry which ranged between 0.07 in 2001-02 and 0.11 in 2008-09. The average of this 
ratio was 0.07 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was.0.09 in the post disinvestment 
period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 0.08. The compound 
annual growth rate at this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was 3.41 and 5.57 
respectively. . 
The retained cash flow to capital employed registered in Petroleum industry shows a 
fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.12 in 2001-02 to 0.26 in 
2007-08. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in Petroleum 
industry which ranged from 0.11 in 1992-03 to 0.17 in 2007-08. The average of this ratio 
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was 0.19 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was 0.13 in the post-disinvestment 
period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 0.16. The compound 
annual growth rate of this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was -7.36 and -
0.41 respectively. 
The retained cash flow to capital employed registered in Chemicals and Petrochemical 
industry shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.06 in 
2001 to 2002 to 0.19 in 2007-08. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a 
fluctuating trend in Chemicals and Petrochemical industry which ranged from 0.01 in 
2002-03 to 0.11 in 2007-08. The average of this ratio was 0.06 in the pre-disinvestment 
period whereas it was 0.04 in the post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for 
the whole period accounted for 0.05. The mean difference was found to be insignificant. 
The compound annual growth rate of this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period 
was -3.43 and -15.82 respectively. 
From the above analysis it is clear that there was improvement in Retained Cash Flow to 
Capital Employed ratio in Coal and Lignite followed by Minerals and Metals and Power 
whereas in the case of the remaining industries there was reduction in the performance of 
this ratio. This means that efficient and effective utilisation of capital was more in those 
industries which showed improvement in this ratio. 
Net Profit before Interest and Tax to Capital Employed ratio 
It is otherwise called Return on Capital Employed (ROCE). This is one of the most basic 
profitability ratios. It is a good indicator of the profitability of the capital employed in the 
firm. The percentage of earnings before interest and tax to capital employed has been taken 
as the return on capital employed. 
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Table 6.11 
Ratio of Net Profit before Interest and Taxes to Capital Employed; before and after 
Disinvestments 
Sectors 
Steel 
Mineral and 
Metals 
Coal and Lignite 
Power 
Petroleum 
Chemicals «& 
Petrochemical 
Industry 
Lowest 
Pre 
0.02 
0.03 
0.01 
0.06 
0.18 
0.05 
Post 
0.29 
0.12 
0.09 
0.11 
0.46 
0.12 
Highest 
Pre 
0.05 
0.08 
0.09 
0.07 
0.17 
0.09 
Post 
0.23 
0.34 
0.31 
0.22 
0.33 
0.34 
Average 
Pre 
0.06 
0.03 
0.03 
0.09 
0.32 
0.08 
Post 
O.U 
0.16 
0.17 
0.13 
0.26 
0.15 
CAGR 
Pre 
14.67 
30.15 
8.07 
5.2 
5.47 
10.97 
Post 
-9.60 
14.07 
13.99 
13.10 
6.82 
0.36 
The net profit before Interest and Tax to Capital Employed ratio registered in Steel industry 
shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.02 in 2001-02 to 
0.29 in 2001-02 . In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in 
Steel industry which ranged from 0.05 in 2001-02 to 0.23 in 2007-08. The average of this 
ratio was 0.06 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was 0.11 in the post-
disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 0.08. 
The mean difference was found to be insignificant. The compound annual growth rate of 
this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was 14.67 and -9.60 respectively. 
The net profit before interest and tax to capital employed ratio registered in Minerals and 
Metals industry shows a fluctuating trend in the pre-disinvestment period. It ranged from 
0.03 in 2001-02 to 0.12 in 2007-08. Except these two years all the remaining years in the 
pre-disinvestment period showed only negligible ratio. In the post-disinvestment period 
also there was a fluctuating trend in Minerals and Metals industry which ranged from 0.08 
in 2007-08 to 0.34 in 2000-2001. The average of this ratio was 0.03 in the pre-
disinvestment period whereas it was 0.16 in the post-disinvestment period. The average of 
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this ratio for the whole period accounted for 0.10. The compound annual growth rate of this 
ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was 30.15 and 14.07 respective!). 
The net profit before interest and tax to capital employed ratio registered in Coal and 
Lignite industry shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 
0.01 in 2001-02 to 0.09 in 2007-08. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a 
fluctuating trend in Coal and Lignite industry which ranged from 0.09 in 2002-03 to 0.31 in 
2007-08. The average of this ratio was 0.03 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was 
0.17 in the post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period 
accounted for 0.10. The compound annual g4owth rate of this ratio in the pre and post-
disinvestment period was 8.07 and 13.99 respectively. 
The net profit before interest and tax to capital employed ratio registered in Power industry 
shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.06 in 2001-02 to 
0.11 in 2007-08. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in 
Power industry which ranged from 0.07 in 2007-08 to 0.22 in 2000-01. The average of this 
ratio was 0.09 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was 0.13 in the post-
disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 0.11. 
The compound annual grovrth rate of this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period 
was 5.2003 and 13.10 respectively. 
The net profit before interest and tax to capital employed ratio registered in Petroleum 
industry shows a fluctuating frend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.18 in 
2002-03 to 0.46 in 2008-09. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating 
trend in Petroleum industry wllich ranged from 0.17 in 2001-02 to 0.33 in 2008-09. The 
average of this ratio was 0.32 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was 0.26 in the 
post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 
0.29. The mean difference was found to be insignificant. There was moderate fluctuation in 
both pre and post-disinvestment periods as per CV values. The compound annual growth 
rate in this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was 5.47 and 6.82 respectively. 
The net profit before interest and tax to capital employed ratio registered in Chemicals and 
Petrochemical industry shows a fluctuating trend in the pre-disinvestment period. It ranged 
from 0.05 in 2001-02 to 0.12 in 2007-2008. In the post-disinvestment period also there was 
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a fluctuating trend in Chemicals and Petrochemical industry which ranged from 0.09 in 
2001-02 to 0.34 in 2007-08. The average of this ratio was 0.08 in the pre-disinvestment 
period whereas it was 0.15 in the post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for 
the whole period accounted for 0.11. The compound annual growth rate of this ratio in the 
pre and post-disinvestment period was 10.97 and 0.36 respectively. 
Taking into account all the industries under review based on the difference between the 
average of Net Profit before Interest and Tax to Capital Employed ratio pre and post-
disinvestment periods. Coal and Lignite ranked first followed by Chemicals and 
Petrochemical, Power, Steel and Minerals and Metals. Petroleum industry was omitted for 
ranking for it showed negative growth rate. This implies that except Petroleum industry, in 
all other industries profitability of capital employed has marked with a difference between 
pre and post-disinvestment periods. 
(D) Return on Shareholders Equity 
Return on Shareholders investment explains the relationship between net profits (after 
interest and tax) and the proprietor's funds. This ratio is one of the most important ratios 
used for measuring the overall efficiency of firm. As the primary objective is to maximize 
its earnings, this ratio indicates the extent to which this primary objective of business is 
being achieved. This ratio is of great importance to the present and prospective 
shareholders as well as the management of the company. This ratio reveals how well the 
resources of a firm are being used, the higher the ratio the better are the results. There are 
three ratios viz. Profit After Tax to Shareholders' Equity, Operation Cash Flow to 
Shareholders' Equity and Earnings Before Interest and Tax to Interest Charges which have 
been discussed in the following pages. 
Profit after Tax to Shareholders' Equity 
It is otherwise called Return on Equity. The important objective of every business 
undertaking is profit maximization, defined as a continuous maximization of wealth to the 
shareholders. This analysis of profitability from shareholders' point of view is meaningful 
in the sense that it measures the residue of income which really belongs to the owners. The 
shareholders are the residual owners. They assume maximum risk and have the highest 
stake in the company. The earnings enabling a most satisfactory return on their funds are 
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the most desirable objective of a business. The ratio is, thus, of great interest to 
shareholders and great concern to management. Return on equity can be calculated by 
dividing the net profit after taxes with equity that has been discussed. 
Table 6.12 
Profit after Tax to Shareholders Equity; before and after Disinvestments 
Sectors 
Steel 
Mineral and 
Metals 
Coal and 
Lignite 
Power 
Petroleum 
Chemicals & 
Petrochemical 
Industry 
Lowest 
Pre 
0.67 
1.21 
1.03 
0.90 
91.20 
2.21 
Post 
4.51 
9.21 
3.30 
8.13 
185.20 
83.07 
Highest 
Pre 
6.70 
6.25 
2.53 
7.41 
9.6 
-4.63 
Post 
9.61 
27.34 
20.02 
20.59 
229.13 
14.43 
Average 
Pre 
-4.97 
-0.60 
-3.55 
5.27 
139.75 
Post 
-1.31 
15.51 
-7.67 
13.19 
158.53 
4.90 
CAG 
Pre 
18.41 
46.68 
7.38 
25.68 
1.55 
18.73 
Post 
19.11 
3.94 
-7.18 
10.27 
-6.42 
16.73 
The profit after tax to shareholders' equity ratio registered in Steel industry shows a 
fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.67 in 2001-02 to 4.51 in 
2007-2008. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in Steel 
industry which ranged from 6.70 in 2002-2003 to 9.61 in 2007-08 
The average of this ratio was -1.31 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was -4.97 in 
the post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 
-3.14. The compoimd aimual growth rate in this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment 
period was 18.41 and-19.11 respectively. 
The profit after tax to shareholders' equity ratio registered in Minerals and Metals industry 
shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 1.24 in 2001-2002 
to 9.21 in 2007-08. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in 
Minerals and Metals industry which ranged from 6.25 in 2001-02 to 27.34 in 2007-08. The 
average of this ratio was -0.60 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was 15.51 in the 
post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 
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7.46. The compound annual growth rate in this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment 
period was 46.68 and 3.94 respectively. 
The profit after tax to shareholders' equity ratio registered in Coal and Lignite industry 
shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 1.03 m 2001-2002 
to 3.30 in 2007-08. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in 
Coal and Lignite industry which ranged from 2.53 in 2002-2003 to 20.02 in 2001-2002. 
The average of this ratio was -3.55 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was 7.67 in 
the post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 
2.06. The compound annual growth rate of this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment 
period was 7.34 and -7.18 respectively. 
The profit after tax to shareholders' equity ratio registered in Power industry shows a 
fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.90 in 2001-02 to 8.13 in 
2001-02. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in Power 
industry which ranged from 7.41 in 2001-02 to 20.59 in 2007-08. The average of this ratio 
was 5.27 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was 13.19 in the post-disinvestment 
period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 9.44. The compound 
annual growth rate of this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was 25.68 and 
10.27 respectively. 
The profit after tax to shareholders' equity ratio registered in Petroleum industry shows a 
fluctuating trend in the pre-disinvestment 'period. It ranged from 91.20 in 2002-03 to 
185.60 in 2006-07. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in 
Petroleum industry: which ranged from 96.00 in 2002-03 to 229.13 in 2007-08. The 
average of this ratio was 139.75 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was 158.53 in 
the post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 
149.14. The mean difference was found to be insignificant. There was more consistency in 
the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was less consistency during the post-disinvestment 
period. The compound armual growth rate of this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment 
period was 1.55 and -6.42 respectively. 
The profit after tax to shareholders' equity ratio registered in Chemicals and Petrochemical 
industry shows a fluctuating trend in the pre-disinvestment period. In this year the ratio was 
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0.50. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in Chemicals and 
Petrochemical industry which ranged from 2.21 in 2001-2002 to 83.07 in 2007-08. The 
average of this ratio was -4.63 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was 14.43 in the 
post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 
4.90. The compound annual growth rate of this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment 
period was -18.73 and -16.73 respectively. 
From the above analysis it can be concluded that except steel industry, satisfactory returns 
have been achieved by all the remaining industries which is due to the fact that in all these 
industries the impact of disinvestment over its earnings is visible. 
Operating Cash Flow to Shareholders' Equity Ratio 
Operating Cash Flow has been taken as the sum of PAT and depreciation provided during 
the year. Whereas shareholders' equity is defined as the total paid up Capital (Ordinary and 
preference) forfeited shares and accumulated reserves and surplus adjusted for losses. The 
ratio is computed by dividing operating cash flow to shareholders' equity. The operating 
cash flow to shareholders' equity ratio of selected industries are incorporated in table 6.13 
Table 6.13 
Ratio of Operating Cash Flows to Shareholders Equity; prior to and after 
Disinvestments 
Sectors 
Steel 
Mineral and 
Metals 
Coal and 
Lignite 
Power 
Petroleum 
Chemicals & 
Petrochemical 
Lowest 
Pre 
0.01 
0.02 
0.02 
0.01 
0.12 
0.03 
Post 
0.08 
0.14 
0.13 
0.08 
1.26 
0.09 
Highest 
Pre 
0.03 
0.06 
0.07 
0.08 
0.51 
0.01 
Post 
0.10 
0.15 
0.08 
0.14 
0.14 
0.06 
Average 
Pre 
0.04 
0.05 
0.04 
0.05 
0.32 
0.10 
Post 
0.05 
0.10 
0,26 
0.11 
-
0.80 
CAG 
Pre 
16.78 
29.58 
-0.20 
20.57 
-20.59 
-1.96 
Post 
-3,31 
-6.73 
-2.92 
6.2 
6.2 
-13.27 
The operating cash flow to shareholders' equity ratio registered in Steel industry shows a 
fluctuating trend in the pre-disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.01 in 2001-02 to 0.08 in 
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2007-2008. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in Steel 
industry which ranged from 0.03 in 2001-2002 to 0.10 in 2007-08. The average of this ratio 
was 0.04 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was 0.05 in the post-disinvestment 
period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 0.05. The mean 
difference was found to be insignificant. The compound annual growth rate of this ratio in 
the pre and post-disinvestment period was 16.78 and -3.31 respectively. 
The operating cash flow to shareholders' equity ratio registered in Minerals and Metals 
industry shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.02 in 
2001-02 to 0.14 in 2007-08. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating 
trend in Minerals and Metals industry which ranged from 0.06 in 2001-02 to 0.15 in 2007-
08. The average of this ratio was 0.05 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was 0.10 
in the post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted 
for 0.08. The compoimd annual growth rate of this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment 
period was 29.58 and -6.73 respectively. 
The operating cash flow to shareholders' equity ratio registered in Coal and Lignite 
industry shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.02 in 
2001-02 to 0.13 in 2007-08. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating 
trend in Coal and Lignite industry which ranged from 0.07 in 2001-02 to 1 .08 in 2007-08. 
The average of this ratio was 0.04 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was 0.26 in 
the post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 
0.15. The compound armual growth rate of this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment 
period was -0.20 and -2.92 respectively. 
The operating cash flow to shareholders' equity ratio registered in Power industry shows a 
fluctuating trend in the pre-disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.01 in 2001-02 to 0.08 in 
2007-08. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in Power 
industry which ranged from 0.08 in 2001-02 to 0.14 in 2007-08. The average of this ratio 
was 0.05 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was 0.11 in the post-disinvestment 
period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 0.08. The compound 
annual growth rate of this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was 20.57 and 
62.00 respectively. 
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The operating cash flow to shareholders' equity ratio registered in Petroleum industry 
shows a fluctuating trend in the pre-disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.12 in 2001-02 to 
1.26 in 2007-08. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in 
Petroleum industry. The average of this ratio was 0.51 in the pre-disinvestment period 
whereas it was 0.14 in the post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the 
whole period accounted for 0.32. The compound annual growth rate of this ratio in the pre 
and post-disinvestment period was -20.59 and 4.46 respectively. 
The operating cash flow to shareholders' equity ratio registered in Chemicals and 
Petrochemical industry shows a fluctuating trend in the pre-disinvestment period. It ranged 
from 0.03 to 0.09 in two observed periods. In the post-disinvestment period also there was 
a fluctuating trend in Chemicals and Petrochemical industry which ranged from 0.01 in 
2002-2003. The average of this ratio was 0.06 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it 
was 0.10 in the post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period 
accounted for 0.08. The compound annual growth rate of this ratio in the pre and post-
disinvestment period was -1.96 and -13.27 respectively. 
From the overall analysis of operating cash flow to shareholders' equity ratio it is implied 
that except petroleum industry in all other industries the ratio showed improved 
performance while making comparison with the pre-disinvestment period. 
Earnings before Interest and Tax to Interest Charges Ratio 
It is otherwise called Times - Interest - Earned (on Interest coverage) Ratio (TIER). This 
indicates the interest charges are covered by funds that are ordinarily available for their 
payment. The ratio has been calculated by dividing earnings before interest and tax by 
interest expenses. 
The earnings before interest and tax to interest charges ratio registered in Steel industry 
shows a fluctuating trend in the pre-disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.28 in 2001-02 to 
1.83 in 2007-2008. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in 
Steel industry and which ranged from 0.32 to 1.80. The average of this ratio was 0.80 in the 
pre-disinvestment period whereas it was 0.96 in the post-disinvestment period. The average 
of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 0.88. The compound annual growth rate of 
this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was 10.64 and 3.20 respectively. 
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Table 6.14 
Ratio of Earning before Interest and Taxes to Interest Charges; prior to and after 
Disinvestments 
Sectors 
Steel 
Mineral and 
Metals 
Coal and 
Lignite 
Power 
Petroleum 
Chemicals & 
Petrochemical 
Industry 
Lowest 
Pre 
0.28 
0.11 
0.18 
1.2 
2.2 
0.46 
Post 
1.83 
2.22 
1.54 
3.8 
10.23 
1.31 
Highest 
Pre 
0.32 
1.2 
1.26 
2.36 
2.5 
0.78 
Post 
1.80 
9.75 
2.19 
10.99 
10.17 
4.34 
Average 
Pre 
0.80 
0.69 
0.62 
2.66 
7.54 
0.90 
Post 
0.96 
5.81 
3.07 
3.87 
5.07 
1.82 
CAG 
Pre 
10.64 
29.91 
7.03 
2.92 
-4.50 
3.65 
Post 
3.20 
20.50 
18.18 
12.73 
11.57 
2.93 
The earnings before interest and tax to interest charges ratio registered in Minerals and 
Metals industry shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 
0.11 in 2001-02 to 2.22 in 2007-08. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a 
fluctuating trend in Minerals and Metals industry which ranged from 1.20 in 2001-02 to 
9.75 in 2007-08. The average of this ratio was 0.69 in the predisinvestment period whereas 
it was 5.81 in the post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period 
accounted for 3.25. The compound annual growth rate of this ratio in the pre and post-
disinvestment period was 29.91 and 20.50 respectively. 
The earnings before interest and tax to interest charges ratio registered in Coal and Lignite 
industry shows a fluctuating trend in the pre disinvestment period. It ranged from 0.18 in 
2001-02 to 1.54 in 2007-08. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating 
trend in Coal and Lignite industry which ranged from 1.26 to 2.19. The average of this ratio 
was 0.62 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was 3.07 in the post-disinvestment 
period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 1.85. The compound 
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annual growth rate of this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was 7.03 and 18.18 
respectively. 
The earnings before interest and tax to interest charges ratio registered in Power industry 
shows a fluctuating trend in the pre-disinvestment period. It ranged from 1.20 in to 3.80. In 
the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in Power industry which 
ranged from 2.36 in 2001-02 to 10.99 in 2007-08. The average of this ratio was 2.66 in the 
pre-disinvestment period whereas it was 3.87 in the post-disinvestment period. The average 
of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 3.27. The mean difference was found to be 
insignificant. The compound armual growth rate of this ratio in the pre and post-
disinvestment period was 2.92 and 12.73 respectively. 
The earnings before interest and tax to interest charges ratio registered in Petroleum 
industry shows a fluctuating trend in the pre-disinvestment period; It ranged from 2.20 to 
10.23. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in Petroleum 
industry which ranged from 2.50 in 2001-02 to 10.17 in 2007-08. The average of this ratio 
was 7.54 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was 5.07 in the post-disinvestment 
period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted for 6.31. The compound 
annual growth rate of this: ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment period was -4.50 and 
11.57 respectively. 
The earnings before interest and tax to, interest charges ratio registered in Chemicals and 
Petrochemical industry shows a fluctuating trend in the pre-disinvestment period. It ranged 
from 0.46 to 1.31. In the post-disinvestment period also there was a fluctuating trend in 
Chemicals and Pefrochemical industry which ranged from 0.78 in 2001-02 to 4.34 in 2007-
08. The average of this ratio was 0.90 in the pre-disinvestment period whereas it was 1.82 
in the post-disinvestment period. The average of this ratio for the whole period accounted 
for 1.36. The compound annual growth rate of this ratio in the pre and post-disinvestment 
period was 3.65 and 2.93 respectively. 
From the above said analysis it can be inferred that the increase in mean value in Steel, 
Mineral and Metals, Coal and Lignite, Power and Chemical and Petrochemical implies the 
funds of the company have the ability to cover interest charges for payment. Only 
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Petroleum -industry showed dismal performance of this ratio in the post-disinvestment 
period. 
Industry-wise Trend Analysis: 
In this section efforts have been made to observe the trends in various performance 
indicator measures using industry data and has been divided into important heads as given 
below. 
PROFITABILITY 
In profitability analysis the direction of change over a period of time is of crucial 
importance. It provides a base to judge whether the practice and prevailing policy of the 
government is good enough or an improvement is to be made in this regard. Further, 
anyone trend by itself is not very informative and therefore, a comparison with related 
trends should also be made by an analyst. Hence, in this part, an attempt has been made to 
study the profitability trend of selected industry during, before, and after disinvestment 
period. To study the profitability trend profit before interest and tax has been taken as base. 
Steel Industry 
In Steel industry the indices of profit before interest and tax in the before disinvestment 
period marked a fluctuating trend. It fluctuated from 50.82 in 2001-02 to 407.70 in 2007-
2008, showing a wide gap of 35.69. The main reason for the sharp increase in profitability 
in 2001-02 and 2007-08 was due to favourable market conditions for steel products. In the 
year 2008 there was a negative deviation indicating that the steel industry's performance 
during that year was poor. The least square trend values of profit before interest and tax 
show that the average increase in profit before interest and tax comes to Rs.38.99 crores. 
The difference in' actual and trend values was negative in all the years. 
The year 2001-2002 marked a large difference between the actual and trend values among 
the positive differences. In steel industry, the difference between the actual and trend 
values of profit before interest and tax during pre-disinvestment period is significant. 
Trends in profitability after disinvestment (2001-02 - 2007-08) in steel industry which 
reflect the indices of PBIT show generally an increasing trend for the first five years of 
study under review i.e. up to 2007-08. Thereafter it is marked by a fluctuating trend. It 
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fluctuated from 100 in the year 2002-03 to 841.58 in the year 2008-09 showing a wide gap 
of 741.58. The increasing trend for the five years connotes that after the introduction of 
disinvestment measures Steel industry has improved its performance and thereafter there 
was a fluctuating trend, which may be due to intense competition. The least square trend 
values of PBIT reveal that the average annual increase in PBIT comes to Rs. 156.58 crores. 
The positive difference in 2007-08 was very large due to sudden increase in the export 
earnings. In steel industry after disinvestment the actual and trend values of PBIT are 
significant. 
Minerals and Metals Industry 
In Minerals and Metals industry the indices of Profit Before Interest and Tax in the pre-
disinvestment period marked a negative growth in all the years except in the years 2002-03 
and 2008-09 which has positive values. The main reason for this may be because the intake 
of Minerals and Metals by the steel industry has become poor during this period. There is a 
sharp increase in profitability in the year 2002-03. The least square trend of PBIT unfurls 
that the average annual increase in PBIT worked out was 62.06. The difference between 
actual and trend value was positive in all periods. The positive difference in 2001-02 was 
large due to high increase in profit. The difference between the actual and trend values is 
significant. 
In the post-disinvestment period, the indices of PBIT in Minerals and Metals industry were 
marked with a fluctuating trend in the first five years and thereafter a general increase in 
trend prevailed. It fluctuated from 66.22 in 2002-03 to 163.87 in 2007-08, with a gap of 
97.65. The reason for increase in trend in the second half of the post disinvestment period 
may be related to increase in the demand for minerals and metals in the domestic as well as 
international markets. The least square trend values of PBIT bring to light that the average 
annual increase in PBIT was Rs.145.46 crores. The difference in actual and trend values 
was negative in 2002-03, 2004-05 and 2006-07 while it was positive in the remaining 
years. The positive difference in 2002-02 was very large due to the various austerity 
measures introduced by the government in the public sector enterprises. In Minerals and 
Metals, during the post-disinvestment period the difference between the actual and trend 
values of PBIT is significant. 
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Coal and Lignite Industry 
The indices of PBIT in Coal and Lignite industry in the pre-disinvestment period reflected 
a fluctuating trend all through the period under review. It fluctuated from 50.42 in 2002-03 
to 529.03 in 2007-08 showing a wide gap of 478.61 barring 2007-08 and 2006-07 which 
showed negative deviations. The indices of PBIT had increasing trend in the three years 
period. For the remaining years there was wide fluctuation from year to year. The least 
square trend values of PBIT depict that the average annual increase in PBIT was Rs.61.71 
Crores. The difference in actual and trend values was negative. The positive difference in 
2002-03 was very large due to intensive implementation of reformation measures 
introduced by the government. In steel industry the difference between the actual and trend 
values of profit before interest and tax is significant because the calculated chi-square 
arrived at 161.10, which is much higher than the table value 21.67 at 1 % level of 
significance. 
The indices of PBIT after disinvestment in Coal and Lignite industry show a fluctuating 
trend. It fluctuated from 100 in 2002-03 to 554.32 and in 2007-08, showing a wide gap of 
454.32. The indices of PBIT increased for the first two years and thereafter decreased in the 
year 2002-2003. The year 2007-08 marked an increase in trend and it is followed by all 
years, which implies that in all these three years the supply of products was encouraging. 
But the indices of PBIT showed a dismal trend in 2004-05 which lasted till 2006-07. The 
least square trend values of PBIT indicate that the average increase in PBIT comes to Rs. 
400.00 crores. The difference between actual and trend values was negative in all the years. 
The positive result in 2002-03 was the highest due to high increase in the price of products 
and decrease in the cost of production after disinvestment. 
Power Industry 
Before disinvestment the indices of PBIT expose an increase in trend all through the years. 
They ranged from 100 in 2002-03 to 512.03 in 2007-08. The sharp increase in profit before 
interest and tax was in the year 2005-07 which was due to good market conditions. The 
least square trend values of PBIT uncover that the average annual increase in PBIT comes 
to Rs. 157.78 crores. The positive difference in 2005-06 was very large due to opening up 
of economy, removal of all sorts of hassle like abolition of redtapism (Multiplicity of 
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procedures) etc. The difference between the actual and trend values of PBIT in the pre-
disinvestment phase is significant. 
After disinvestment, in Power industry the indices of PBIT increased from a low of 256.09 
in 200304 to 597.24 in 2007-08. All through the years there was only an increasing trend. 
This regular increase in trend implies that the implementation of disinvestment measures 
by the successive governments at the centre has led to this phenomenon growth of power 
industry's performance. The least square trend values of PBIT shows that the average 
annual increase in PBIT comes to Rs. 1026.20 crores. 
Petroleum Industry 
In Petroleum industry the indices of PBIT before disinvestment worked out show that there 
is an increase in trend barring 2007-08 which showed a negative deviation. In all the 
remaining years the indices of PBIT showed only positive deviations. There was only a 
moderate increase in indices of PBIT year after year. The least square trend values of PBIT 
establish the fact that the average armual increase in PBIT comes to Rs. 340.30 crores. The 
difference between actual and trend values was negative in the year 2003, 05, and 06, while 
it was positive in the remaining years. 
For the post-disinvestment period of petroleum industry the trend analysis goes as follows. 
The indices of PBIT marked an increasing trend throughout the 10 year period of study. 
During the year 2002-03 there was a sudden gallop in the indices of PBIT which was 
mainly due to increase in the oil prices in the international market and increase in demand 
for petroleum products in the cosmetic market from the dependent industries. The least 
square trend values of PBIT show that the average annual increase in PBIT comes to 
Rs.2655.57 crores. The following years under study were marked with negative deviations 
while making comparison between actual and trend values. The positive difference in the 
year 2003-04 was very large due to the prevalence of better market conditions. 
Chemicals and Petrochemical Industry 
The indices of PBIT in Chemicals and Petrochemical throughout the pre-disinvestment 
period marked a fluctuating trend. It fluctuated from 47.17 in 2002-03 to 154.52 in 2007-08 
showing a gap of 107.35. By observing the indices of chemicals and Petrochemical from 
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2002-03 to 2007-08 it can be inferred that in the year 2002 it increased and then decreased 
in 2003, 04 and 05 and this trend continued all through the years. This was due to the 
volatile market conditions in the drugs and Petrochemical industry. The least square trend 
values of PBIT reveals that the average annual decrease in PBIT comes to Rs.78 crores. 
The difference between actual and trend values was negative in all the years. 
The indices of PBIT in chemicals and Petrochemical in the post-disinvestment period under 
analysis show that barring 2005-06 absolute fluctuation was there in the remaining years. 
The fluctuation in the indices of PBIT ranged from 100 in the year to 540.02 which resulted 
in a gap of 440.02. There was a sudden increase in indices in the 2002-2003 which was due 
to the fact that all the factors that contribute to increase in profit were favourable. The least 
square trend values of PBIT disclose that the average annual increase in PBIT was Rs. 
720.29 crores. The difference in actual and trend values was positive in the years 2002-
2003, 2003-04 and 2008-09 while the remaining years showed negative deviations. The 
positive difference in 2007-08 was very large due to the fact that there was a large scale 
reduction in overhead expenses. 
TRENDS IN PROFITABILITY 
With a view to test the significance of variations in the profit before interest and tax 
between the various sample industries selected and between various years covered under 
the study, the 'F test based on two way classification has been applied. 
Before Disinvestment: 
It can be seen from tables 6.14 to 6.17 that before disinvestment calculated value of 'F' 
ratio of PBIT between the years is 3.54. The table values of'F' at 1 per cent and 5 per cent 
levels of significance for Vl=9 and V2=45 are 2.69 and 2.02 respectively. Since the 
calculated values of'F' between the years are more than the table value at 1 % level and 5% 
level of significance, the difference in PBIT between the years among different selected 
industries is significant. Similarly, the calculated value of 'F ratio between industries is 
75.48. The table value of'F at 1 per cent and 5 per cent levels of significance for V.=5 and 
V2=45 are 3.47 and 2.43 respectively. Since the calculated value of 'F' between industries 
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is more than the table value at 1 % and 5% level of significance, the difference in PBIT 
between industries is also significant during the study period. 
After Disinvestment: 
After disinvestment the calculated value of'F ratio of PBIT between the years is 2.85. The 
tables value of 'F' at 1 per cent and 5 per cent levels of significance for V,=9 and V 2=45 
are 2.69 and 2.02 respectively. Since the calculated values of 'F between the years are more 
than the table value at 1 %level and 5% level of significance, the difference in PBIT 
between years is significant. Similarly, the calculated value of 'F' between industries is 
17.35. The table values of'F at 1 per cent and 5 per cent levels of significance for VI =5 
and V2=45 are 3.47 and 2.43 respectively. Since the calculated values of T between 
industries are more than the table value at 1 % and 5% level of significance, the difference 
in PBIT between industries is significant. 
Whole Period: 
It could be observed fi-om whole period that the calculated value of 'F' ratio between years 
is 3.65. The table values of 'F' at 1 per cent and 5 per cent levels of significance for V=l 9 
and V2=2003 are 2.11 and 1.70 respectively. Since the calculated values of'F between the 
years are more than the table value at 1 % level and 5% level of significance, the difference 
in the PBIT between the years is significant. Similarly, the calculated value of 'F' ratio 
between industries is 17.83. The table values of T' at 1 per cent and 5 per cent levels of 
significance for Vl=5 and V2=2003 are 3.21 and 2.31 respectively. Since the calculated 
value of 'F' between industries is more than the table value at 1 % and 5% level of 
significance, the difference in PBIT between industries is significant. 
Return on Investment and Performance Indicators 
In this section an attempt has been made to examine the impact of some parameters of the 
industries position and performance on the profitability by computing Karl Pearson 
correlation co-efficient between the profitability measure and the selected ratios viz. 
Current Ratio (CR), Quick Ratio (QR), Current Assets to Total Assets Ratio (CTTR), Total 
Assets Turnover Ratio (TATR), Capital Employed Turnover Ratio (CETR) and Fixed 
Assets to Total Assets Ratio (FTTR) indicating the industries position and performance 
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before disinvestment (2001-82 to 199091). In this connection Return on Investment Ratio 
(ROIR) has been taken as the profitabihty measure as it is the best indicator of overall 
profitability of the business. 
Steel Industry - Before Disinvestment 
In Steel industry the correlation co-efficient between ROI and CR is 0.17. It mdicates that 
there is low degree of positive association between current ratio and profitability. The value 
of correlation co-efficient is found to be insignificant. Secondly, the correlation co-efficient 
between ROI and QR is 0.251 which is found to be insignificant. It shows that there is a 
low degree of positive association between the two variables. Thirdly, there is a low degree 
of positive association between CTTR and ROI as the correlation co-efficient shows 0.054 
which is statistically insignificant. Fourthly the co-efficient of correlation between T A TR 
and ROI is 0.656. It reveals that there is a moderate degree of positive association between 
profitability and T A TR which is found to be significant at 5% level. Fifthly correlation 
co-efficient between CETR and ROI is 0.285 which indicates that there is a low degree of 
positive association between these two variables. This value is found to be insignificant at 
5% level. Lastly, the Co-efficient of correlation between ROI and FTTR at -0.012 depicts 
absence of association between profitability and FTTR. It is also insignificant at 5% level. 
Steel Industry - After Disinvestment 
Here the impact of some parameters of the company's position and performance on the 
profitability related to post disinvestment period (2001-02 to 2007-08) by computing Karl 
Pearson's correlation co-efficient between the profitability measure and the selected ratios 
indicating the company's position and performance has been studies. Results of steel 
industry shows that the correlation co-efficient between CR and ROI is 0.414. It unveils 
that there is a low degree of positive association between the two variables, profitability 
and CR. The correlation Co-efificient value is foimd to be insignificant at 5% level. The 
correlation Co-efficient between QR and ROI is 0.570. It means that there is a moderate 
degree of positive association between QR and ROI. The correlation co-efficient is found 
to be insignificant. There is no association between CITR and profitability which is known 
through the value of correlation co-efficient which is -0.001. The correlation co-efficient is 
also insignificant at 5% level. The co-efficient of correlation between T A TR and ROI 
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worked out to 0.485 which estabHshes the fact that there is a moderate degree of positive 
association between profitability and T A TR. The coefficient of correlation is insignificant 
at 5% level. While analysing the association between CETR and ROI the table discloses the 
correlation co-efficient at 0.02002 which depicts there is a very low degree of positive 
association between CETR and profitability. The correlation co-efficient between FTTR 
and ROI shows -0.016which uncloaks the truth that there is very low negative association 
between FTTR and ROI. 
From the above analysis, it can be inferred that out of six ratios used for correlating with 
ROI, five ratios viz. CR, QR, CITR, T A TR, CETR showed positive association while the 
remaining FTTR displayed absence of association in the pre-disinvestment period while the 
post disinvestment period's performance is as follows: All the six selected ratios except 
CITR and FTTR, registered positive association viz. CR, QR, TATR and CETR. There was 
negative association between FTTR and ROI. The association between CITR and ROI was 
absent. 
Minerals and Metals Industry - Before Disinvestment 
The correlation co-efficient between ROI and CR is 0.219 in Minerals and Metals industry. 
It reveals that there is a low degree of positive association between current ratio and 
profitability. The value of correlation co-efficient is found to be insignificant at 5% level. 
The next ratio under analysis is Quick Ratio which indicates there is a moderate degree of 
positive association between ROI and QR whose value is 0.532 which is insignificant at 
5% level. The correlation co-efficient between CITR and ROI is 0.625. It discloses that 
there is a moderate degree of positive association between profitability and CITR. It proves 
that the correlation co-efficient appears to be significant at 1% level. The co-efficient of 
correlation between CETR and, ROI is 0.166. It connotes there is a low degree of positive 
association between the two variables viz. profitability and CETR. The Co-efficient of 
correlation between FTTR and ROI depicts moderate degree of positive association of 
0.514. It is also insignificant at 5% level. 
Minerals and Metals Industry - After Disinvestment 
In Minerals and Metals industry, the correlation co-efficient between ROI and CR is 0.678. 
This unfolds the fact that there is a moderate degree of positive association between CR 
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and ROI. The correlation is found to be insignificant at 5% level. There is a low degree of 
positive association between QR and ROI as the correlation co-efficient shows 0.148, 
which is statistically insignificant at 5% level. The correlation co-efficient between CITR 
and ROI is -0.024 which unmasks the truth that there is very low degree of negative 
association between the two variables, profitability and CITR. The co-efficient correlation 
is found to be insignificant. The correlation coefficient between TATR and ROI is 0.756. It 
uncloaks the fact that there 4s moderate degree of positive association between TATR and 
ROI. The correlation co-efficient between FTTR and ROI is -0.120 which implies there is a 
low degree of negative association between profitability and FTTR. The correlation co-
efficient is found to be insignificant at 5% level. 
The overall analysis of Minerals and Metals industry indicates that none of the selected 
ratios had negative association with Return on Investment (ROI) in the pre-disinvestment 
period. In the post-liberalisation period positive association between ROI and selected 
ratios was recorded in CR, QR, T ATR and CETR. It was negative in CITR and FTTR. 
Coal and Lignite Industry - Before Disinvestment 
In Coal and Lignite industry, the correlation co-efficient between CR and ROI is 0.258. It 
unfolds the fact that there is a low degree of positive association between profitability and 
current ratio. The value of correlation co-efficient is established to be insignificant at 5% 
level. There is a low degree of positive association between QR and ROI which is shown in 
the table at 0.111. It exposes that the value of correlation Coefficient is found to be 
insignificant. The next ratio under analysis is CITR. Here there is a low degree of negative 
association between profitability and CTTR whose value is -0.208. The value of correlation 
co-efficient appears to be insignificant at 5% level. Correlation co-efficient between TATR 
and ROI is 0.609. It unfolds that there is a moderate degree of positive association between 
the variables profitability and TATR. The value of correlation co-efficient is found to be 
insignificant at 5% level. A moderate degree of positive association is brought to light 
between CETR and ROI which bears the value 0.578. The correlation co-efficient is 
established to be insignificant. The correlation co-efficient between FTTR and ROI is 
0.235. It unveils the truth that there is low degree of positive association between FTTR 
and ROI. The value of correlation co-efficient is found to be insignificant at 5% level. 
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Coal and Lignite Industry •• After Disinvestment. 
In Coal and Lignite industry, the correlation co-efficient, between CR and ROI is 0.0417. It 
exposes the truth that there exists very low degree of negative association between ROI and 
CR. The correlation co-efficient is found to be insignificant. There is a high degree of 
positive association between QR and ROI. The value of correlation co-efficient is 0.853 
which is statistically significant at 1 % level. The correlation co-efficient at -0.290 between 
CITR and ROI indicates that there is a low degree of negative association. The correlation 
co-efficient is found to be insignificant. There is a low degree of negative association 
between TATR and ROI which is proved through the value of correlation co-efficient at -
0.208. The co-efficient co-relation is found to be insignificant. The correlation co-efficient 
between CETR and ROI is 0.159 which shows that there is a low degree of positive 
association between CETR and ROI. The correlation co-efficient is found to be 
insignificant. There is a moderate degree of negative association between FITR and ROI 
which is known through the correlation co-efficient at -0.566. The correlation co-efficient 
is found to be insignificant. 
From the above analysis it is known that positive association was there in CR, QR, TATR, 
CETR and FTTR while CITR recorded negative association with ROI in the pre-
disinvestment period. In the post-disinvestment period, positive association was there in 
QR and CETR while the remaining ratios viz. CR, CITR, TATR and FTTR registered 
negative association with ROI. 
Power Industry - Before Disinvestment 
One of the important among energy producing industries, power shows that there is a 
moderate degree of positive association between ROI and CR as the correlation co-efficient 
shows 0.569 which is statistically insignificant at 5% level. The correlation co-efficient 
between QR and ROI is 0.607. This emphasizes that there is a moderate degree of positive 
association between QR and ROI which is found to be insignificant at 5% level. There is a 
low degree of positive association between CITR and FTTR of power industry which is 
shown in the table as 0.263 which is also found to be insignificant. In case of correlation 
co-efficient between TATR and ROI, which is laid out at 0.043, there is almost non-
existence of association between profitability and T A TR. The value of co-efficient of 
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correlation is found to be insignificant at 5% level. The value of correlation co-efficient 
between CETR and ROI is 0.568. This shows that there is a moderate degree of positive 
association between CETR and profitability. 
Power Industry - After Disinvestment 
In Power industry, the correlation ' co-efficient between CR and ROI is 0.265 which 
uncertain the truth that there is a low degree of positive association between CR and 
profitability. The correlation co-efficient is found to be insignificant. The co-efficient of 
correlation between QR and ROI is -0.097 which unfiirls the truth that there is a negligible 
degree of association between the variables profitability and QR. The value of correlation 
co-efficient is found to be insignificant. The correlation co-efficient between CITR and 
ROI is 0.394. This shows there is a low degree of positive association between CITR and 
ROI. The value of correlation co-efficient is found to be insignificant. The Co-efficient of 
correlation of power industry between TATR and ROI is 0.568 which discloses that there is 
a moderate degree of positive association between TATR and profitability. The last ratio 
under discussion, establishes the association between FTTR and ROI at -0.594, which 
means that there is a moderate degree of negative association between profitability and 
FTTR. 
The scenario of Power industry before disinvestment was as follows: 
CR, QR, CITR and CETR recorded positive association with ROI whereas no association 
was' recorded in TATR and FTTR mth ROI. In the post- disinvestment period positive 
association with ROI was recorded in CR, CITR, T A TR and CETR. It was negative and 
negligible association with ROI in FTTR and QR respectively. 
Petroleum Industry - Before Disinvestment 
In petroleum industry, the correlation co-efificient between current ratio and ROI is 0.846. 
It unmasks that there is a high degree of negative association between profitability and 
current ratio. The value of correlation co-efficient is found to be significant 5% level. 
Secondly, there is a high degree of negative association between QR and FTTR as the 
correlation co-efficient shows -0.853. 
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Petroleum Industry - After Disinvestment 
In Petroleum industry, the correlation co-efficient between current ratio and ROl is 0.315 
which explains that there is a low degree of negative association between CR and 
profitability. The correlation co-efficient is found to be insignificant. There is a moderate 
degree of negative association between QR and ROI which shows that there is a low degree 
of negative association between profitability and CTTR. The correlation co-efficient is 
found to be insignificant. The correlation co-efficient between TATR and ROI is 0.733 
which displays the information that there is a high degree of positive association between 
TATR and ROI. The correlation co-efficient between FTTR and ROI is 0.280 which 
reveals the fact that there is a low degree of positive association between FTfR and 
Profitability. The correlation co-efficient is found to be insignificant at 5% level, 
From the above analysis it is clear that during pre-disinvestment period, positive 
association with ROI was conspicuous in CTTR, TATR and CETR whereas it was negative 
in CR and QR. In case of CETR it showed negligible association with ROI. In the post-
disinvestment period 3 ratios viz. T A TR, CETR and FTTR recorded positive association 
with ROI while the remaining CR, QR and CTTR recorded negative association with ROI. 
Chemicals and Petrochemical Industry - Before Disinvestment 
Chemicals and Petrochemical Industry - After Disinvestment 
In Chemicals and Petrochemical the association between CR and ROI is at the lowest 
positive as the correlation co-efficient is shown at 0.181 which is also statistically 
insignificant. The Correlation co-efficient between QR and ROI is 0.250 which throws 
some light that there is a low degree of positive association between profitability and QR. 
The Correlation co-efficient is found to be insignificant. The coefficient of correlation 
between CTTR and ROI is 0.228. It leaks out tiie truth that there is a low degree of positive 
association between the two variables CTTR and ROI which is also statistically 
insignificant. There is a low degree of positive association between TATO and ROI as the 
correlation co-efficient shows 0.330 which is also statistically insignificant. 
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6.6 Hypothesis Testing: 
The problems of disinvestments, in preceding section were discussed in the hght of 
employees related issues; financial issues, legal issues and then finally the problems in 
finance areas were discussed. The profitability trends and the market response to the 
disinvestment decisions have been discussed in the preceding paragraphs. The financial 
statements were scaimed and ratios calculated to arrive at conclusion. However to confirm 
the findings and our calculation, the findings need to tested using acceptable statistics, 
hence the results have been tested using F-Ratios at 5% level of significance. Major 
findings are given below. 
Table 6.15 
Pre and Post Disinvestment Sector-Wise Effect on Equity 
Sectors 
Steel Industry 
Minerals and 
Metals 
Coal and 
Lignite 
Power Industry 
Petroleum 
Chemicals and 
Petrochemical 
FMCG 
Equity after Disinvestment 
F-Ratio Before 
2.086 
4.38 
1.132 
0.757 
6.345 
3.607 
0.864 
F Ratio after 
1.827 
3.2 
9.333 
0.745 
0.683 
1.861 
0.945 
Sig. Level 
0.122* 
0.343* 
0 
0.562* 
0.604* 
0.117* 
0.438* 
*Sectors, which have insignificant F ratios 
Source: www, nse. india. com 
As evident fi-om table 6.15, the effect of disinvestment on equity infusion was 
insignificant in all sectors except cola and lignite. The apparent reason could be the 
time fi-ame as these industries have long gestation period and it takes time for returns 
to start coming in. 
144-
Table 6.16 
Pre and Post disinvestment Sector -wise yearly Effect 
Sectors 
Steel Industry 
Minerals and 
Metals Industry 
Coal and Lignite 
Industry 
Power Industry 
Petroleum 
Industry 
Chemicals and 
Petrochemical 
Industry 
F-Ratio 
Before 
disinvestment 
1.036 
1.340 
2.098 
0.789 
5.897 
3.212 
F-Ratio 
After 
disinvestment 
0.237 
2.672 
3.098 
0.575 
0.238 
1.981 
Sig. Level 
0.238* 
0.916* 
0.560 
0.761* 
0.609* 
0.086* 
*Sectors, which have insignificant F ratios, 
Source: www.nse. india.com 
Table 6.15 shows the yearly effect of disinvestment on select sectors. This too does 
not show any significant change. The calculated values of 'F' are all below the table 
value and it shows that year wise also there was no effect on any of these sectors. 
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Table 6.17 
Pre and Post disinvestment sector-wise Monthly Effect 
Sectors 
Steel Industry 
Minerals and 
Metals Industry 
Coal and Lignite 
Industry 
Power Industry 
Petroleum 
Industry 
Chemicals and 
Petrochemical 
F-Ratio 
Before 
disinvestment 
0.092 
1.238 
1.903 
0.881 
1.349 
0.571 
F-Ratio 
After 
disinvestment 
1.239 
1.202 
9.318 
0.871 
0.601 
1.761 
Sig. Level 
0.091* 
0.323* 
0 
0.981* 
0.687* 
0.109* 
Source: -www, nse. india. com 
Table 6.17 illustrates the monthly effect on monthly basis. It is very clear that when on 
yearly basis disinvestment has shown insignificant results on equity infusion, there is no 
significant effect on monthly basis. 
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Table 6.18 
Year H^ ise Relative movement across all industries 
Years 
1991-2000 
2000-2001 
2001-2002 
2002-2003 
2003-2004 
2004-2005 
2005 - 2006 
2006-2007 
2007-2008 
Average 
F-Ratio before 
Disinvestment 
0.979 
1.608 
1.497 
1.508 
1.508 
3.175 
3.787 
8.811 
7.091 
2.859125 
F-Ratio after 
Disinvestment 
-
-
-
1.51 
0.918 
1.251 
1.426 
1.753 
1.349 
Sig. Level 
-
-
-
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Source: www, nse. india. com 
As shown in the above table 6.18, right from 1991-2000 to 2007 - 08, the calculated values 
in each year are far below the table values hence one can conclude that disinvestment did 
not yield the desired results. Unless the perception of government changes in the minds of 
investors things may perhaps not improve. 
Further analysis of this chapter has been provided in the next chapter. 
147-
Chapter - 7 
Conclusions and Suggestions 
Chapter - 7 
Conclusions and Suggestions 
As evident from the previous chapters, the disinvestment was half hearted exercise 
completely banking on its political ramifications. The economic consideration occupied 
back seat which resulted in a lot of chaos. The preceding chapter has conclusively proved 
the same with empirical evidence. Hence the following suggestions are offered to improve 
the impact of disinvestment of public sector enterprises. 
Mere disinvestment of PEs is not enough. Entire industries have to be restructured to 
ensure competitiveness. Even for natural monopolies, it will be necessary to introduce 
regulation and supervision to reproduce effective competition. Otherwise, privatised 
enterprises may not be able to reap substantial monopoly profits, leaving consumers, worse 
off Hence, improvements in efficiency do not follow from disinvestment per se, but, from 
the benefits that increased competition in the market place. 
An alternative is to allow foreign capital to bid when PEs are put up for sale. The foreign 
investors would be in a position to bring in additional technology or management skills. 
Foreign investment may partly ease the scarcity of foreign exchange. But, a possible area of 
concern could be the element of control exercised by foreign interests on important sectors 
of the economy. 
To remove the loss of revenue and the survival of uneconomic socially necessary services, 
special provisions have to be incorporated in various laws. 
When privatising the public sector, the decision makers should not commit the sins of 
disinvestment, such as confused objectives, lack of transparency in the privatization 
process and greater concentration of assets. Moreover, the financial strategy should be 
sound, it should not be based on an unrealistic labour strategy and be vehicle for bridging 
budgetary deficits. It should also be kept in mind that there is no political consensus on the 
move. 
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Disinvestment should not merely mean indiscriminate disinvestment, but efficiency and 
competitiveness in industry. The debate of disinvestment is not question of government or 
private control. It is essentially a question of competitiveness. It is a formidable task 
requiring shared political leadership and vision. 
Evidence suggests that efficiency gains that are needed for improving a country's fiscal 
condition will materialise only if disinvestment is accompanied by extensive industrial 
restructuring. This will be best served if the process is allowed to evolve in a phased 
marmer over a period of time. 
Keeping in view the above observations relating to the study, the following measures are 
suggested which would go a long way to improve the profitability of Indian Public Sector 
Enterprises. 
It is essential to have objective performance appraisal criteria far every public sector 
undertaking. For this purpose, the best way will be to introduce performance audit and 
revise the performance indicators. Commercial performance must take care of all the 
objectives and goals. For this purpose, a suitable system of financial and non-financial 
objectives must he developed. Policymaking should be based on realistic assessment of 
cost. According to present policies, if size aft economy grows, as grows the expenditure on 
public sector without adequate return an investment. Hence, the need for review aft the role 
of public enterprises in this regard is needed. 
In public sector there is invariably over run of cost and time. This over run makes the 
project partly sick at the inception itself Economy, efficiency and effectiveness in public 
sector enterprises are need of the hour to improve overall performance of the Indian 
economy. The incidence of project failure in public enterprises has got to be curtailed. 
For revamping the units, there is strong need to assign clear targets to ensure accountability 
of the management. Necessary budgetary support either equity are loan based should be 
provided. For each unit, physical and financial targets should be worked out, precisely 
spelling out how many financial resources are needed from the centre and from raising 
fimds fi-om the public and how much should be these fi-om internal generation of ftinds. 
Public barrowings may be suggested for short term and medium term financial 
requirements of the public enterprises. Also efforts should be made to increase net income 
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contribution of public sector corporations which is necessary to compete with private 
sector. 
The overstafifing and overhead personnel cost is a major reason of disappointing 
profitability of Public Sector Enterprises. Employment cost should be controlled through 
improvement in efficiency and productivity of employees. Extra staff should be diverted to 
other works. All out efforts should be made to tune up the efficiency and ensure 
effectiveness in this regard. On the pattern of All India services, a new cadre in the name of 
public sector services should be organized in which professional managers should be 
selected. Members of this service should be posted at the top level management of these 
corporations in place a bureaucrats. 
Audit has been playing an important part as an instrument of financial control in public 
sector undertakings. Reforms are also required in the existing pattern, system and method 
of audit. A change in the attitude of the audit control is also highly desirable. The auditors 
have to be trained especially for the purpose reviews of financial accounts and statements 
of these enterprises which have been established with different objectives and it must be 
seen that these aims are fulfilled to the best possible extent. More over, a system of 
efficiency audit is essential. The real need of the hour is efficiency, audit performance 
appraisal, management audit, achievement assessment in relation to public enterprises 
along with the built in system of reward cum punishment for managerial efficiency. It 
would be, of course a devisable for these charged with efficiency audit to be mere forward 
looking. There is a necessity of reorientation in the approach and efforts should be made to 
judge the management efficiency properly and far that there should be increased reliance 
upon the efficiency audit of these enterprises. 
The formation of holding companies, to improve financial performance, ensure public 
enterprises - Government interface, devote greater fxmctional autonomy to subsidiaries, 
formulate suitable operational policies and attempt greater flexibility in regard to pricing 
and investment are same measures suggested for efficient functioning of public enterprises. 
The financial information system, internal and external should be improved in order to 
strengthen decision making and the one hand and effective financial stability of the public 
enterprises on the other. 
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The Bureau of public enterprises should not only act as a clearinghouse of information and 
ideas relating to the public sector but also constitute a pool of experience which could be 
shared by various enterprises. It should help also the government in strengthening the 
working and performance of public sector enterprises. 
The management information system should be systematical in order to assist decision 
making on the one hand and effective control over the public sector undertakings on the 
other. 
The state govenmient may give a cash grant to those undertakings v^ h^ich have accumulated 
losses and which are likely to improve their profits prospects in future. The central 
government assist for some sort of cash grants say consessional tax, less power tariff etc to 
revamp the already loss making units. Another way of helping out the losing concerns is to 
reconstruct their capital structure, including writing off the capital to the extent of over 
capitalisation. 
Some of the public sector undertakings suffer from underutilisation of their capacities 
because of non-materialisation of expectations of demand. There should be a systematic 
and scientific market survey so as to assess the demand correctly before a project is 
conceived. 
Many of the public sector undertakings have been characterized by delay in 
commissioning of their prospects mainly because of govermnental delays in decision 
making. The Government should constitute a committee of secretaries of the concerned 
departments to expedite the setting up of projects in public sector, once they are planned 
and conceived by the government. 
A control mechanism, based on initial evaluation of expectation, is possibly best suited for 
public enterprises. The evaluation of these enterprises should be based on exclusively on 
financial targets. The methods of exercising accountability and control in public 
enterprises, currently used, are characterized by a plethora of control agencies. Operating 
without any real basis for either locating accountability or control has no meaning. The 
sine-qua for such control that is a set of clearly specified targets and objectives to be 
handed over to particular unit is absent. 
-151 
The public enterprises are having poor profitability owing to a variety of factors. One, 
major factor that has proved to be drag on the efficient ftinctioning of the public enterprises 
is the multi point interference in its day to day decision making. The idea of Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) represents a genuine desire to give autonomy to the public 
enterprises management. At the same time, they have to be made accountable for better 
management and efficient operations of the enterprise. The government should be primarily 
concerned with overall strategic planning and policy rather than day to day functioning of 
the enterprises. Its responsibility is to ensure that the public money invested in these 
enterprises earns an appropriate rate of return and that the functioning of these enterprises 
is consistent with plan objectives including these related to employment, fair pricing, 
regional dispersal, of industries and, efficient use of scarce resources. Once the goals have 
been mutually agreed to, an enterprise should be held strictly accountable for its 
performance in relation the goal set and there should be an appropriate mechanism for 
evaluation of performance. 
Spell out the mission of the enterprise, derive its broad objectives and obligations and 
delete objectives which will have to be evaluated with subjectivity. 
It is recommended for PSUs to specify objectives which are amenable for performance 
evaluation and identify possible performance parameters for each of the specific objectives. 
Checking the data availability on actual performance with regard to each of the possible 
performance parameter and specifying performance parameters and their quantifications is 
a must. 
Limitations 
No work is free from limitations and this research is no exception. Some of the limitations 
that the researcher could note are that a study of this kind naturally calls for divulging 
confidential information by companies which was very difficult to get. Therefore, the 
researcher relied only on secondary data sources which were available in public domain 
like prowess database and companies balance sheets. The personal views of experts in a 
formal manner could not be obtained though thesis covers them in many other forms. 
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Scope for Further Research 
Future researcher can be undertaken in the areas covering opinions of experts. An empirical 
study would also be a possibility. Many other ways of measuring performance of PSUs are 
available which too can be studied and the effect of PSUs on competition and their social 
aspect a also be studied. 
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